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## *Fiction of the Yen-an Period\**

By CYRIL BIRCH

DURING the Yen-an period the Chinese Communists built up a literature as they built up a party organisation and an army: as an instrument of policy, fashioned in accordance with Marxist principles. Like the organisation and like the army, the literature served the needs of the time. Plays, poems, stories, novels, ballads, *reportages* flowed in profusion from professional writers emerged from Kuomintang jails; from trainees of the Lu Hsiün Academy in Yen-an itself; from farmers and soldiers who after initial success were welcomed into the ranks of "art workers." These writings whipped up popular support for the new government and established flesh-and-blood examples of behaviour-patterns for the new society. More effectively than any textbook of theory, they gave instruction in practical Communism.

But of literature we demand more than the satisfaction of contemporary needs. We demand at once a monument to the age and a contribution to the record of human experience. It is from all these points of view that we now re-examine the outstanding works of fiction of the Yen-an period. We find them indeed to represent a monolithic body of writing, devoted to the interpretation of common themes in a common light. In style, although exceptions will be noted below, the general rule is anonymity. Yen-an fiction relates to the work of the individualists of the nineteen-twenties and thirties only by way of reaction. It bears practically no relation to the classical esoteric tradition of Chinese literature. To the popular tradition it is very deeply indebted, as we shall see, but not so much by direct inheritance as by raiding of the family vaults. And we may take 1949 as a closing date with as much justification for a literary as for a historical study. After that year new problems provide the novelist's raw material and his story opens with much less regularity in the "old society." After that year, also, the new writers are joined by many established writers (Mao Tun, Kuo Mo-jo, Pa Chin, Lao She) who during the Yen-an period followed their individual careers elsewhere. Much of their work at this time was of the first importance: Lao She produced his masterpiece

\* Yen-an in north-west China was the Chinese Communists' capital from early 1937 to early 1947. In this article, the term "Yen-an period" is used in a somewhat broader sense to cover the period from the arrival of the Communist armies in north-west China in 1935 after the Long March until the proclamation of the Communist People's Republic in 1949.

in *House of Four Generations*.<sup>1</sup> But it does not belong to the corpus which is the subject of the present discussion.

The task facing Communist writers during and just after the war was to create a body of literature which would interpret contemporary reality in terms of the Marxist world-outlook for the mass of "workers, peasants and soldiers"—which in the circumstances meant the peasants of one of the most culturally neglected areas of China. In the words of Chou Yang, chief expositor of Mao Tse-tung's pronouncements on literature: "The 'turning of the former culturally backward areas into centres of culture' does not at all mean packing the former culture of the big towns in boxes and carting it out intact to the villages: it means transforming the old culture which, relatively speaking, was suited only to the big towns and restricted to bourgeois circles, into a culture fitted to the vast countryside and to the wide field of the war."<sup>2</sup>

First and foremost, then, new writing must be of such form and style as would be acceptable to the peasant. Such form and style, in turn, could be mastered only by one whose association with the peasants was so close that he had learnt not to imitate peasant speech but actually to think and speak himself in their language: hence the need for the writer to live and work in the village, not to collect material but to transform his own outlook. He might find technical guidance in the best of the traditional popular literature; not so much emphasis was placed in these early years on the model of Soviet writing, which was only beginning to become available in translation.

The dominant themes for the first part of the period were dictated by the need to incite the peasants to struggle against the remnants of former authority and against the new menace of the Japanese: proper subjects, then, were the exposure of "feudal evils" and the eulogy of heroes of the resistance. Exposure of course had been a preoccupation of writers for decades past, but now a fundamental difference appears. Stories of the twenties and thirties were now regarded as mere negative outbursts of indignation or satire whose outcome was to stress the isolation of the individual author from the society he lived in. In the new stories, the evils themselves and their perpetrators were to be shown up as isolated from the true life of the masses; the author indeed integrates himself to such good purpose that he becomes anonymous, obliterated by socialist objectivity. The happy ending is more than justified, it is morally obligatory. Most obviously is this the case in the treatment of the theme of war. Whether in the stories of the Japanese War, or of the Civil War, or even after 1950 of the Korean

<sup>1</sup> *Ssu-shih t'ung-t'ang*, in three volumes, published between 1946 and 1949.

<sup>2</sup> *Piao-hsien hsin-ti ch'ün-chung-ti shih-tai* (Peking: Hsin-hua Book Co., 1949), p. 16. Passage quoted was written in 1942. Chou's quotation of Mao Tse-tung is from the essay "On Protracted War."

War again, we should look in vain for any expression of revulsion from the horror and futility of war, for anything indeed but intense patriotic fervour.

Later in the Yen-an period, "the theme of all themes is the theme of production. . . . We must not only create large quantities of spiritual food suited to the great masses of workers, peasants and soldiers; we must also make sure that all the works of literature brought forth have as their great aim the reflection of the richness of the struggle for production, that they describe and comprehend the heroic spirit in which the business of restoring and developing production is being carried on."<sup>3</sup> In practice, the "struggle for production" in the years before 1949 meant the reorganisation of agriculture by dispossession of the landlords and redistribution of land. The land reform in one part of China after another is mirrored in scores of stories and novels which inevitably bear strong family likenesses. Industrial development is reflected only in a very small proportion of writings, of which Tsao Ming's *Energy*<sup>4</sup> is outstanding.

From the mass of writing which drew its material from the war against the Japanese two novels stand out, both the work of young "new" writers, both published towards the end of the Yen-an period. The first of these was given by its authors, K'ung Ch'ieh and his wife Yüan Ching, a title which not only recalls a popular novel of the past but clearly indicates the new work's overall intention. The novel under recall is the *Son and Daughter Heroes*.<sup>5</sup> The author of this book, a Manchu nobleman named Wen K'ang, attempted to personify in one and the same set of fictional characters two different concepts: the concept of filial piety, cardinal virtue of Confucian teaching, and the concept of heroic behaviour which inspires the great Ming works of fiction. He therefore dreamed up a figure of fantasy, a girl called Ho Yü-feng, "Thirteenth Sister," who was brought up as a boy rather than as a girl and delighted in the practice of the military arts. Subsequently this girl makes good use of her prodigious strength and skill at arms to follow a career of Robin Hood-type banditry while awaiting an opportunity to avenge her father, murdered by an unjust official. She becomes involved in the adventures of the An family, a model family embodying all the ideals of the Confucian ethic; eventually, she marries into the family, and changes almost overnight from fearless girl-bandit to dutiful

<sup>3</sup> Chou Erh-fu, *Hsin-ti ch'i-tien* (Shanghai: Ch'ün-chung Press, 1949), p. 18.

<sup>4</sup> *Yüan-tung-li* (Peking: Hsin-hua Book Co., 1949). (Text dated June 1948, Harbin.) English translation by Foreign Languages Press, Peking, under the title of *Prime Moving Force*. Most of the works cited in the present essay have been published by the Foreign Languages Press in English translations which are generally complete and accurate, if rather utilitarian in style (the fault to be traced to a mixture of idioms, as though the Dead End Kids were to play *Love on the Dole*).

<sup>5</sup> *Erh-nü ying-hsiung chuan*, in 41 chapters, first printed in 1878.



wife and daughter. The author works hard to explain this development of character, which illustrates his central thesis that the hero and the dutiful child are moved by the same impulse; but he never succeeds in persuading us that the Ho Yü-feng of the second part of his story is the same person as the Ho Yü-feng of the first part, or indeed that any of his major personages are credible human beings.

Under their title of *New "Son and Daughter Heroes"*<sup>6</sup> K'ung Chüeh and Yüan Ching seek to emend Wen K'ang's thesis. The springs of heroism, they are at pains to show us, are to be located not in the old moral pattern but in the new, not in filial piety but in Communist patriotism. This is the real significance of the "New" of their title. It must be conceded at once that they are far more successful in the integration of moral with story, that is to say in this case in the development of character through action. They present a chronicle of the eight years' war against Japan as it affected a small group of peasants living on the shores of Lake Pai-yang in Hopei province. The scale of action expands to offer an image of growing Communist military effort against the Japanese. After the flight of Kuomintang troops (who, of course, pause only long enough to pick up a little loot) and the arrival of the Japanese enemy, resistance begins on the smallest possible scale with the collection of ex-Kuomintang stores of hand-grenades and their storage under the floors of peasant homes. Gradually resistance is organised and grows in scale, the village militia attack steamers on the lake, survive extermination campaigns, capture forts, until in the last stages they join with regular units of the Red Army itself in all-out attacks on enemy-held walled town and city.

Operations form the successive climactic crests of the story. Chapters are headed chronologically, and most have a brief introductory orientation to the new strategic phase. The deliberate effect is to reduce the protagonists of the action to the stature of representatives rather than to allow them to dominate the story by presenting their personal development as an end in itself.

These characters of the novel are not of course Communists to begin with; if they were there would be too little scope for growth. On the contrary, emphasis at the beginning is all on their ignorance, timidity and resistance to new ideas. Ta-shui, the central figure and principal exemplar of the didactic thesis, is at the opening of the story "more concerned about his marriage than about the news that the Japanese were advancing." Asked later if he approves of Communism, he replies, "I don't know. What if they communise my land? I've only got less than an acre." Even after joining the Party, he attends a cadre course

<sup>6</sup> *Hsin Erh-nü ying hsiung chuan* (Shanghai: Hai-yen Book Co., 1949).

and "sat up front, straining his ears to everything that was said. But what was meant by 'the present circumstances,' or 'united front,' or 'guerrilla tactics,' he had no idea." He remains essentially a peasant: after years as a militia leader, the sight of a big yellow ox fills him with admiration for its draught powers. He makes his mistakes: on their first assignment the militiamen in his charge succeed in the dark in finding no other target than their comrades.

But gradually, through their experience in action and under the guidance (not too obtrusive) of Communist veterans, Ta-shui and his friends assume the ideal *kanpu* behaviour-pattern. They remain frugal, self-reliant, ready to improvise; they become resourceful, self-sacrificing and supremely brave. The source of their strength is mass support: "the enemy constantly pressed the peasants into labour battalions to rebuild the ruined strongholds; but the people and the Eighth Route Army were of one mind. Somehow the repairs were never finished, for what the peasants were forced to build during the day they demolished at night." Gratitude for this support gives the *kanpu* a deep sense of responsibility to the masses. Thus Ta-shui, leaving on a dangerous mission: "'I'll show that the people's food I've been eating these past few years hasn't been given to me in vain!'"

Ta-shui's sweetheart, Hsiao-mei, undergoes a comparable transformation from self-effacing peasant girl to ardent revolutionary cadre. Their relationship (they are the only lovers in the book) is extremely chaste. They "haven't even held hands" until their marriage, late in the story, a marriage which appears to take place in response to the demands of their comrades rather than of their own volition. Again a standard is set for *kanpu* behaviour, a model of the subjugation of the sex-life to service of the people. "Love has retired to a position in life of no importance; the new works have themes a thousand times more important, more significant than love."<sup>7</sup> But this is not the only value the authors derive from Ta-shui's relationship with Hsiao-mei. The theme of marriage serves further to organise the pattern of action. In all, four weddings occur, each symbolic of the conditions of its phase of the war. First, the old régime still unbroken, comes the arranged marriage of Hsiao-mei, against her will, to the future traitor Chin-lung. In the next stage, under Japanese domination, Ta-shui rides to wed a peasant-girl, Hua-erh, but finds her village under enemy attack: Hua-erh is raped, and commits suicide. Later comes the counter-attack. The local Japanese commander attempts to force Hsiao-mei (now divorced) to marry him but is foiled, and killed, by a classic stratagem (*hao chí*) mounted by the militia: Ta-shui's younger brother poses veiled as the

<sup>7</sup> Chou Yang, *op. cit.* p. 67.

bride and shoots the lustful groom on the wedding-night. The fourth and last wedding, of Ta-shui and Hsiao-mei, is the first genuine love-match: the war is not yet over, but already the supremacy of the people is established.

The supremacy of the people: of the Communist-led peasants, that is to say. Certainly there are few indications that any other section of the community is likely to be accepted into this supremacy. The rank-and-file of those who have collaborated as puppets of the Japanese may, it is true, be welcomed back after their surrender. This is no more than the grace apparently accorded to the Japanese themselves. In their case the distinction is drawn between leaders and led: "The Chinese and Japanese people should unite to destroy Japanese imperialism," Chang explained. The prisoners nodded their heads. Yoneda said he would like to join the Japanese Anti-War League in the liberated area. Most of the other captives expressed the same wish." The leaders, on the other hand, emerge as vicious, stupid and cowardly without exception. But the Chinese puppets, at least all those who are individually named, are if anything worse. They, not the Japanese, are the plunderers and torturers. They are constant only in treacherousness, and there is none, however many opportunities to reform he is given, but comes to a bad end. As for the Nationalists, who do not appear in person, by repute they hardly differ from the puppets: "General Kamesaka spoke expansively about 'Sino-Japanese co-operation' and of what a fine man Wang Ching-wei was. He said Chiang Kai-shek wasn't bad, either, that behind his back he was offering the Imperial Army his hand."

Much the same propaganda lessons are given by the other outstanding war novel, *The Heroes of Lü-liang*,<sup>8</sup> although here the Japanese figure more prominently as targets for militia bullets. In its literary provenance, however, this is a very different kind of book. Jaroslav Prusek<sup>9</sup> rightly draws between this and the work previously discussed the distinction made traditionally between the picaresque cycle represented by the *Shui-hu-chuan* and the fictional chronicle of the *Three Kingdoms* type. *The Heroes of Lü-liang*, again the joint work of young writers, Ma Feng and Hsi Jung, reproduces the traditional form of the cyclical novel. Of its 100 chapters, many comprise more or less detachable episodes and end at some climactic stage of the action (the stage, that is, where the story-teller of former days would collect contributions before continuing). Overall construction, so skilfully organised in the *New "Son and Daughter Heroes,"* is relatively negligible here; unity is given by the physical setting in the hills of Shansi province and by the attribution of the deeds narrated to the militiamen of a single village. Again rightly,

<sup>8</sup> *Lü-liang ying-hsiung chuan*, 2 vols. (Peking: Hsin-hua Book Co., 1949).

<sup>9</sup> *Die Literatur des Befreiten China und ihre Volkstraditionen* (Artia-Prag, 1955), p. 210.

Prusek expresses his admiration of the authors' skill in linking disparate incidents of war, which must have been retailed to them from many parts of North China, into one cycle of adventures set in a single village.

The episodes themselves re-create many of the values of the tales of the *Shui-hu* kind. The following brief incident must serve to illustrate their blend of racy incident and gay hyperbole:

"Chao Te-sheng and two other militiamen were lying hidden in the long grass when old Chou crawled in as well and said, 'The enemy have come down to get water!' Chao Te-sheng stuck his head up to take a look. All was quiet in the hollow, the water of the stream gurgled on. But then when he looked at the slope opposite, there were eight or nine of the enemy scrambling up it. So the enemy had already got their water! Three of the puppet troops were in front carrying buckets on poles, five Japs armed with rifles guarded them in the rear, and soon they would have reached the top. Chao Te-sheng hurriedly raised his rifle, drew a bead on the foremost water-carrier, and fired several shots rapid. He had put a couple of holes in the left-hand bucket and the water came spurting out. In a split second the left-hand bucket was empty and the carrying-pole, with no weight at that end to balance it, flew up in the air. The puppet carrying the water failed to steady it and dropped the right-hand bucket on the ground, where the water out of it went flowing merrily down the path. The second carrier went head-over-heels on the path made slippery by the water, and lost his whole load as well. Fearing that the third carrier would go with them the Jap escort behind him grabbed hold of his buckets themselves and pelted off uphill. The militiamen quickly opened fire before the enemy in the fort, occupied in sweeping the hill-top opposite with machine-gun fire, had realised that there was anybody half-way up. As a result they lost one of the Japs carrying a bucket. The rest of the enemy just managed to scuttle back into the fort with the one bucket of water they had left."

All is enriched by the flavour of the style itself, a re-creation rather than a mere pastiche of the old colloquial with its brusque pace and its wealth of picturesque saws and similes.

Past this formal differentiation between the two works it is possible to see further a distinction in total intention. *The Heroes of Lü-liang* is very clearly for mass-consumption, new wine in an old and well-loved bottle. It is an obvious choice for reading aloud, and it has indeed been immensely popular. The ideal public for the *New "Son and Daughter Heroes,"* on the other hand, would be the young cadres themselves, seeking guidance, readier to welcome a more sophisticated story redolent of European or Soviet Russian rather than of traditional Chinese fiction. In the Yen-an period there was no overt acknowledgment of the special cultural needs of the *kanpu*. It was stressed that works of mass appeal were to be preferred to deliberate masterpieces of higher literary quality. *New "Son and Daughter Heroes,"* in its construction, is perhaps as near

as the writers of the time came to the achievement of independent literary excellence.

This is not the place to enter into analysis of the true nature and significance of the land reform movement, which from the old Liberated Areas was extended first to Manchuria and then, in the wake of the victorious Communist armies, throughout North China, changing the face of an entire countryside in the years before 1949. It is enough to remind ourselves that this was infinitely more than a matter of refashioning the organisation of agriculture. Just as the resistance and guerrilla war against the Japanese, however exaggerated in its scope, had been the means of instilling patriotic loyalty into the peasants and of identifying the Communist Party as their leader against the national enemy, so the land reform was the means of instilling political consciousness and enforcing participation in the Party's crusade against the class enemy. The great outcome was not that the peasant received his patch of land: he was not in any case to enjoy the thrill of possession for very long. The real and astonishing achievement was that he was goaded into attending political meetings, into believing that he was being guided, not directed, by the Communist Party to a position of control over his own destiny.

No writer following the directive to write about the peasants for the peasants could ignore the land reform theme. And indeed it gave scope enough for creative fiction. "Character," as Henry James said, "is interesting as it comes out"; in the land reform stories, the peasants might "come out" from despairing absorption in their own poverty to self-possession as members of a new society, the Communist cadres from textbook theorists to practical administrators, the landlords themselves from positions of leadership (feared by the masses, respected only by the misled) to exposure as corrupt and corrupting parasites. The pattern of action which permitted this unfolding was ready-made: initial rousing of the poor peasants to attack the landlord and confiscate his property; more or less cunning use by the landlord of reactionary elements in the village to hoodwink the inexperienced cadres, thwart the "turn about" and retain his own power; eventual exposure of his stratagems and solution of the situation by progressive villagers, aided by more experienced cadres.

*Lao Chao Goes Down to the Village*<sup>10</sup> is a land reform story no better and no worse than dozens of its type. Lao Chao is a member of a *hsien* agricultural committee. He is sent to a village to speed-up the wheat-sowing: the time is autumn, 1943, in the Border Areas, the Japanese have just left after a brief occupation of the district,

<sup>10</sup> Yü Lin, *Lao Chao hsia-hsiang*, published under this title together with the story *Shuai Lung-wang* (see below, note 18) (Hsin min-chu Press, 1949).

and the overdue sowing must be done. Chao finds the people apathetic, backward, quarrelling among themselves over the redistribution of goods recovered from the enemy. He roots around and finds out the truth: the local landowner has the weak village headman in his pocket after a shady land-deal, and is running things his own way; rent-reduction has been merely nominal, and the local authorities are being hoodwinked. Chao calls meetings and thrashes the matter out, the landlord is caught shifting his secret hoard of wealth, the headman publicly confesses his misdeeds, new officers are appointed and Chao leaves in a rosy glow.

Of two very lengthy novels of the land reform, both of which were awarded Stalin Prizes, the first, *The Hurricane*,<sup>11</sup> invests the *Lao Chao* pattern with a wealth of naturalistic detail. The author's notebooks must have bulged with data of crops, livestock, rent and interest rates and methods of repairing a *k'ang*. Unfortunately, not all the detail in the world can bring to life a dead story. No matter how many times Mrs. Pai knits her "beautiful black eyebrows," no matter how often old Sun the carter says "I am fifty-one this year, and I shall be fifty-two next year," they remain unreal, and the microscopic investigation of their poverty holds only a documentary interest. The shrill clamour of indignation is too persistent: are we really to believe literally in the wife who is too poor to own clothes, so that she can work in the fields only when the grain is tall enough to hide her nakedness?

In total contrast is the prize-winning novel of Ting Ling, who began her writing career in the late twenties with romantic confessions of the Alfred de Musset kind but turned swiftly to the wider social scene. *On the River Sang-kan*<sup>12</sup> has no central figure, but skilfully varies its focus among a group of representative types. No one receives undue attention, no one is left without an "exit from the stage." The types themselves are well-chosen and well-depicted, and most become satisfyingly real. Ting Ling's landlord is at least cunning in his wickedness; her "experienced *kanpu*" avoids priggishness and has fortunately little part to play. Ku Yung is interesting, a middle peasant afraid of "communisation," but finally won over to the new society by the generous treatment he receives as one who has won his property with the sweat of his own brow. And there is an effective twist in the choice of heroine in Hei-ni, orphan niece of the landlord, brought up by him and used as bait for the *kanpu* but successful at last in freeing herself from this corrupting

<sup>11</sup> Chou Li-po, *Pao-feng tsou-yü* (Peking: Hsin-hua Book Co., 1949). Chou Li-po was the translator into Chinese of Sholokhov's *Virgin Soil Upturned*. From the latter work Chou Li-po borrows the general theme of the attack on the kulaks, and even individual incidents and characters (compare, e.g., the attack by the kulak's watchdog on old Shchukar in Chap. 8 of Sholokhov's novel with that on old Sun in Part Two, section vi of *Pao-feng tsou-yü*). But Chou Li-po's peasants are idealised, anaemic figures in comparison; nowhere does he achieve the strong realism of his model.

<sup>12</sup> *T'ai-yang chao tsai Sang-kan ho-shang* (Peking: Hsin-hua Book Co., 1949).



association. Where Chou Li-po's *Hurricane* piles up trivialities, Ting Ling makes an intelligent choice of incident, skilfully blends dramatic and narrative methods and offers evocative scenic description (of which she has mastery), humour and warm human sympathy.

Chao Shu-li, the most widely-acclaimed new fiction writer of the Yen'an period, again used the land reform theme,<sup>13</sup> but ranged also more widely over peasant life as a whole. His first great success was with his short story *Blackie Gets Married*,<sup>14</sup> published in 1943, which celebrates the successful courtship of a charming young peasant couple. The opposition to their marriage, the representation that is to say of the old restrictive family system, is provided by a pair of splendid rogues, Auntie Three the Witch and Blackie's father Chu-ko Liang the Second. (From his own peasant background Chao Shu-li derives one precious boon—that earthy sense of fun so lamentably absent from the work of writers who are hell-bent on divesting themselves of their "petty-bourgeois mentality.") A further theme exploited by Chao Shu-li is the inevitable conflict between traditionally-minded mother and emancipated daughter. *The Heirloom*<sup>15</sup> is a sensitive, sympathetic study of this problem.

Even Chao Shu-li, during the period under consideration, is given mostly to exposure of the dark truths of the "old society." Of course, every work will end in joyful celebration of the defeat of the class enemy; but few stories and no full-length novels before 1949 extol exclusively the brave new world of socialism. One charming example of these few is the story, *The Sale of a Hen*.<sup>16</sup> Here, the goods on sale in the market are "more than in previous years," the peasants having "turned about" can buy "so much more than before." The gay Kai-kai can cheek her elders with impunity and, blushes notwithstanding, can make her own proposal to the boy of her choice. The go-between is still brought in as a formality, but her position is that of "ears on a deaf-mute—just there for ornament."

Ts'ao Ming's novel *Energy* is a good way from being a eulogy of the new society. It is an example, very rare for its period, of the writing for the industrial worker which was to receive more and more emphasis in subsequent years. The theme is the rehabilitation of a Manchurian power-station by the workers under *kanpu* guidance. There are some well-drawn portraits of workers, almost the first to appear in Chinese

<sup>13</sup> In *Li Yu-ts'ai pan-hua* (Peking: Hsin hua Book Co., 1949), *Li-chia-chuang-ti pien-ch'len* (ditto), etc.

<sup>14</sup> *Hsiao Erh-hel chieh-hun*, reprinted together with *Li Yu-ts'ai pan-hua* (see previous note).

<sup>15</sup> *Ch'uan-chia-pao*, dated April 1949, reprinted in *Chao Shu-li hsüan-chi*, Kai-ming Selections Series, 1951.

<sup>16</sup> Shu Wei, *Mai chi*, dated 1948, in collection *I-ko nü-jen fan-shen-ti ku-shih* (Peking: Hsin-hua Book Co., 1949). See p. 12 of this issue.



literature; but the principal interest lies in the author's success in establishing the power-station itself as the "central figure" of the book, in its effect on the hearts and minds of all who live by it now that it is "their property."

Other themes treated in short stories that stand out from the mass of Yen'an fiction include the rent reduction movement, predecessor to the land reform proper and subject of a careful study by Wang Li in his story *Fine Day*.<sup>17</sup> The attack on superstition is conducted in lively fashion by Wang T'ieh in *The Smashing of the Dragon-king*<sup>18</sup>; Inky-nob the sorceress and her partner in humbug, Mr. Zodiac Mah, exceed in picturesqueness even the characters of Chao Shu-li. K'o Lan's *The Crow Lays Complaint*<sup>19</sup> is an unexpected and interesting murder-story in which mass action assists in exposing the criminals. And to return finally to the Japanese war, again as in the *Heroes of Lü-liang* both the techniques and values of the old heroic fiction are recalled by Shao Tzu-nan in such stories as *Minefield*.<sup>20</sup> Li Yung here is a hero on the grandest scale: thus, helping the villagers to flee as the Japanese approach, he yells, "To the hills, to the hills! I'm with you!"

Events bear eloquent testimony to the success of the Yen'an writers in fulfilling their propaganda commitments. They laid a sound enough foundation for a literature of social realism, even though since their day no more than a flimsy hut has yet been erected on the site. Into Chinese literature they brought one thing new. Writing for an audience of a size hitherto undreamed-of, they led the peasant from his place in the wings, where he waited to perform briefly as buffoon or potential bandit, to the centre of the stage as a dramatic figure in his own right. The Communist régime had not yet darkened beneath the shadow of totalitarian power, and through some Yen'an fiction shines a vision of a new China, impressive in its sincerity. If such a vision inspires no great dramatic moments, at least it offers us a sparkling mediocrity. Much more extensive, of course, is the hack-writing which depicts a black-and-white world frightening in its unreality, a world where love and friendship are meaningless, where every landlord is a monster, every cadre a saint and no poor peasant prefers life to social justice. This is sickly, dogmatic nonsense which is happily now forgotten. And the sacrifices made even by the masters—of independence, of subtlety, of that nine-tenths of the writer's scope which lies outside the political life—expose the poverty of nationalistic Communism as a literary creed

<sup>17</sup> *Ch'ing-t'ien*, title-story of collection. (Hsin min-chu Press, 1949.) (Story dated May 1944, Shantung.)

<sup>18</sup> *Shuai Lung-wang*, see above, n. 10.

<sup>19</sup> *Wu-ya kao chuang*, in collection *I-ko nü-jen fan-shan-ti ku-shih*, see above, n. 16.

<sup>20</sup> *Ti-lei-chen*, title-story of collection. (Peking: Hsin-hua Book Co., 1949.)

## *The Sale of a Hen\**

By SHU WEI

(Translated by Cyril Birch)

A YOUNG girl was walking along the road to Hung-wu-chen, the road which led to market. You would say she was about seventeen or eighteen, and clasped in her arms she carried a white hen. Trotting by her side was a little girl of seven or eight who had come along to buy some little cakes and see what was going on. They were sisters, and their names were Kai-kai and Eh-eh. The sisters talked as they went.

"How much are you going to ask for our white hen?" asked little sister.

"Mummy said we have to find out what the market prices are when we get there," replied big sister.

"You must buy me some cakes when you've sold her!" little sister went on.

"Didn't Mummy give you some money?" asked big sister. "And how do we know we'll be able to sell our hen anyway?"

So the two sisters went on, and before they noticed how far they had come they reached the first houses of Hung-wu-chen. Already the village was filling up with people come to market. The girls were looking for a place to sit down and rest when an ear-splitting clamour broke out from gongs and drums and pipes. Excitedly they hurried across to see, and before long four men appeared carrying a gaily-decorated red sedan-chair, passing straight in front of Kai-kai on their way out of the village. When they had passed, Eh-eh came running up to her sister and said, pointing and gesticulating, "Doesn't it frighten you? A girl being married and she's so tiny!" Her eyes grew round as she spoke, and the look on her face was pitiful to see. She went on, the words tumbling out: "She wouldn't get into the chair, and so a man came and carried her out and stuck her inside it. I heard her crying, too!"

Kai-kai had felt a sudden jump of fright, and then calmed down again. She was thinking how, if she hadn't had that row with her mother and broken off her engagement, she might be just like that girl being married off, with somebody forcing her into the sedan-chair, and then her eyes and nose never dry from weeping for the rest of her life.

She belonged to the Po family, who had "turned about" in the land reform just completed. They had been very poor, keeping alive somehow off the bit of land they rented. Every member of the family worked hard year in year out, but they seldom had enough food to eat or clothes to wear. Because of this Kai-kai's mother had sold her when she was ten to a merchant twenty years older than herself, for a marriage-price of fifty silver dollars. The man had sent several times to urge them to fix the date of the wedding, and it was only because Kai-kai was set against it and had tried to hang herself that the wedding had not yet taken place. Then just recently Kai-kai had proposed cancelling the marriage-contract. She had argued

\* This story is discussed in Prof. Birch's article on p. 10 of this issue.

at great length for this and couldn't be dissuaded, and her mother had grown very angry. But her mother was after all fond of her, and at last she had given in to Kai-kai's wishes and sent back the fifty dollars marriage-price. At first when her mother wouldn't agree, Kai-kai had flared up in a rage: "You talk all the time about your 'own dear daughter,' and now you're trying to push me over a cliff! Why do you want to sell me as if I was a donkey? Whatever you say, I'm not going. You've taken his money—you go and live with him. If you try any more to browbeat me into marrying, we'll go and argue it out before a meeting, and if you won't do that I'll kill myself and that'll show you."

Kai-kai was a determined young woman, and in the end her mother had no alternative: "If you want to find yourself a blind man or a deaf mute, well it's up to you. It's a changed world we're living in, parents have no control over their children any longer. I suppose even the little one will be off on her own when she's a bit bigger. I've done enough worrying about you both."

So Kai-kai had struggled out of the sea of suffering, and when she saw the girl weeping in the sedan-chair she couldn't help smiling somewhere deep inside.

Everyone had some little secret or other, and Kai-kai was a girl with a secret. She had already found herself a boy-friend. This young man was a committee-member in Liu-chia-kou, and his name was Liu Tsai-sheng. His family were poor peasants, but he was a smart lad. It was because his family was so poor that he had got to the age of twenty-three without anyone seeking him in marriage. Kai-kai had come to know Liu Tsai-sheng during the time of the land reform in the previous winter. He had been to a number of meetings in her village, and they had talked to each other a few times at one side. No one was quite clear exactly what they had talked about, but somehow or other it got about that they made a good pair, and that Kai-kai was making a tobacco-pouch for the lad. But Kai-kai had not yet broken free from her luckless marriage-contract, and the two of them were filled with anxiety; nor could there be any mention of engagement or marriage between them. Right up to this time, it was still a case of

Mist comes up the mountain as the clouds roll away,  
Two in a quandary, don't know what to say!

And now that Kai-kai had broken off her marriage-agreement, she heard that someone had been making an offer of marriage to Liu Tsai-sheng, so that this time she was really alarmed. Until she saw him she could say nothing and had no call to interfere, so she picked up her hen and went off to market. It was not, of course, the idea of selling the hen that prompted her. That was purely for the look of things—if anyone asked, it would save her a good deal of embarrassment to tell them she had a hen for sale.

Suddenly, as the two sisters were sitting resting at the entrance to the village, someone behind them asked, "Which village are these girls from?"

Turning round they saw an old woman standing there. She did not wait for a reply, but went on, "Is this hen of yours for sale?"

"Yes," said Kai-kai.

The old woman stretched out her hand: "Let's have a feel at it, to see whether it'll lay."

Eh-eh butted in, "She loves laying! One day, she's very conscientious."

The old woman prodded and felt, and the white hen gave several loud

clucks. The woman seemed quite satisfied and asked how much they wanted. Kai-kai hesitated for a second, calculating, then came straight out with eighty thousand. Hearing this price the old woman said with a frown, "Ai-ya-ya! You go and ask anywhere in the market if there's a hen priced at eighty thousand! I can see you've not been to market very often. Eighty thousand—you could buy a phoenix for that! You might get thirty thousand for it."

They haggled a little, and then the old woman, who had obviously taken a fancy to the hen, offered forty thousand. But Kai-kai stuck to eighty thousand and would sell for no less. They went on haggling for a while but without settling anything, and finally the sisters picked up their hen again and moved on. "It's a fine hen," the old woman was thinking as she walked away, "but what a price!"

The two sisters strolled about the market-place for some time. Kai-kai was busy looking about her in every direction, so much so that she forgot she was supposed to be selling a hen, and one old fellow spoke to her several times without making himself heard. In the end he stepped right up to her and shouted, "Is this hen of yours for sale?"

Kai-kai brought her attention to bear on him as he went on to explain, "My old woman keeps on at me all day long to buy a hen." As he spoke he was having a good look at the hen, and then he asked how much it was. Again Kai-kai asked eighty thousand.

The old fellow's eyes widened: "Eh? Eighty thousand for a hen? You could buy a sheep for eighty thousand."

"Go and buy a sheep then," said Kai-kai. "I'm not selling this hen for less than eighty thousand."

"You could get thirty thousand for it," said the old man. "Any more than that and you'll have to take it home again." But he could see that Kai-kai wasn't going to sell, and that was all there was to it.

It was the eighth month, only a few days till the Mid-Autumn Festival and a few days more till the autumn harvest. There were melons and pears and peaches for sale in the market, and the rich "moon-cakes," round like a pie, with a whole egg in the middle, specially made for the Festival; and besides these things there were tools and equipment for the harvesting, more than in previous years. The men who sold these things were very clever at knowing what the people wanted, and now that the peasants had "turned about" they were able to buy so much more than before. Because of this the market was unusually crowded. Kai-kai took Eh-eh right through the market and back, twice. There were enough people there, but none of them was Liu Tsai-sheng, and she was beginning to grow a little anxious. And who would have guessed there were so many people would want to buy a hen! Every three or four yards there was someone asking about it. At first Kai-kai got rid of prospective buyers by sticking to her price of eighty thousand, but then she got tired of this, and when anyone asked she would say, "I'm not trying to sell this hen, I've just bought it."

The street was very narrow to start with, and what with little stalls of every description set up on either side, everyone kept bumping into everyone else all the time. The sisters grew tired of walking and began to look for a shady tree where they could rest for a while. Suddenly a young man walked past them. Kai-kai turned round. She could only see his back. Dizzy and breathless she hurried after him, but when she caught up she found she had got the wrong man. Nothing for it but to walk on.

## THE SALE OF A HEN

The sisters bought some apples and sat down to rest on a boulder at the foot of a wall. They chatted as they ate their apples.

Eh-eh began to think about the hen her sister was supposed to be selling. "Why won't you sell it?" she asked.

Eh-eh's question took Kai-kai unawares, for a moment she could find nothing to say, and then when she raised her head again—ai-ya! here he was!

Liu Tsai-sheng came hurrying by. Just as he was getting near, Kai-kai gave a little cough, not too loud, not too soft, and the sound of the cough drew the youth over to her. Kai-kai fished out some coppers and sent Eh-eh off to buy some little cakes. Those eyes of Kai-kai's had never been as useful as they were that day. "Light of my life," they were saying to Liu Tsai-sheng, "why have you been so long? I've been waiting all morning for you! That's just what I'm doing now—waiting for you!"

But how could two young people, a boy and a girl, talk to each other in a crowded place like this? If they went outside the village they would be able to talk away to their hearts' desire, but just think what the gossips would make of it! But necessity is the mother of invention, and even in this busy market-place they could find a way to say what they had to say. Kai-kai's eyes were fixed on Liu Tsai-sheng as he approached. He was glancing all about him, and it seemed as though all the people hurrying by were watching just the two of them. Kai-kai's heart was pounding, her eyes on Liu Tsai-sheng, for a while she had nothing to say, but then she began with the hen.

"Do you want to buy a hen?" she asked in a loud voice, adding in a whisper, "Come a little nearer, I've something to tell you."

Liu Tsai-sheng came nearer, and asked out loud, "Is this hen of yours for sale?"

"It is," said Kai-kai out loud, then softly asked: "Why have you been so long?"

"Is she old enough to lay?" asked Liu Tsai-sheng out loud; then in a low voice: "I'm off to the war in three or four days!"

"She's laying all the time now," said Kai-kai out loud, and then, softly: "They tell me you're looking for a wife! I've broken off that marriage-agreement of mine."

"There's nothing settled yet," said Lui Tsai-sheng, and then asked in a loud voice: "How much do you want for this hen?"

"Eighty thousand," said Kai-kai out loud. Then plucking up courage she looked all round. None of the people passing seemed to be taking any interest in them, and so they began to talk a little less timidly, but still with caution.

"Now that I've broken that agreement, I'm waiting for you," said Kai-kai. As soon as she had said it she blushed for shame, as red as the apples lying beside her on the boulder. Yet she went on, "Go back and find a go-between!"

Liu Tsai-sheng gave a grunt of delight, but he said, "I'm off to the front now, there's no time, wait till I get back."

"What do you mean, 'no time'?" asked Kai-kai. "Didn't you say it's three or four days before you have to go? What's the difficulty? Once you find a go-between we can do it in a day, we can get engaged now and be married when you come back."

Liu Tsai-sheng hadn't the least objection and straight away promised to send a go-between over the very next day.

Kai-kai was just about to ask something else but Liu Tsai-sheng said, "I've got here late today, I must be off to find a blacksmith to sharpen my bayonet for me."

"Have you any money to take with you when you go?" asked Kai-kai. "Take this hen now and sell it, so you'll have something to spend on the way." And she put the hen into Liu Tsai-sheng's arms, where it clucked loudly several times as if delighted with the arrangement. Liu Tsai-sheng had brought twenty thousand dollars with him, which he pulled out to give to Kai-kai, but Kai-kai flatly refused to take them. So the lad said in a deliberately loud voice, "It's enough if you get twenty thousand for it!"

Kai-kai could do nothing but take the money in her hand. Her eyes watched Liu Tsai-sheng as he walked off, but suddenly she caught sight of the old fellow and the old woman who had just been trying to buy the hen, standing there flailing their arms about in indignation, lost for words.

Eh-eh came back with her little cakes, and the two of them got up and moved off. As they reached the edge of the village the old fellow and the old woman came walking up to them.

"You've got a funny way of selling things!" said the old fellow. "You won't sell for thirty thousand, but you'll sell for twenty!"

"You offered her thirty thousand, and that's bad enough," said the old woman, "but what about me? I offered her forty thousand and she still wouldn't sell it! And then along comes that lad, pulls out twenty thousand and walks off with it!"

Kai-kai didn't want to argue with them, but they grew ruder and ruder and in the end she couldn't help putting in a word: "Who says it was twenty thousand? I got eighty thousand for it!"

"I asked the lad himself," said the old woman, "and he said he bought it for twenty thousand. I saw you when you were bargaining there."

Kai-kai realised she would never be able to explain to these two old fatheads, the best thing to do was to be off. So she said with an air of indifference, "The hen was mine, I could please myself whom I sold it to."

And she turned away and walked off, but she heard the old woman behind her: "When she first got here I offered her forty thousand and she wouldn't sell, and then she ends up talking nonsense to that young lad!" She clicked her tongue disapprovingly. "What a way to carry on! When I was a girl the old folks wouldn't let me come to market."

"Young people have a better time of it these days," said the old fellow.

"There's no controlling young people nowadays," said the old woman. "I've found a wife for that boy of mine, but he won't have her at any price, I don't know what to do about it."

"Ai-ai, I can see you're a bit more stubborn than I am," replied the old fellow. "Young folks today have a better time than we had, whatever you say, and why should we old ones interfere when we've one foot in the grave already?"

Kai-kai made her way past the jealous, envious or sympathetic eyes of bystanders, and heard what the old man said, and walked in great happiness back to her home. The next day, Liu Tsai-sheng did in fact send a go-between over, and in a few short words everything was settled.

"It's all 'freedom' nowadays," said the go-between, "and we go-betweens are just about as useful as ears on a deaf-mute—just there for ornament!"

And with her quick tongue the go-between sent Kai-kai's whole family into roars of laughter.



## *Lu Hsün and the Communist Party*

By HARRIET C. MILLS

IN terms of his impact on the young intelligentsia of China, particularly in the 1930s, and of the emotional symbolism as patriot and reformer with which his name is charged, Lu Hsün (1881-1936) was the most powerful figure in modern Chinese letters. For the last seven years of his life he was openly identified with Communist-led left-wing cultural movements in China. Today he is honoured by the Chinese Communist Party as the great cultural hero of the Chinese Revolution. His homes have become museums, his tomb a shrine. He is presented as a Communist in everything but name.

Before this assumption becomes axiomatic, it is well to review the record, to examine the nature, extent and quality of his commitment, for in a sense Lu Hsün is representative of that group of anguished patriots whom increasing disillusionment with the Kuomintang after 1927 turned to support of the Communist opposition in much the way that the economic debacle of 1929 and the rise of Fascism in Europe turned many Western liberals toward the Communist ideal and Russia in the early thirties. As with his European counterparts Lu Hsün's sympathy grew out of desperation and remained more emotional than intellectual.

Prior to his brief stay at Sun Yat-sen University in Canton in the spring of 1927, Lu Hsün had had no contact with the Communist Party. Although one important early influence on him was the nineteenth-century Russian literature he had read as a student in Japan, the October Revolution made little impression on him at the time and he was, as he later admitted, even a little suspicious of it.<sup>1</sup> He rejected the idea that Communism could ever be successful in China.<sup>2</sup> In the early 1920s, his old interest in Russian literature reawakened, he translated some not very radical pre-revolutionary fiction and read about the new Russia, discussions of Marxist cultural theory and Soviet literary development. Through the Unnamed Society, in the mid-twenties, he encouraged other translations of Russian fiction and literary theory and from his notes to these volumes it is clear that by the time he left Peking in August 1926 he had an outline knowledge of post-revolutionary literary development in the Soviet Union.

<sup>1</sup> Lu Hsün, *Lu Hsün Ch'üan Chi* (*Lu Hsün's Complete Works*) (Shanghai: Lu Hsün Ch'üan Chi Ch'u-pan-she, 1938) 6:25.

<sup>2</sup> Lu Hsün, *Lu Hsün Ch'üan Chi* (*Lu Hsün's Complete Works*) (Peking: Jen-Min Wen-hsueh Ch'u-pan-she, 1957) (annotated), 9:299.



At no point, however, did this literary interest lead to a political interest. Although he knew Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao when they were beginning to study Marxism and although he was at National Peking University after study groups on Socialist and Marxist thought were formed, he took no part. In August 1922 he did not apparently participate in the welcome to Adolph A. Joffe, the Soviet envoy, so enthusiastically extended by many groups including those at the university with which he was closely associated.

On the contrary, during his Peking days he was a supporter of Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang.<sup>3</sup> He considered it the only legitimate agent of revolution in China, the only hope for reunification of China. In late 1925 and early 1926 he briefly edited a literary supplement to the *Kuo Min Hsin Pao*, official Kuomintang organ in Peking. In late 1926 he followed with real joy the progress of the Northern Expedition under Kuomintang leadership. However, he defended the right of Chinese to be Communist if they chose and bitterly resented attempts to justify the May 30th Incident and T'üan Ch'i-jui's March 1926 massacre of students or other repressive measures as Red suppression.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, prior to Canton, the mainsprings of his thinking—humanitarian concern for the welfare of the common man and a patriotic concern for a great and truly independent China—were as compatible with the programme of the Kuomintang as with that of Chinese Marxism. His realistic appreciation of the ruthlessness of revolution, his conviction that ends justified means and his feeling that mercy should not be shown enemies of progress could have led him to justify the actions of either group he considered just. At this time he had not thought about the Communist Party because he did not see it as a practical power factor in China. In this he was typical of thousands of students and other intellectuals at the time who looked to the Kuomintang and gave it their moral and material support.

It was only after he arrived in Canton in January 1927 that he came into contact, however indirectly, with a Communist organisation. Before this, as he said, he did not even know there was a distinction between the Communist Party and the Communist Youth.<sup>5</sup> In Canton many of his students were Communists or sympathisers and they, like their Kuomintang counterparts, called on him to present him with official party publications. It was during the early spring of 1927 that Lu Hsün came to realise the great popularity of the Communist Party among the students. He concluded that the Communists were the locomotive of

<sup>3</sup> Lu Hsün, *C.W.* 3:43.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* 3:92; 3:307; 1:249-259.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* 3:438.

the Revolution, and the Kuomintang but the railroad cars.<sup>6</sup> He became increasingly aware of the tension between the rival parties which erupted with such bloody violence in the massacres of April 12 and 15 during which some of his students were killed or arrested. The cruelty of the purges and their aftermath made his "hair stand on end" and shattered his faith in the Kuomintang.<sup>7</sup> He who had believed in evolution and therefore in the inevitable superiority of youth over its elders now saw youth split against itself, and his faith in both evolution and youth was badly shaken. Although he seems to have admired the bravery and dedication of Communist elements in Canton, he made no attempt to get in touch with the party organisation as such nor to inform himself more deeply on its theory.

The two years after he reached Shanghai in October 1927 are the key transition period in terms of his relations with the Chinese left, for it was then that he changed from an interested bystander to a sympathetic but non-doctrinaire, undisciplined and independent supporter. After his great disappointments in Canton, he needed new insights if he was to go on. He began by reading heavily in translations from works on modern Russian literature, Marxist literary theory, shifting then to Marxist dialectics, social, political and economic thought and finally Russia itself. He never pretended to systematic study, admitted that he did not understand historical materialism and had never held *Das Capital* in his hands.<sup>8</sup> Although he translated heavily from works relevant to Marxist literary theory, his own writing of these two years has little to reflect his new intensive reading in Marxism. Intellectually his attitude was basically one of detached exploration. Emotionally, however, continuing government persecution of all critics, political disunity, corrupt and inefficient government predisposed him in favour of the Communists whose bravery and dedication to what he considered to be nationalist and humanitarian ideals he admired and whom he regarded as the only potential opposition to the Kuomintang.

What then was the nature and extent of his contacts with the Chinese Communist Party from 1927-29? On his arrival in Shanghai Lu Hsün was called on by many important Communist Party and left-wing literary figures. These contacts were soon halted when Lu Hsün was bitterly attacked in the 1928-29 debate on revolutionary literature as an obstacle to the revolution by zealous self-styled young Marxists who were then either not in the Party or, given the disorganised state of the Party at

<sup>6</sup> Wu Yuan-k'an, ed., *Lu Hsün Shu Chien Pu Yi* (Lu Hsün: Supplementary Letters) (Shanghai: Shanghai Ch'u-pan Kung-ssu, 1953) (letters to Japanese), pp. 72-73.

<sup>7</sup> Oda Takeo, *Lu Hsün Chuan* (Biography of Lu Hsün) Fan Ch'üan trsl. (Shanghai: Kaiming, 1946), p. 73.

<sup>8</sup> Lu Hsün *Lu Hsün Jih-chi* (Lu Hsün's Diaries) (Peking: Jen-min Wen-hsueh Ch'u-pan-she, 1959), *passim*.

the time, were not under its direct control. Although on at least two occasions during these years official Party organisations described Lu Hsün as a nihilist, pessimist, an outsider to the proletariat, a rationalist and not a socialist,<sup>9</sup> on the whole official views of his social role were fairly temperate. He was, for example, sufficiently trusted by some Party elements to be asked for contributions to Red Aid. He was also involved in several literary enterprises with Jou Shih, Feng Hsüeh-feng and Pai Mang, three Communist writers who had contacted him on their own, not Party, initiative. There are reasons for thinking, however, it was not until well along in 1929 that Lu Hsün realised they were Communists.<sup>10</sup> In other words, this was a period when Lu Hsün was by no means intimate with the Party and it was by no means committed to him.

By the end of 1929 for various reasons both Lu Hsün and the Communists were ready for closer co-operation. The first example was the radical magazine *Meng Ya* (Sprout) edited by Lu Hsün and Feng Hsüeh-feng which appeared in January 1930 and in March became an official organ of the League of Left Wing Writers.<sup>11</sup> Next was the Freedom League, organised about the same time, to protest increasing restrictions on free speech, news, assembly, publication and the like. The Central Committee, anxious to avail itself of Lu Hsün's prestige for the new venture, sent Pan Tsu-nien and Feng Hsüeh-feng to solicit his support. Actually Lu Hsün felt the proposed organisation was useless. However, he agreed to deliver an address at an early meeting which made him, he discovered to his dismay, a sponsor, but he took no other part in its activities.<sup>12</sup>

He did, however, join wholeheartedly in preparations for the League of Left Wing Writers, launched in March 1930. He delivered the keynote

<sup>9</sup> Feng Hsüeh-feng, "Ke-ming yü Chih-shih Chieh-chi" ("Revolution and the Working Class") from Li Ho-lin, ed., *Chung-kuo Wen Yi Lun-chan* (China's Literary Polemics) (Shanghai: Pei Hsin Shu Chü, 1930), pp. 7-8.

<sup>10</sup> Lu Hsün recommended Jou Shih as editor of *Yu Ssu* in late 1928, a move which would have been illogical, given the background and general orientation of the magazine, had he known Jou was a Communist. Lu Hsün himself says that it was not until after the formation of the League of Left Wing Writers that he knew Pai Mang was also the poet Yin Fu, indicating that it was highly unlikely he knew of his Communist affiliation.

<sup>11</sup> The League, affiliated with the International Union of Revolutionary Writers in Moscow and the most important of several front associations in cultural fields organised by the Communist Party at this time for the purpose of advancing its cause in the revolutionary struggle, rallied the support of most major liberal authors in its first two or three years. Branches were established in various parts of China and in Tokyo, a publication programme was undertaken, secret theoretical discussions on Marxism were held and a secret workers' and peasants' correspondence movement organised. However, constant and often brutal pressure against it drove it completely underground thereafter and it was finally dissolved early in 1936 in response to the less partisan united front line.

<sup>12</sup> Feng Hsüeh-feng et al., *Tang Kel Lu Hsün ti Li-liang* (The Strength the Party Gave Lu Hsün) (Honolulu: Honan Sheng Wen-lien Ch'ou-wei hui, 1951), pp. 4-5. Hsü Shou-shang, *Wang Yu Lu Hsün Yin-hsiang chi* (Impressions of a Lost Friend, Lu Hsün) (Shanghai: O Mei Ch'u-pan-she, 1947), pp. 91-92.

address at its opening meeting, contributed financially, assisted in several of its publications, open and secret, and participated in one or two debates originating within the League applicable to general social problems such as the question of a mass language and the popularisation of literature. He defended the League against outside attack but inwardly became sceptical of its value. He never hesitated to criticise its mistakes, never participated in its theoretical discussions on Marxist dialectics and literature. To say, therefore, that he "led" the League or the left-wing cultural movement, as is universally claimed by Communist commentators, is misleading. Ts'ao Chü-jen's point is well taken that in organisations like the Left League, the Communists had their own people, Chou Yang, Pan Han-nien and others, who regarded Lu Hsün merely as a fellow traveller held in revered but not intimate position.<sup>13</sup> Thus Lu Hsün's adherence to the Left League does not reflect so much a new specific collectivist element in his thinking after 1930 as the existence of a group with which he thought it worth while to co-operate.

After 1930 he was formally much closer to the Party than before. There is reason to think that through Jou Shih he was well apprised of the proceedings of the All-Soviet Areas Conference in May 1930 in Shanghai. That same year Li Li-san had several talks with Lu Hsün on his "militant responsibilities."<sup>14</sup> Lu Hsün's fiftieth birthday was marked by a daring dinner at a restaurant attended by over a hundred left-wing figures including the editor of the underground Party paper and a representative of Red Aid just released from prison.<sup>15</sup> In 1932 Ch'en Yi, visiting Shanghai incognito, conferred at length with Lu Hsün on the possibility of his writing a novel on the bitter annihilation campaign then in progress. Before he ultimately dropped the idea, Lu Hsün had seen many emissaries from the Soviet Areas.<sup>16</sup> Lu Hsün's relations with Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, currently out of high power and living from late 1930 to December 1933 in hiding in Shanghai, were close and on two occasions Lu Hsün hid Ch'ü in his home when Ch'ü was being hunted.<sup>17</sup>

After Ch'ü and Feng left Shanghai in late 1933, Lu Hsün's known contacts with the Party are hard to trace. We know that in 1935 he was the channel through which the famed Red Army Commander Fan Chih-min's last letter from his Nanchang prison was forwarded to the Central Committee.<sup>18</sup> Later that year together with Mao Tun he sent a telegram of congratulation to Mao Tse-tung on the completion of the

<sup>13</sup> Ts'ao Chü-jen, *Lu Hsün P'ing Chuan (A Critical Biography of Lu Hsün)* (Hongkong: Hsin Wen-hua Ch'u-pan-she, 1956), p. 102.

<sup>14</sup> Feng Hsüeh-feng et al., *op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>15</sup> Agnes Smedley, *The Battle Hymn of China* (New York: 1945), p. 74.

<sup>16</sup> Feng Hsüeh-feng Hui-yi Lu Hsün (*Remembering Lu Hsün*) (Peking: Jen-min Wen-hsueh Ch'u-pan-she, 1952), pp. 93-95.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 122-142.

<sup>18</sup> T'ang T'ao, "How Lu Hsün Lived in Shanghai," *China Reconstructs*, June 1953, p. 32.

Long March, which read, "The future of China and mankind lies with you."<sup>19</sup> Early in 1936 he was still, with apparent difficulty, able to forward a secret report on the Party's North China work brought by messenger from Peking to Central Committee contacts in Shanghai.<sup>20</sup> In April it was to Lu Hsün and Mao Tun that Feng Hsüeh-feng, returning from the north-west after the Long March to re-establish broken contacts, was ordered by the Party in Yen-an to turn. In mid-1936, in a statement declaring his unequivocal support for Mao and Stalin against Trotsky and his Chinese followers, we get Lu Hsün's only statements on factions within the Communist movement.<sup>21</sup>

On the other hand, Lu Hsün's local contacts with the Left League deteriorated sharply from late 1933 for he was out of sympathy with the rigid orthodoxy of Chou Yang, then increasingly in control of its underground remnants. Lu Hsün supported Hu Feng against Chou Yang in two disputes in 1935 and that fall advised against young authors like Hsiao Chün joining.<sup>22</sup> Early in 1936, still unpersuaded of the wisdom of the United Front policy, Lu Hsün was displeased with Chou's dissolution of the League in conformity with the new line. It was only after Feng Hsüeh-feng on his return to Shanghai that spring persuaded Lu Hsün that the new policy would not entail repetition of the 1927 tragedy that Lu Hsün in June accepted it. However, this did not keep his old antagonism with Chou Yang from flaring up bitterly later in the summer on the issue of the application of the United Front to literature. Thus Lu Hsün's support of the Party for its revolutionary role in China did not entail abject acceptance of all policies or personnel. Despite his record of relatively close association with the Party, he never showed any interest in joining. Nor did the Party press the issue for under prevailing conditions he, like Madame Sun or Mao Tun, was far more useful as an independent sympathiser. Ts'ao Chü-jen has aptly remarked that Lu Hsün was simply a fellow traveller of the revolution. As such he joined the Left League but not the Party. Unlike his friend, Tsou T'ao-fen, he did not ask on his deathbed for posthumous membership.

When we turn to Lu Hsün's very few comments on Communism the same pattern of disinterest in theory, relative detachment from 1927 to 1929 and increasing emotional commitment thereafter is apparent. Between 1927 and 1929, aside from occasionally recapitulating some long-held ideas on the nature of social protest or revolutionary literature,

<sup>19</sup> Feng Hsüeh-feng, *Remembering Lu Hsün*, p. 144.

<sup>20</sup> Tsou Lu-feng "Tang Tsui Ch'in-mi ti Chan Yu" ("The Party's Closest Comrade-in-Arms") in Shen Yin-mo ed., *Hui-yi Wei-ta ti Lu Hsün (In Remembrance of the Great Lu Hsün)* (Shanghai: Hsin Wen Yi Ch'u-pan-she, 1958) pp. 168-174.

<sup>21</sup> Lu Hsün, *C.W.* 6:584-591.

<sup>22</sup> Lu Hsün, *Lu Hsün Shu Chien (Lu Hsün's Letters)* Hsü Kuang-p'ing, ed. (Shanghai?: Lu Hsün Hsien-sheng Chi-nien Wei-yuan-hui, 1948), pp. 946-947.

Lu Hsün's study of Marxism is reflected only in a few minor and unimportant passages. Some suggest a greater precision than before in his thinking on the relation of the economic system to social behaviour and character. He accepted the idea it was possible to change one's class ideology, although he never claimed to have done so. He does not discuss the class struggle for to him the conflict between oppressor and oppressed had long been axiomatic. There is an amusing sidelight on the question of love and revolution much debated at the time:

"I think there is only non-revolutionary love. Revolutionary love is for the masses. But with sex as with food, there can be temporary selection but not interminable involvement."<sup>23</sup>

There are, in addition, a few protests against anti-Communist measures but it would be a mistake to attribute these to pro-Communism rather than to his long-standing defence of civil liberties.

During 1930 he begins to use Marxist terminology to express ideas, the germ of which he had long held:

"Proletarian literature is one wing of the proletarian struggle for liberation which grows as the strength of the proletariat in society grows."<sup>24</sup>

He leaves no doubt that he both believes in and welcomes the fact that the proletariat will arise and establish a new civilisation and a new literature displacing the capitalist one, acceptance of which view he insisted did not mean subservience to, bribery by or support of Russia.<sup>25</sup>

After the execution of Jou Shih and others in 1931, he becomes highly impassioned in his hatred of the Kuomintang and his support of the opposition therefore becomes more fervid. In an exposé of the stereotype of Communist horror later in 1931, there is implicit a defence of the Party not inherent in his 1928 protests against the execution of Communists.<sup>26</sup> To him the Party symbolised the future:

"Originally I simply hated my own class with which I was familiar and had no regret on its collapse. Later practical reality taught me that it is really to the newly arisen proletariat that the future belongs."<sup>27</sup>

Increasingly from 1933 there is in Lu Hsün a series of very moving and passionate references to the plight of the labouring masses. He describes them as oppressed for so long that they have become malleable as sand and though they give their all in silence, cold and hunger are hounded for their very lives. Yet he indicates that the future belongs to these very masses who will be led to victory by the Communist Party. He refers to a cohesive force moving in the Chinese desert to bring

<sup>23</sup> *Letters*, p. 190.

<sup>25</sup> Lu Hsün, *C.W.* 4:250.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* 4:339-341.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* 4:197-198.

<sup>24</sup> Lu Hsün, *C.W.* 4:240.



great changes.<sup>28</sup> His description, which fits the beleaguered state of the Communists then, hails those—

“who have self-confidence and do not cheat themselves, who press on unflinchingly in battle despite the constant persecution, slaughter and secret extinction which keeps knowledge of them from the people.”<sup>29</sup>

He is proud of those with the faith and method to believe they can change China's bleak fate. However strong his optimism on the Chinese Party might be he did not think that the victory of the masses in China could come about unsupported by world changes. In 1934 he displayed considerable foresight when he wrote:

“Most things in China are subject to foreign manipulation and without some really major change, there will be no major change in China. When China can change herself, then imperialism will be on the wane.”<sup>30</sup>

Lu Hsün was bitterly critical of the civil war against the Communists but one did not have to be a Marxist—merely a humanitarian—to oppose civil war in China.

The more closely one reads Lu Hsün the more it becomes apparent that intellectually he had not become a Marxist. Some of his important ideas, formed before he came close to the Party, run parallel to certain generalisations in Marxism and were sharpened by his reading. It did not take Marxism to tell Lu Hsün that history was the story of oppressor and oppressed but Marxism gave him a schematic framework. He had long held revolution would ultimately establish a world for the common man. Marxism told him it would be the proletariat which he apparently interpreted not in its narrow sense but in the broader context of labouring masses in general. The relation between cultural expression and social origin was not new to Lu Hsün but Marxism gave him terms with which to phrase it more precisely though he had no patience with empty or forced theorising. To his longstanding hatred of imperialism as aggressive in China, Marxism gave a theoretical explanation. But his major focus was hardly orthodox for in the last analysis he put the blame for China's humiliations on China herself rather than on her imperialist foes.

Lu Hsün's scepticism mitigated against his accepting the Communist faith. Unlike convinced Marxists he claimed no eternal validity for Marxism, or for that matter for any other system:

“The final goal of life,” he wrote, “of the universe and art are not clear . . . eternal existence or destruction? But we must go on and act. We and art are but links in a progressive chain of evolution.”<sup>31</sup>

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* 5:142-144.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* 6:119.

<sup>30</sup> *Letters*, p. 682.

<sup>31</sup> *Letters*, p. 952.



His independence of mind made him non-doctrinaire. He did not attack Trotsky until 1936, still referred with respect to Ch'en Tu-hsiu as late as December 1935. While accepting the idea of a "correct standard" in various fields of endeavour, he insisted that all sides of an argument be presented. He therefore opposed a censorship of prohibition in favour of free circulation of properly annotated materials. He never favoured arbitrary application of the theory of the class struggle. He never repudiated his "bourgeois humanitarianism" for to him, as Wang Jen-shu has said, humanitarianism and the ideals of the labouring class were the same.<sup>32</sup>

On Russia he had very much the outlook of left-wing liberals elsewhere in the world in the 1930s. He was determined to believe that in contrast to the economic stagnation of the West, Russia was showing the way to a viable new society. Workers and peasants were living decent lives, he believed. He interpreted all criticism of Russia, accounts of famines, and other difficulties as envious capitalist propaganda. He took pleasure in the panic that Russian export of wheat and oil introduced into Western commercial circles in China, interpreting the move somewhat naively in terms of an exportable surplus rather than as political or economic strategy. He was attracted by the drama of a new planned society rising on the ruins of the old order. He believed a new moral order was emerging. Japan's attack in 1931 he felt was the prelude to an attack on the U.S.S.R., and he called on China to "resist the devils who attack the Soviet Union. This is our road to survival." He felt a warm bond with the Soviet Union because he thought that it, like China, was the subject of imperialist attack. His logic was simple: Imperialism was bad; it wanted to attack Russia; therefore Russia must be good. Lu Hsün accepts the right of the revolutionary Soviet Government to use force and censorship against those who would undermine it at the same time that he attacks the Kuomintang for employing similar tactics, because he believed one was working for and the other against the common good.<sup>33</sup>

Lu Hsün does not discuss the various points at issue between China and the Soviet Union during 1927-36, particularly the long tension, negotiations and border incidents in connection with the Chinese Eastern Railway. He makes only one veiled appeal against hysterical anti-Russianism which had reached such proportions that some writers were proudly claiming Genghis Khan's victory over the Russians as one of

<sup>32</sup> Wang Jen-shu, "Lu Hsün Hsien-sheng ti 'Chuan-pien'" ("The 'Turn' in Lu Hsün's Life") in *Lu Hsün Hsien-sheng Chi-nien Chi* (Memorial Collection on Mr. Lu Hsün) Lu Hsün Hsien-sheng Chi-nien Wei-yuan-hui, ed. (Shanghai: Wen-hua Sheng-huo Ch'u-p'an-she, 1937), Section I, pp. 102-105.

<sup>33</sup> Lu Hsün, *C.W.*, especially 5:25-32, 5:127, 4:295, 7:789-790.

China's glorious achievements. The concentration of his most fervent remarks about the Soviet Union in 1932 reflects not only his contribution to the powerful current "save Russia" line but also his support of the move to resume diplomatic relations between China and the Soviet Union completed in that year. In 1936 he hailed the dykes and dams, aeroplanes, collective farms and other evidences of Soviet prosperity.<sup>34</sup>

In retrospect it is perhaps surprising that Lu Hsün did not veer toward Communism before 1929. In some ways it was easier for him to accept its necessities than for many European idealists in the 1930s. First the religious dimension so troublesome to Gide did not exist for him. Second, the liberal concern with the problem of ends and means so central in Rolland was for Lu Hsün a practical, not a moral, issue. Third, his concern for the individual was deep and practical but without the special scrupulousness of the West European liberal tradition. Finally the situation under which he lived was more desperate than that of his European contemporaries.

In view of this, the relative restraint of his reaction, compared for example to that of Gide, Rolland, Auden, Spender and the like, is remarkable. Not only did he never join the Party, but he was never "converted." Gide describes the delirious joy of his conversion to Marxism but there are no passages in Lu Hsün and none in the literature about him to suggest a parallel experience. Nor is there anything in Lu Hsün or the writing on him to match Gide's statements that he would lay down his life for the Soviet Union. Thus although there is no question that Lu Hsün's sympathy with the Party was emotional in origin, it is equally clear that it was quite different in intensity from someone like Gide. Thus where Gide at the height of his Communist period felt that if he could not accept Communist dogma something was wrong with him, Lu Hsün never tried to remould himself to conform with dogma.

This notable degree of independence and restraint within his emotional commitment raises the question as to whether if he had lived in a society where the social alternatives were not so sharply drawn, where between the Communists on the one hand and the conservatives on the other, there lay a third road to reform, he might not, like Shaw, whom he so resembled and admired, have been a socialist. Despite his hatred of rigidity and formalism, the exigencies of the Chinese situation narrowed the practical choice to the Kuomintang or the Chinese Communists. This fact obscured for him the essential role of dogma in the overall Communist movement. The whole problem of freedom—intellectual and political—was overshadowed for it did not affect his estimate

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 6:481-485.

of the practical potential of the Party to regenerate China, which was after all his lifelong concern.

Lu Hsün had often warned of the disillusionment inevitable in the realisation of a revolution. Had he made Gide's journey to Mecca would he too have returned disappointed? Would the purges or the Soviet-Nazi German Pact have undermined his faith as with many of his counterparts in Europe? Or would the exigencies of the revolutionary situation have convinced him? In considering these questions, it must be remembered that the vigorous role of the Chinese Communist Party in the struggle against Japan, its incessant demands for civil liberties in an increasingly oppressive situation, and the growth of its power had an immediate reality for the Chinese which the purges and the pact did not. Where the Party in Europe suffered from such developments, the Party in China continued to mobilise the humanitarian and nationalistic aspirations of the people in the drive against Japan. It was such questions that had brought Lu Hsün to the Party and might well have kept him, like Mao Tun, Madame Sun and thousands of others, behind its larger objectives.

On a different level—that of his day-to-day relations with the Party—had he lived the friction between his more moderate views and the dogma of men like Chou Yang might have developed to the point where in the ensuing struggle he would no longer have been acceptable. Certainly Lu Hsün's close friends of moderate persuasion have suffered. Hsiao Chün, a young Communist close to Lu Hsün whom Lu Hsün advised not to join the Left League in 1935, was attacked for his independent views in 1948. Hu Feng and Feng Hsüeh-feng, who stood with Lu Hsün against Chou Yang in Shanghai, were broken in 1955 and 1957 respectively. Death removed Lu Hsün from the struggle and made of him a symbol it is to no one's advantage to tarnish. But the guilt with which this figure is now encrusted should not blind us to the many levels of his relations with and attitude toward Communism and the Party. Like so many in the depression and post-depression years the very desperation of his situation made him more emotional than critical. Shaw admits he was attracted to socialism through his emotions before he examined its tenets. Feng Hsüeh-feng says the same thing of Communism, that he believed in the Party first and only later in its principles.<sup>35</sup> In a word Lu Hsün was more pro-Communist than Communist.

<sup>35</sup> Feng Hsüeh-feng, *Remembering*, p. 161.

## Peking's Evolving Ministry of Foreign Affairs

By DONALD W. KLEIN

ON the first anniversary of the "Chinese People's Republic" (October 1, 1950), the Peking government had but eleven ambassadors abroad, eight of them accredited to Communist *bloc* nations. Most had only recently exchanged an army uniform for the proverbial pin-stripes. With such obvious exceptions as Chou En-lai, the men in the Foreign Ministry offices in Peking were ill-trained or untrained "diplomats." Now, a decade later, there is a new picture. A significant part of the story of China's emergence on the international scene may be found in the rapidly developing foreign service—a service which staffs thirty-two ambassadorial outposts,<sup>1</sup> as well as the various departments in Peking.

Confined to the hinterlands for two decades and hitherto dependent largely on the peasantry, the Chinese Communists were perforce in short supply of diplomatic personnel in 1949. Immediate steps were taken to remedy this situation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was given top priority for the best linguists, and short-term schools were established to train outgoing diplomats and their wives, with the instruction often including such rudimentary details as Western table manners. Priority was even given to obtain scarce materials to make clothes for the new diplomats and their wives.<sup>2</sup>

In 1949 the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs was established, in part, to conduct research in foreign policy. Other institutes

<sup>1</sup> The nations with which Peking has established diplomatic relations are: Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, East Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, North Korea, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Rumania, the Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.S.S.R., the U.A.R., the U.K., North Vietnam, the Yemen, and Yugoslavia. All are at the ambassadorial level with the exception of the Yemen (legation) and the Netherlands and the U.K. (both offices of the *chargé d'affaires*). Since shortly after the Chinese charged Belgrade with "revisionism" in 1958, Peking has had no ambassador in Yugoslavia (considered as a *bloc* nation in this essay). In addition, Peking has at least 10 consulates-general or consulates in cities other than national capitals. The Chinese also maintain diplomatic relations of a sort with the "Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic." The *New York Times* (July 8, 1960) reported from Tunisia that "Algeria" "... confirmed ... that it was naming a permanent representative ... to reside ..." in Peking. To date, Peking has not appointed an "ambassador." In all likelihood, "Algerian affairs" are conducted by the embassy in Cairo, where a long-time intimate of Chou En-lai (Ch'en Chia-k'ang) is ambassador.

<sup>2</sup> The writer is indebted for this information to a Westerner (who prefers to remain anonymous) resident in Peking in those early days.

## PEKING'S EVOLVING MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

such as the Peking Foreign Languages College, the Russian Language School, the Institute of Diplomacy, and the Institute of International Relations of the Academy of Sciences were subsequently established. A number of the larger universities have added diplomacy and language courses to their curricula. Language training in particular is reportedly excellent.

### *Structure and Personnel*

Constitutionally, the Chairman of the C.P.R. "represents . . . China in its relations with foreign states" and the State Council "direct(s) the conduct of external affairs." Few would dispute the proposition, however, that foreign *policy*—as opposed to the implementation of it—rests with the inner core of the Politburo. Subject to the approval of Mao Tse-tung in particular, and Liu Shao-ch'i to a lesser degree, ex-Foreign Minister Chou En-lai probably prevails on matters of foreign policy. A good case could be made, in fact, that Chou remains the *de facto* Foreign Minister despite having resigned over two years ago. Since that time, Chou's authoritative voice is heard in almost direct proportion to the intensity of crises which have arisen.<sup>3</sup>

The principal arm of foreign policy is, of course, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (M.F.A.). Significantly, the M.F.A. is lacking in prominent Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) leaders. Aside from Politburo member Ch'en Yi, the Foreign Minister, only one full and three alternate members of the 190-odd member Party Central Committee are represented.<sup>4</sup> This fact is one of numerous indicators that foreign service personnel are being increasingly drawn from more qualified younger echelons, rather than being selected solely on the basis of Party seniority.<sup>5</sup> (Other reliable tests of Party stature—such as hailing from Mao Tse-tung's native province or having participated in the "Long March"—have also been ignored in recent years.<sup>6</sup>)

<sup>3</sup> For example, Chou made a number of the major pronouncements during the Lebanese crisis of 1958, the Quemoy flare-up of the same year, and the Tibetan affair of 1959—all important events post-dating Chou's resignation. Chou has conferred with Nehru this year, and almost certainly will represent Peking at a "summit" meeting if and when the Chinese participate. His relationship with Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi seems quite similar to that of Adenauer and von Brentano.

<sup>4</sup> The full Central Committee member is Liu Hsiao, ambassador to the U.S.S.R.; the three alternates are: Vice-Foreign Ministers Chang Han-fu and Lo Kuei-po, and ambassador to India P'an Tzu-li.

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Admiral C. Turner Joy, one of the few Americans who has negotiated with the Chinese Communists in the post-1949 era, has commented as follows: "Force of intellect is the primary consideration. Reputation, rank, and position are of secondary consideration to the Communists in choosing the members of their delegation." See *How Communists Negotiate* (New York: 1955), p. 10.

<sup>6</sup> The dearth of high-ranking C.C.P. figures notwithstanding, one searches in vain for any influential non-Party persons in the M.F.A. A number of ex-K.M.T. diplomats are known to have returned to the mainland, and are probably utilised in non-sensitive posts such as translation work.

Indeed, Ch'en Yi may have been selected to succeed Chou En-lai (February 1958) in order to serve as the continuing voice of the Central Committee—and more particularly the Politburo—within the M.F.A. For Ch'en's qualifications are at best dubious, and considerably less impressive than several of his M.F.A. subordinates. Although judged to be a man of considerable intelligence,<sup>7</sup> his only real foray into the diplomatic world came in 1955 when he served under Chou at the Bandung Conference.<sup>8</sup>

Directly subordinate to Ch'en are five Vice-Ministers<sup>9</sup> and four Assistants to the Minister (or Assistant-Ministers). Here is where much of the talent and experience lie. These men (and woman), in fact, probably manage the day-by-day implementation of Peking's foreign policy. The senior Vice-Minister is Chang Han-fu.<sup>10</sup> Educated in one of China's great universities (Tsinghua), Chang had further education in the United States, and has had diplomatic experience dating back to 1945 when he accompanied the Chinese delegation to the U.N. conference in San Francisco. Chang headed the Chinese side in the 1954 negotiations which led to the treaty with India regarding the status of Tibet. He went to the Bandung Conference and in recent years has been quite active in meeting with the endless line of foreign visitors invited to China, especially those coming from the non-Communist world.

Although lacking the formal academic training usually expected of diplomats, the other four Vice-Ministers—Chi P'eng-fei, Tseng Yung-ch'üan, Lo Kuei-po, and Keng Piao<sup>11</sup>—have all had considerable experience in the past ten years. All four have had extensive tours abroad as ambassadors. Chi, a medical doctor by training, was in East Germany for over four years. Tseng replaced Chi in Germany in 1955, after

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, the remarks of Gerald Clark in *Impatient Giant: Red China Today* (New York: 1959), p. 29.

<sup>8</sup> In addition, Ch'en attended the 19th C.P.S.U. Congress in Moscow in 1952 under Liu Shao-ch'i and led a delegation to the celebrations of the East German régime's fifth anniversary in 1954. One of his few earlier statements on foreign policy came at the Eighth Party Congress in Sept. 1956.

<sup>9</sup> In addition to the present five, another five men have served as Vice-Foreign Ministers. They are: Chang Wen-t'ien, former ambassador to the U.S.S.R., who was dismissed in Sept. 1959; Wang Chia-hsiang, Peking's first ambassador to Moscow, also dismissed in Sept. 1959, but who has since made numerous appearances on occasions when foreign Communists have visited Peking; Li K'o-nung, relieved in 1954 and now a ranking military figure; Wu Hsiu-ch'üan, leader of the Chinese delegation to the U.N. in 1950 and ex-ambassador to Yugoslavia (1955-58), who has (much like Wang Chia-hsiang) been very active in contacts with visiting foreign Communist Party figures; and Yüan Chung-hsien, who died in 1957 after serving for over five years as ambassador to India. Note that the first four easily rank above the present Vice-Foreign Ministers in Party stature—another indication of the trend of using fewer senior Party members in the M.F.A.

<sup>10</sup> Chang has been a Vice-Foreign Minister since the government was established in the autumn of 1949.

<sup>11</sup> The dates from which Chi P'eng-fei, Tseng Yung-ch'üan, Lo Kuei-po, and Keng Piao have been Vice-Foreign Ministers are Jan. 31, 1955, June 18, 1957, Oct. 18, 1957, and Jan. 7, 1960, respectively.



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serving for about three years as minister-counsellor in Moscow and as ambassador to Poland for over two years. Reported to have some knowledge of English and Russian, Tseng has been extremely active in negotiations in recent years with officials visiting Peking from East Europe. Lo Kuei-po was for over three years ambassador to North Vietnam; he was a leading negotiator in the 1955 agreement providing Chinese aid to Hanoi. The fourth Vice-Minister, Keng Piao, has the distinction of having been the only Peking envoy accredited to four different countries. His service as ambassador to Sweden and Pakistan, and as minister to Denmark and Finland<sup>12</sup> covered a span of nine years.

The post of Assistant-Minister of Foreign Affairs was created in late 1954. The four incumbents<sup>13</sup> are Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Liu Ying (a woman), Han Nien-lung, and Liu Hsin-ch'üan.<sup>14</sup> Ch'iao, highly proficient in English and German<sup>15</sup> (with some higher education in Germany), is well known to Westerners, as is his highly-talented, American-educated wife, Kung P'eng. He spent part of the war years in Chungking where he worked as a propagandist and, in 1945, as secretary to Chou En-lai, then chief Communist liaison officer in the wartime capital. Ch'iao has had wide service in the Ministry, having served as deputy-head of both the Staff Office (administration) and the Foreign Policy Committee, and as acting director of the Asian Affairs Division. A simple listing of the meetings attended by Ch'iao gives the best brief indication of his experience: the U.N. meeting in New York in 1950 (where the Communists charged the United States with aggression in Korea), the 1954 Geneva Conference, and the Bandung Conference. He also accompanied Chou En-lai to South-east Asia in 1956 and 1960 as an adviser on the latter's tours of various countries.

Miss Liu Ying, wife of former Vice-Minister Chang Wen-t'ien, appears to have little importance, and the political setback that her husband possibly received recently may have affected her position. She has reportedly received some training in Russia. More typical of the newer blood in the Ministry is Han Nien-lung. He served abroad for over seven years, first as ambassador to Pakistan and later to Sweden. Liu Hsin-ch'üan, the newly-appointed fourth Assistant-Minister, remains

<sup>12</sup> The periods during which Keng was Minister to Denmark and Finland were partially concurrent with his tour in Stockholm where he resided.

<sup>13</sup> There are also three former Assistant-Ministers: Wang Ping-nan, who held the post briefly in 1954-55 before going to Poland in 1955 as ambassador; Ch'en Chia-k'ang, now ambassador to the U.A.R. and Minister to the Yemen; and Ho Wei, currently ambassador to North Vietnam.

<sup>14</sup> The dates from which Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Liu Ying, Han Nien-lung, and Liu Hsin-ch'üan have been Assistant-Ministers are Oct. 31, 1954, Jan. 31, 1955, Nov. 21, 1958 and Apr. 29, 1960, respectively.

<sup>15</sup> For several years prior to 1955, Ch'iao headed the Translation Committee of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs.



something of a mystery. No information is available on this man, suggesting that he is a bright young prospect. Negatively, it is certain that he is not a ranking Party figure, thereby conforming with patterns suggested above.

The departmental structure of the M.F.A. is not unlike that of most foreign offices. There are six divisions organised on an area basis (such as the West European Affairs Division<sup>16</sup>), plus six other divisions<sup>17</sup> devoted to protocol, administration, research, etc.

An examination of the personnel<sup>18</sup> who direct the twelve divisions or offices reveals a high degree of continuity. Negatively speaking, there seem to be no arbitrary appointments of Party hacks lacking diplomatic experience—the men in question have had at least some experience in recent years even if in some cases they are not well educated.

The above-mentioned Kung P'eng brings to the directorship of the Information Division an American higher education, fluency in English, and experience in diplomacy dating back to the Chungking days in the 1940s. She accompanied Chou En-lai to Geneva in 1954 and to South-East Asia in late 1956. Chang Wen-chin, one of Chou En-lai's English-language interpreters, has been active in the Ministry for eleven years, and now heads the First Asian Division. The head of the Treaty and Law Division, Yao Chung-ming, brings to his post over seven years' experience as ambassador to Burma. Ho Ying, head of the West Asian and African Affairs Division and a one-time resident of Malaya, has served as minister-counsellor in Indonesia, ambassador to Mongolia, and as deputy-director of the First Asian Affairs Division.

These examples could easily be multiplied. The average among them has had several years in Peking in foreign affairs activities, or has been abroad for a few years in one of the embassies.

Some space must be devoted to an organ which, in theory, stands between the M.F.A. and the Premier. This is the Office in Charge of

<sup>16</sup> The other area divisions are: U.S.S.R. and East European, West Asian and African, American and Australian, First Asian, and Second Asian. For a period in 1958, the U.S.S.R. and East European Affairs Division was known as the Socialist States Affairs Division. Before the autumn of 1956, the West European Affairs Division was known as the West European and African Affairs Division; at that time the West Asian and African Affairs Division was created, a reflection of Peking's growing interest in the Middle East. In 1955, the Asian Affairs Division was divided into the First and Second Divisions. Reamalgamated in the same year, it was again split over the 1958-59 winter. The First Asian Division deals with non-Communist nations; the Second with Communist Asian countries.

<sup>17</sup> The six known non-area divisions or offices are: International Affairs, Information, Treaty and Law, Protocol, Consular, and the General Office. In the early days of the régime there was also a Foreign Policy Committee and a Personnel Division. However, nothing has been heard of these organs for several years; presumably they have been absorbed by one of the other divisions. In addition, there are almost certainly other divisions (e.g., security and intelligence) which receive no publicity.

<sup>18</sup> This is based on an analysis of 35-odd persons currently believed to be either a director or a deputy-director of one of the divisions.

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Foreign Affairs, created in early 1958, but about which little is known. Inasmuch as Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi concurrently heads this office, its principal function appears to be the co-ordination of Peking's many-faceted foreign policy. The activities and backgrounds of three of the four deputy-directors provide significant clues as to Peking's view of the conduct of foreign policy. First and probably foremost is Liao Ch'eng-chih, China's key figure in overseas Chinese affairs. He has had a wealth of experience in two leading international Communist-front organisations, the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and is known to have worked many years in intelligence. Born in Tokyo and fluent in Japanese, Liao is considered by many (including some Japanese Foreign Office officials) to be Peking's leading "Japan expert."<sup>10</sup> He is one of the most widely-travelled of the Chinese Communist leaders. Equally peripatetic is Liu Ning-yi, another deputy-director. He heads the labour federation in China, and has extremely close ties with the World Peace Council. The third man, K'ung Yüan, an expert in foreign trade (and formerly a Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade), is also well-travelled.

### *Embassy Staffs*

So much for the men in Peking—what of the men abroad? Before examining individual cases, it might be helpful to create a composite ambassador and his staff. More correctly, two composites must be created—thus leading to the first clue to Peking's apparent concept of a present-day ambassador: one type for the Communist *bloc* nations, another for the non-Communist world.

The *curriculum vitae* of this hypothetical ambassador to a Communist ally might well read as follows. After serving as a junior army commander in the 1930s and 1940s, he became Party First Secretary in an important provincial city in the 1950s. His "higher education" was in a Red Army academy (in Yenan) in the 1930s. Activity in his branch of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association enabled him to make his only trip abroad as a member of a "friendship" delegation to a Moscow May Day celebration. He is about fifty years old, married, and accompanied abroad by his wife. He will stay abroad for about three years and two months, or some fifteen months less than his opposite number in a non-Communist nation. His staff will include at least commercial, military, and cultural attachés, plus the lesser secretaries

<sup>10</sup> It is a rare occasion when Central Committee member Liao is not on hand for Japanese visiting Peking, particularly when they are given an "audience" with Mao or Chou. In addition to a Japanese higher education, Liao has been to Japan twice in recent years, once in 1955 and again in 1957-58. In neither case was he the titular leader of these Red Cross missions (*sic!*), but observers in Tokyo had little doubt that he was the actual head. He is the son of the famed Liao Chung-k'ai.

and interpreters (whom he will need because he doesn't know the native language). Information on the exact size of these embassies is scanty. It appears, however, that the staff (exclusive of secretarial and domestic help) will average about ten, with about double that figure for the Soviet Union.

In the diplomatic world, this is not a very impressive background, which in turn suggests that there must be solid reasons for the dispatch of this sort of person to *bloc* nations. The steady flow of officials between these states and China tends to lessen the role of the Chinese ambassador. Important negotiations are handled at a higher echelon; witness Chou En-lai's six trips to Moscow and Nikita Khrushchev's three trips to China, or Li Fu-ch'un's extended visit to Moscow in 1952-53 to negotiate Soviet assistance for China's First Five-Year Plan.<sup>20</sup> There is probably also a policy of using the *bloc* as a testing ground for diplomats; a diplomatic slip in, say, Sofia, would certainly be less damaging than one in London or Cairo. The corollary of this appears to be another motivation for sending the less-qualified to *bloc* nations: given the Chinese desire to become a respectable member of the family of nations, it appears that they give first priority to the dispatch of the most qualified people to the non-Communist world.

The impression should not remain, however, that Peking stations only token representatives in Communist nations. Party organisational experience can, after all, be a helpful asset provided a man is dealing within the realm of others who tend to think along "Party lines." We know, for example, that Peking felt impelled to call back several ambassadors within the *bloc* during the serious 1958 crisis involving the landing of U.S. Marines in the Lebanon. Still, diplomatically speaking, the foreign affairs experience of the Communist *bloc* ambassadors ranges from mediocre to none at all. He is, so to speak, an untested man in a testing ground.<sup>21</sup>

The one important exception to this pattern is Wang Ping-nan, presently ambassador to Poland. Wang doubles as the negotiator in the

<sup>20</sup> In similar fashion, the less publicised aspects of intra-*bloc* government affairs tend to be handled by missions to and from China. Some of these affairs—such as scientific-technological co-operation—are now so institutionalised as to call for permanent bodies which meet annually. There are, in addition, Party channels which handle those affairs descending from Comintern/Cominform days. In the military sphere, a Warsaw Pact meeting will always bring forth an important mission from China. (K'ang Sheng is the most recent of highly influential Peking leaders to attend a Warsaw Pact meeting—in Feb. 1960.)

<sup>21</sup> That the *bloc* at least partially serves as a testing ground is borne out by an examination of the subsequent careers of 28 men who have completed an ambassadorial tour abroad. Slightly less than half of those formerly in a Communist nation were "rejected" for further diplomatic service. By contrast, nine out of the 11 former ambassadors outside the *bloc* continued their careers in the Foreign Ministry or closely related posts. (One man, Wang Yu-p'ing, was excluded from this compilation because he had served as ambassador to both a Communist and non-Communist nation.)

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Sino-U.S. talks concerning American prisoners in Peking, tension in the Taiwan Straits, and related issues. Wang's experience dates back to the mid-1930s when he served under Chou En-lai both in Chungking and, later, during the Marshall Mission days. After 1949, Wang headed a Foreign Ministry department, during which time he accompanied Chou to the 1954 Geneva Conference.<sup>22</sup>

An examination of the twenty-one ambassadors<sup>23</sup> Peking has stationed in non-Communist nations is almost a study in contrasts when compared to those within the *bloc*. These men are on the whole better educated and definitely have more experience in diplomatic affairs, granting that much of that experience came in the post-1949 period. Not one of the eleven present ambassadors within the *bloc* had been an ambassador to another nation prior to his current assignment. Outside the *bloc*, in contrast, eight of the twenty-one were ambassadors to *at least* one other nation before their present assignments. Wang Yu-p'ing, for example, was ambassador to Rumania for four years and to Norway for three before going to Cambodia, and Ting Kuo-yü (a former delegate to the Military Armistice Commission in Korea) was in Afghanistan for three years before his present assignment in Pakistan. One of the twenty-one was an Assistant Foreign Minister, five more were counsellors in embassies for extended periods, and still another five served as directors of one of the Foreign Ministry departments.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, several of these men held more than one of the posts mentioned above. For example, Hsü Yi-hsin, now in Norway, was deputy-director and then director of the U.S.S.R. and East European Affairs Division, and ambassador to Albania before being sent to Norway. Wang Yü-t'ien served as counsellor in East Germany, as deputy-director of the Protocol Office of the M.F.A., and as head of the U.S.S.R. and East European Affairs Division before serving as ambassador to the Sudan.

In total, then, nineteen of the twenty-one current ambassadors in non-Communist nations had specific experience in the Foreign Ministry in Peking or as a diplomat abroad. Even the remaining two, Pai Jen in Morocco and Li Yi-mang in Burma, can scarcely be termed exceptions. Pai served as an Assistant-Minister of Foreign Trade and Li was for

<sup>22</sup> On the surface, Central Committeeman Liu Hsiao, ambassador in Moscow, might seem to be another exception. However, his experience prior to his present assignment was limited to Party affairs. Nor do other elements in his background suggest any pertinent diplomatic qualifications. One reliable foreign correspondent told this writer that the Russians have little regard for Liu. Interestingly, he is the only full member of the Central Committee in a diplomatic post. (Liu was an alternate member when he went to Moscow in 1955, but was subsequently promoted to full membership in Sept. 1956.)

<sup>23</sup> This figure excludes the Yemen, the affairs of which are handled by the embassy in Cairo. The term "ambassador" is used here in a non-technical sense and includes the *chargé d'affaires* in both the U.K. and the Netherlands.

<sup>24</sup> An example of the last-mentioned category is Huan Hsiang, the well-educated *chargé* in London. Before going to London in late 1954, he headed the West European and African Affairs Division of the M.F.A. for five years.

several years a key figure in the World Peace Council, a post which kept him abroad (attending a host of international Communist-front meetings) during much of the 1950s.

The staff of the ambassador in the non-Communist nations is similar to that of his counterpart within the *bloc*. In most cases there will be both commercial<sup>25</sup> and cultural<sup>26</sup> attachés, but fewer than half will have a military attaché.<sup>27</sup> The size of the accredited staff will tend to be somewhat less than that of the staffs within the *bloc*—about five to ten men. Interesting exceptions to this are India and Indonesia where, including outlying consulates, this figure is doubled or tripled. A possibly illuminating fact is that most if not all “domestics” (e.g., cooks, chauffeurs) are brought with the mission rather than relying on local hire. Such a practice (which is also used by the Soviet Union) would tend to diminish the possibilities for annoying and embarrassing incidents, and, more important, provide much tighter security.<sup>28</sup>

#### *Embassy Activities*

It is one thing to describe the experience and background of the men abroad, but it is quite another to describe their activities. However, at least a partial picture can be drawn. As suggested above, the men within the *bloc* seem to have been relegated to handling fairly mundane matters. We also know that they spend a very large amount of time in ceremonial functions—giving parties, celebrating National Day, May Day, or Red Army Day, opening exhibitions, greeting visiting Chinese missions, etc.

Outside the *bloc*, the main tasks of the diplomatic missions would appear to be a shrewd mixture of political and “cultural” activities.<sup>29</sup> The ambassador, aside from ceremonial functions, is principally occupied with official contacts with the government to which he is accredited. In recent years, this has meant stressing “peaceful co-existence” (especially in the Afro-Asian *bloc*) or, when the need arises as it has recently in India and Indonesia, explaining away Peking’s truculence. The commercial attaché, of course, devotes his time to the promotion of trade, but with an added twist: attempts designed to

<sup>25</sup> There appear to be commercial attachés in all non-Communist nations except in Iraq and in the recently established missions in Guinea and Ghana.

<sup>26</sup> There appear to be cultural attachés in all non-Communist countries except Ceylon, Ghana, Guinea, Norway, Morocco, the Sudan and the Yemen.

<sup>27</sup> Military attachés are only stationed in the following: Burma, Denmark, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.A.R.

<sup>28</sup> This policy seems to have backfired in London recently with the defection from the Chinese embassy of a cook—apparently due to over-work and over-indoctrination. (*New York Herald Tribune*, Apr. 7, 1960.)

<sup>29</sup> How much time is devoted to reporting on the country concerned is an open question. It would be especially interesting to know if the reporting is generally accurate or, à la the Nazi diplomats (as revealed after the Second World War), coloured to fit dogma.

break down COCOM restrictions. An embassy officer must also act as a sort of travel agent in arranging for the almost endless procession of government and non-government personnel who visit China.

Perhaps the most interesting diplomat abroad is the cultural attaché. Less in the limelight, he devotes considerable energy to the promotion of the dissemination of the Chinese Communist periodicals which flood a number of nations, particularly in Asia. He is also probably the contact man for the local "friendship" association, that is, those groups formed to promote relations between a given nation and Communist China. Covering all the continents, at least twenty-eight such organisations are known to exist outside the *bloc*; judging from the people these organisations have sent to China, it is a safe assumption that most are guided by the local Chinese Communist diplomatic mission.

In South-East Asia in particular, contact with overseas Chinese is a prime task of a diplomatic mission, and probably falls on the shoulders of the cultural attaché. Aside from plain and simple subversion (as seems to have been the case in Indonesia in late 1959), the mission is particularly interested in fostering the return to the mainland of skilled overseas Chinese, inducing their offspring to return to China for higher education (where they receive "preferential" treatment), and continuing the supply of overseas remittances to relatives on the mainland.

The stationing of relatively few military attachés outside the *bloc* seems to be motivated by two considerations. The Chinese are obviously interested in technically-advanced nations (*e.g.*, Switzerland and Sweden) or in nations in which they have a paramount interest (*e.g.*, Burma, India and Indonesia).

It is virtually certain that such overseas functionaries as officials of the Bank of China, trading companies, and the New China News Agency, though technically not attached to the M.F.A., receive their instructions via the local Chinese diplomatic missions.

### *The Unofficial Foreign Ministry*

It would be a mockery of facts to discuss the M.F.A. without some mention of the "unofficial" foreign ministry and the equally "unofficial" ambassadors. The former consists of an amalgam of several of the "people's" organisations, most prominent of which is probably the above-mentioned Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (C.P.I.F.A.).<sup>80</sup> Headed by the urbane Chang Hsi-jo, the board of

<sup>80</sup> A host of other mass organisations also play a significant role in Peking's complex diplomatic procedures. An interesting study could be made, for example, of the diplomatic aspects of the Chinese Red Cross Society in its relations with Japan. Using repatriation as a lever, this society has for several years maintained high-level contacts in Japan. It is certainly no coincidence that Liao Ch'eng-chih serves as an "adviser" to this organisation.



directors of the Institute reads like a checklist of present and past M.F.A. personnel (including Chou En-lai, the honorary president). Such bodies are of special importance in regard to those nations not maintaining diplomatic ties with Peking. Former French Premier Edgar Faure, for example, was elaborately entertained by the C.P.I.F.A. in 1957, and scores of influential Japanese leaders (by no means representatives of the left-wing) have gone to China under the aegis of this or similar organisations.

We are presently witnessing an excellent demonstration of the "unofficial" M.F.A. in action in Africa and in Latin America. After a decade of priority attention to Asian affairs, the Chinese, in the past year, have gradually turned their chief focus on these two continents. This focus has taken a variety of forms: stepped-up radio broadcasts to and about these areas, an enormous increase in the number of visitors to China (with Cubans currently leading the way), a similar increase in the number of Chinese missions visiting these countries, and certainly an augmented budget to back their activities.

In Africa, Peking has concentrated on the alleged identity of circumstances: China was recently successful in throwing off the "imperialistic yoke" and now their African "brothers" have been equally fortunate. Diplomatic recognition of the many newly-independent African states is accorded immediately, often with hints of aid to follow. A number of Chinese specialists have visited these areas, and further contacts have been cultivated by Chinese attending a host of "people's" meetings (almost always from the Afro-Asian *bloc*) in such places as Cairo.<sup>31</sup> The success or failure of these approaches should be evident in the near future; if successful in gaining diplomatic footholds, Peking's chances of gaining a U.N. seat would be greatly enhanced.

In Latin America where, except in Cuba, Peking is completely without formal diplomatic relations, the unofficial arms of the M.F.A. are laying the groundwork for official ties Peking hopes will come. Priority, obviously, has been given to Cuba: the NCNA is now established there, a large sugar contract was recently signed, several influential youth leaders have visited Havana, and a handful of Chinese youths are presently engaged in "volunteer labour" for the Castro régime. They have also been active in other areas: Liu Ch'ang-sheng,<sup>32</sup> a top expert in international Communist-front labour affairs, recently visited Chile; a journalists' delegation toured Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil. Reversing

<sup>31</sup> For example, Chi Ch'ao-ting (an economist with a Ph.D. from Columbia University) has been active for the past two years in the "Afro-Asian Organisation for Economic Co-operation." Logically, Chi was a member of the Chinese delegation to the Second Afro-Asia Peoples' Solidarity Conference held in Conakry, Guinea, in April 1960.

<sup>32</sup> So far as is known, Liu is the first Central Committee member to have visited Latin America since the Communists came to power.



this procedure, we find an impressive list of Latin American delegations visiting Peking—for example, the President of the Uruguayan House of Representatives in late 1959 (at C.P.I.F.A. invitation).

It would be an easy task to compile a long list of the “unofficial” ambassadors. The above-mentioned Liao Ch'eng-chih *vis-à-vis* Japan is an outstanding example. Another is Pao Erh-han (Burhan), a Uighur, who might be termed Peking's roving ambassador to the Moslem nations (he has made three important trips to the Middle East in recent years).

### Conclusions

A number of conclusions are inescapable. Above all, one can say the foreign service is unquestionably becoming a well-developed career service, fortified by an expanding educational programme to train future diplomats. In the words of one person who witnessed much of this from Peking, it is being promoted with a “frightening efficiency.” The continuity of the service is marked by a tendency to assign the more qualified outside the *bloc*, to use the *bloc* nations as a testing ground, and to disregard some of the traditional measurements of Party “reliability,” or, more properly, seniority. Such tendencies will surely improve the calibre of the officials and, moreover, we can expect the present M.F.A. personnel to be around for years to come. As a group they are relatively young. (Only one important figure—Yüan Chung-hsien—has died in the past decade.)

The lack of many diplomatic ties beyond the Communist *bloc* in the early days of the régime has had the effect of staffing the top M.F.A. posts with men who have had much more contact with the Communist than the non-Communist world. Trends of the past few years, however, suggest a growing influence for those men who serve, or have served, outside the *bloc*. Simple arithmetic virtually dictates this trend: there are two ambassadors in the non-Communist world for every one within the *bloc*. This will doubtless provide Peking with better information on the non-Communist world. Such a situation can be viewed with some optimism; any trend that lessens the possibility of a foreign policy based on profound ignorance of the non-Communist world must be welcomed.

## CHINA AND THE SOVIET SATELLITES: Part 2

*Since the first part of this survey appeared, the increasing acerbity of the Sino-Soviet dispute has made the projected visit of Liu Shao-ch'i to Eastern Europe seem very remote. The way in which Mr. Khrushchev has forced the satellites (with the possible exception of Albania) to back his position probably marks the end of Chinese influence among them for some time. Mr. Pringsheim's analysis of the rise and decline of this influence comes therefore at a turning point in China's relations with Eastern Europe.*

### ***New Dimensions in China's Foreign Policy***

By KLAUS H. PRINGSHEIM

THE fact that Liu Shao-ch'i, Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic, since last October has accepted a series of invitations to visit the Eastern European satellites<sup>1</sup> "at an appropriate time" is one indication of Peking's growing interest in developing her relations with these countries. The now fairly close relationships between China and the Eastern European satellites are a rather new dimension in Communist China's foreign policy posture and represent a radical break with China's traditional non-involvement in European affairs. Geographical remoteness, the inability to communicate, lack of interest, and preoccupation with the problems of her more immediate surroundings effectively isolated China from involvement in European affairs until very recent times. It is true that traders intermittently journeyed between China and European trade centres, carrying on a limited exchange of goods, but these exchanges had only a very marginal significance. Western imperialist encroachment upon China in recent centuries, particularly the nineteenth, finally brought to China an awareness of the principal powers of Western Europe, such as Portugal, Spain, England, the Netherlands, Imperial Germany, France, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. Much against her will China was eventually forced into unequal "treaty relations" with these European powers, as well as with Japan, Russia, and the United States

<sup>1</sup> Eastern European satellites here refers to Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Because of the special position of Yugoslavia it cannot be included in any collective references to the Soviet satellites enumerated above, and will be discussed separately.

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of America. However China's political, commercial, and cultural relations with the nations now known as the "East European satellites" were virtually non-existent until 1949. The reasons for this lag lie in obvious historical, political, and developmental factors. When the Chinese door was kicked open in the fifth decade of the nineteenth century the East European nations either were not at the time independent or simply did not exist (East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) as national entities as yet. Even had they existed, it is doubtful whether they would have been in a position to participate in the scramble for trade advantage, concessions, and souls characteristic of the "treaty powers."

Only Poland and Czechoslovakia exchanged diplomatic representatives with China prior to 1949, a Czech Vice-Consul appearing in Shanghai in 1927 and a Polish "Delegate" in Harbin in 1930. Nevertheless a few dozen Hungarians and Rumanians lived in China during the first two decades of the present century, and Austria-Hungary and Imperial Germany were among the treaty powers. Czechoslovakia was the first East European country to establish significant trade relations with China. Thus in 1922 we find 125 Czechs living in China representing six Czech firms. By 1927 the number of Czechs in China had increased to almost 600 persons representing some 22 firms. While Poland's commercial relations with China were far less developed, she was the second East European country to exchange diplomatic representatives with China. In 1931 a Czech Minister and a Polish Chargé d'Affaires resided in Shanghai and the Chinese government appointed a Minister who commuted between Warsaw and Prague. Between 1938 and 1949 first Hitler and later Stalin came to dominate the East European nations and it is hardly surprising that Sino-East European relations did not significantly expand. In the following pages Sino-East European relations since the founding of the Chinese People's Republic on October 1, 1949 will be examined with a view to presenting a general survey of the pattern of relations during the past eleven years.

It may be true that the foreign relations of the East European countries, because of their special relationship with the Soviet Union, are subject to limitations not experienced by countries in full possession of their sovereignty. However, I do not share the view that Sino-East European relations can be regarded as a mere subordinate function of the Sino-Soviet relationship, leaving no room for manoeuvre, variation, or the exercise of influence. The monolithic unity of the "camp of socialism" is probably no less a myth than the right of Soviet Republics to secede from the Union. To say the least, the rise of Communist China to the position of co-leader of the Communist bloc gives China a voice in Soviet East European policy. This in

turn gives the East European nations every reason to communicate with Peking to gain an understanding by China of their needs and aspirations.

The first of the East European countries to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China was Bulgaria, which did so on October 4, 1949, following 24 hours behind the Soviet Union. Rumania was next, establishing relations on October 5, and Hungary and Czechoslovakia followed suit on October 6, 1949. Poland established relations on October 7, eventually followed by East Germany on October 27, 1949. Albania was the last of the satellites to establish ties with Communist China, doing so on November 23, 1949. Yugoslavia's Tito had wired his recognition on October 4, but the Chinese Communist Government chose to ignore this friendly gesture, thereby demonstrating her solidarity with the Moscow-Belgrade rift.

The first East European Ambassador to arrive in Communist China was Dr. F. C. Weiskopf, the Ambassador of Czechoslovakia, who arrived on January 8, 1950, and was followed shortly by envoys from the other East European countries. Albania alone lagged behind, not sending an Ambassador until September 1954. The Chinese Government was rather slower in sending Ambassadors to East Europe, the first being the Ambassador to Poland, who arrived there in July 1950. The Chinese Ambassador to Albania, however, like his Albanian counterpart, did not arrive at his post until September 1954. While these exchanges are not in themselves of great importance, their psychological and prestige value to the Chinese Communist Government, at a time when this government was extremely concerned with establishing its legality both internally and externally, should not be overlooked. The prominence given in the Chinese press to all matters relating to the East European diplomats and visitors reflected the hunger of the Chinese press for "international" items at that time.

Ideologically and politically Sino-East European relations posed no problem during the early phases of the relationship. As early as 1948, Liu Shao-ch'i in his essay *Internationalism and Nationalism* had clearly defined the Chinese Communist position in regard to the East European satellites.<sup>2</sup> He spoke of "the New Democratic countries in South Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Albania and Yugoslavia." "These countries, following their liberation from German and Italian Fascist slavery, are marching toward Socialism under the leadership of their Communist parties. However, in one of these countries, Yugoslavia, as a result of the betrayal of the Tito clique, the proletariat is waging a struggle against those who have betrayed them." He accused Tito of adopting "a policy of national

<sup>2</sup> Liu Shao-ch'i, *Internationalism and Nationalism* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1951), p. 19.

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seclusion and Chauvinism," opposition to "proletarian internationalism," rejection of the "international unity of the proletariat," and opposition to "the Socialist Soviet Union" (p. 9). In a later passage, Tito was identified as a "spokesman of bourgeois nationalism inside the ranks of the proletariat" (p. 40). Liu's world view was precise and uncompromising. He saw two mutually antagonistic camps: The world imperialist camp headed by the United States and reactionaries all over the world, and the world anti-imperialist camp, headed by the Soviet Union, the New Democracies of Eastern Europe, and the national-liberation movements in China, South-East Asia, and Greece. If you did not belong to the one camp, you belonged to the other; there was no neutrality, no third road (pp. 26-27). These statements, first published by Liu Shao-ch'i in 1948, contain the basic features of China's East European policy which has not substantially changed during the last twelve years.

During Stalin's lifetime, and for some time after his death, Sino-East European relations did not develop to any great extent, although a fair number of delegations were exchanged with the satellites. A contributing factor to the relatively low key of Sino-East European relations prior to 1953 was the influence of Joseph Stalin who kept a tight rein on them through the Cominform and whose none too high regard for the Chinese comrades tended to minimise China's stature within the camp of socialism. Nevertheless, when Stalin died on March 5, 1953, China had already signed Trade and Barter agreements, Cultural Co-operation agreements, Technical and Scientific Co-operation agreements, and Postal and Telecommunications conventions with all the East European satellites except Albania.<sup>3</sup> The pattern of Sino-East European trade was then and has remained one of the import to China of manufactured and capital goods, including factory installations, in exchange for Chinese agricultural products and raw materials or luxuries like silk and *objets d'art*.

The period from Stalin's death until the outbreak of the Polish and Hungarian disorders late in 1956 can be termed a transitional period in Sino-East European relations. It was during this period that China finally exchanged Ambassadors with Albania (May 1954), established diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and generally expanded its contacts with Eastern Europe. Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Nieh Jung-chen, Kuo Mo-jo and Hu Yao-pang among others found occasion to visit one or more East European capitals. Direct rail service between China and the East European capitals had been established in January 1954 and facilitated contacts at all levels. In his Report on the Work of the

<sup>3</sup> No agreements with Yugoslavia were signed until February 1956.

Government of November 23, 1954, Chou En-lai reported that "fraternal friendship, and political, economic, and cultural co-operation" was being consolidated and developed between China and the East European satellites. Molotov, in February 1955, referred to China as a "co-leader of the Communist bloc" which had a "co-responsibility for its internal cohesion and external aims." Three months later, in May, China's Defence Minister P'eng Teh-huai attended the Warsaw Pact Conference as an observer and stated that China would "give unreserved support and co-operation to all resolutions adopted by the Conference" and that in case of war in Europe, China would "struggle against aggression jointly with the people and governments of our fraternal countries."

During the 1953-56 transitional period, exactly twice as many trade and miscellaneous agreements were concluded between China and the East European satellites as during the 1949-53 period. (Six with Albania, 11 with Bulgaria, nine with Czechoslovakia, 14 with East Germany, 14 with Hungary, 12 with Poland, nine with Rumania and five with Yugoslavia. The five agreements with Yugoslavia were all signed during a three-day period in February, 1956.) A major diplomatic event was the visit to Peking of the East German Premier Otto Grotewohl in December 1955, who was received with a tremendous show of friendship. The first Session of the National People's Congress in Peking in September 1954, the fifth anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic in October 1954, and the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in September 1956, also provided occasions for party and government leaders of the East European satellites to make their first courtesy calls in Peking. China's prestige and stature within the Communist bloc was steadily rising during this period which saw visits by Khrushchev and Mikoyan to Peking. In February 1956 at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Khrushchev was advocating general adoption of the "well-known Five Principles advocated by the People's Republic of China." While increased contacts with East Europe brought about closer relations with the satellites, the prestige of China was also rising in those countries, partly as a result of China's increased stature in the bloc and possibly because in 1956 China both ideologically and in her domestic policies seemed to be moving in the direction of liberalisation and moderation.

Lu Ting-yi's "One Hundred Flowers" speech<sup>4</sup> of May 26, 1956, the "Ten Principles of Bandung" adopted in April of 1955, and China's full endorsement of the down-grading of Stalin, as manifested in "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat"<sup>5</sup> were all

<sup>4</sup> More properly "Let Flowers of Many Kinds Blossom, Diverse Schools of Thought Contend."

<sup>5</sup> An Editorial appearing in the *People's Daily* on April 5, 1956.

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contributing factors to the creation of such an impression. If China cannot be saddled with the responsibility for creating the atmosphere which led to the 1956 uprisings, it must be noted that China did nothing to prevent a drift toward national Communism until after the uprisings had taken place. At the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which convened (months after the Poznan riots) in September 1956, no criticism of Poland was made. The conclusion might indeed be drawn that the Chinese Communists, in the belief that greater freedom in the East European satellites would strengthen the Communist governments there, at least implicitly "endorsed" the trend towards national Communism and varying roads to socialism.

Under the circumstances the Soviet request for China's intervention in the crises seems entirely logical, especially since by January 1957 the Chinese Communists may have been only too eager to make amends for their previous attitude which may have contributed to the uprisings. These events mark the beginning of a new phase in Sino-East European relations which finds China directly politically involved in problems of Soviet-bloc solidarity, and the ideological and political limitations of "socialist democracy" and "proletarian internationalism."

When the crises began late in October 1956, Chou En-lai was scheduled to leave Peking shortly on an extended tour of South-East Asian countries. The Chinese press waited four days (until October 27, 1956) before publishing the first reports of the uprising. Then it carefully followed the Moscow line in reporting the events. Sample headline: "Counter Revolutionaries Exploit Peaceful Parade in Budapest to Stage Armed Insurrection."

However, on November 1, 1956, the Chinese Government issued a statement on the declaration issued by the Government of the Soviet Union on October 30, 1956. Some excerpts from this statement follow:

The Government of the People's Republic of China considers this declaration of the Government of the Soviet Union to be correct. This declaration is of great importance in correcting errors in mutual relations between the Socialist countries and in strengthening unity among them. The People's Republic maintains that the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-intervention in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence should be the principles governing the establishment and development of mutual relations among the nations of the world. The Socialist countries are all independent, sovereign states. At the same time they are united by the common ideal of socialism and the spirit of proletarian internationalism. Consequently mutual relations between Socialist countries, all the more so, should be established on the basis of these five principles. Only in this way are the Socialist countries able to achieve genuine fraternal friendship and



solidarity and through mutual assistance and co-operation, their desire for a mutual economic upsurge.

As the declaration of the Soviet Government pointed out, the mutual relations between the Socialist countries are not without mistakes. These mistakes resulted in estrangements and misunderstandings between certain Socialist countries. Some of these countries have been unable to build socialism better in accordance with their historical circumstances and special features because of these mistakes. As a result of these estrangements and misunderstandings a tense situation has sometimes occurred which otherwise would not have occurred. The handling of the 1948-49 Yugoslav situation and the recent happenings in Poland are enough to illustrate this. . . .

The Government of the People's Republic of China notes that the people of Poland and Hungary in the recent happenings have raised demands that democracy, independence and equality be strengthened and the material well-being of the people be raised on the basis of developing production. These demands are completely proper. Correct satisfaction of these demands is not only helpful to consolidation of the people's democratic system in these countries but also favourable to the unity among the Socialist countries. . . .

Because of the unanimity of ideology and aim of struggle, it often happens that certain personnel of Socialist countries neglect the principle of equality among nations in their mutual relations. Such a mistake by nature, is the error of bourgeois chauvinism . . . (and) inevitably results in serious damage to the solidarity and common cause of the socialist countries.

While the above statement is supposedly in support of the Soviet Government, it is heavy with criticisms of past Soviet actions. The Chinese Government is here openly supporting satellite aspirations for greater freedom and self-righteously establishing claims to Chinese Communist moral, ideological, and political co-leadership in the Soviet *bloc*. These are precisely the kind of words which East European National Communists would *want* to hear from Peking.

However, only four days later, on November 5, all traces of criticism had vanished and the *People's Daily* cheerfully reported: "The joyful news has arrived that the Hungarian people have set up a workers' and peasants' revolutionary government headed by Comrade Janos Kadar and, with the support of the Soviet Armed Forces in Hungary, have overthrown the reactionary Nagy government which betrayed the Hungarian nation. The Hungarian people have defeated the scheme for a counter-revolutionary comeback and have the entire situation in Hungary under control. The Chinese people who have been deeply concerned about the fate of Hungary in the past ten days or more, warmly greet this great victory of the working people and all patriots of Hungary."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> On November 6, 1956, Chou En-lai sent a message of congratulation to Janos Kadar and announced that China would render material and financial aid in the value of 30 million roubles.

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With the East European situation apparently under control, Chou En-lai left for his tour of South-East Asia on November 17, 1956. Meanwhile the Chinese press continued to give an euphemistic appraisal of East European events. However, on December 24, 1956, it was announced that Chou En-lai would visit Poland in January 1957 at the invitation of the Polish Government. Five days later the Peking *People's Daily* carried a lengthy editorial entitled "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," which included a "post-mortem" on the events in Poland and Hungary, criticism of Yugoslavia's (especially Kardelj's) attitude toward the Hungarian uprising, and a general discussion of Stalin's mistakes and the Soviet Union's path during the past thirty-nine years. The article was based on the discussions at an enlarged meeting of the Chinese Politburo and on the whole was a plea for unity, orthodoxy, and acceptance of Soviet leadership. But it was also openly critical of Soviet mistakes, of Great Nation Chauvinism and disregard for local nationalist aspirations.

Stalin's mistakes aroused grave dissatisfaction among people in certain East European countries. But then neither is the attitude of some people in these countries towards the Soviet Union justified. Bourgeois nationalists try their best to exaggerate the shortcomings of the Soviet Union and overlook the contributions it has made. . . . We Chinese Communists are very glad to see that the Communist Parties of Poland and Hungary are already putting a firm check on the activities of evil elements that fabricate anti-Soviet rumours and stir up national antagonisms in relations with brother countries, and also that these parties have set to work to dispel nationalist prejudices existing among some sections of the masses and even among some party members.<sup>7</sup>

. . . thanks to the help given by the Soviet troops to the Hungarian people, the imperialists were frustrated in their plan to build an outpost of war in Eastern Europe and to disrupt the solidarity of the Socialist camp.<sup>8</sup>

A few days after the publication of this editorial, Chou En-lai interrupted his tour of South-east Asia and headed for Moscow. In Moscow he had two days of talks with Bulganin, Khrushchev, and Kadar, at the end of which a communiqué was issued confirming unity of the Socialist camp and announcing plans for the expansion of economic and cultural contacts. From Moscow Chou proceeded to Warsaw, where he had talks with Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz. The Warsaw communiqué issued on January 16, 1957, is anti-Western in tone but also records Poland's desire for respect for Polish sovereignty, and non-interference in Polish internal affairs by other socialist countries. Polish support for the Kadar régime was also affirmed.

<sup>7</sup> *The Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959), pp. 59-60.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* p. 62.

From Warsaw Chou went for one day to Budapest, where he reiterated his support of the Kadar régime and blamed American intrigues for the Hungarian uprising. On January 17 Chou was back in Moscow, where he continued his talks with leaders in the Kremlin and signed a joint statement referring to national equality in the relations among Socialist states. On January 18, 1957, Chou finally resumed his interrupted tour of South-East Asia.

There was a second Chinese Delegation led by P'eng Chen (a Politburo member and Mayor of Peking) which also toured Eastern Europe immediately after the Hungarian uprising. P'eng's group toured Moscow, Leningrad, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia. The stated task of P'eng's trip was to strengthen unity among Socialist countries.

What effect the appearance of Chinese emissaries in Eastern European capitals may have had on the continued unity of the Soviet *bloc* cannot be judged objectively on present evidence. However, one of the implications is that the Kremlin leaders found it useful at this point to exploit China's reputation as an advocate of "socialist democracy" by sending Chou En-lai to appease Gomulka and bolster the Kadar régime. Chou may have gone to Warsaw with the minimum Soviet demands (adherence to the Warsaw pact and recognition of the Kadar régime, thereby condoning Moscow's suppression of the revolt) and returned to Moscow with the minimum Polish demands (less Soviet interference in Poland's internal affairs, at least a token withdrawal of Soviet troops). The Poles may have been impressed with Chinese arguments for the necessity to remain united in the face of the "imperialist" threat, and may have received Chou's assurances that the Polish viewpoint would be given full consideration and that Moscow was willing to be reasonable. The result was that China gained prestige and gratitude both in Moscow and Eastern Europe and that her claim to ideological and political co-leadership of the Soviet *bloc* was greatly enhanced.

At the same time China had carefully shifted her position to emphasise intra-*bloc* solidarity rather than independence while still paying lip service to "socialist democracy." The extent of China's shift was later to be reflected in the Manifesto of the Communist Parties of the Communist *bloc* issued in Moscow on November 16, 1957, which weakened the theory of varying roads to socialism, no longer claimed absolute equality for the satellites, and raised the cry against revisionism, reportedly on the insistence of Mao Tse-tung, who may thereby have provoked Yugoslavia's refusal to sign. China, being the weaker half of the Sino-Soviet partnership, was apparently fully as afraid of the possible consequences of continued strain between Moscow and East Europe as the Russians

themselves. A new period of increasing Chinese independence in ideology, domestic policies and foreign policy rose like a dragon from the ashes of the Hungarian conflagration.

Meanwhile on February 27, 1957, Mao Tse-tung addressed some 1,800 persons for four hours at a Supreme State Conference he had called. The official text of his speech was published in June 1957 under the title "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People."<sup>9</sup> This extremely important speech, in which Mao's doctrine of "non-antagonistic contradictions among the people" was developed, included a few interesting remarks about the East European uprisings and their effect on China. "Let us see," Mao said, "what effect the Hungarian events had in our country. They caused some of our intellectuals to lose their balance a bit, but there were no tremors. Why? One reason, it must be said, was that we had succeeded in suppressing counter-revolution quite thoroughly." He added later: "Although many of our college students come from families other than those of the working people, all of them, with few exceptions, are patriotic and support socialism; they did not give way to unrest during the Hungarian events." In another reference Mao commented: "It is clear to everybody that the Hungarian events were not a good thing. . . . Because our Hungarian comrades took proper action in the course of these events, what was a bad thing turned ultimately into a good thing. The Hungarian state is now more firmly established than ever, and all other countries in the Socialist camp have also learned a lesson." Mao evidently wished to make sure that a lesson had indeed been learned, and that the unity of the Socialist camp would not be threatened again.

In the months that followed Sino-East European relations assumed an almost frantic aspect with one East European government delegation after the other arriving in Peking for protestations of solidarity, unity and friendship. President Voroshilov and premiers or presidents of all the satellites and of Yugoslavia made personal visits to Peking.

The annual trade and cultural agreements between China and the East European countries were all renewed during 1957. When Mao Tse-tung attended the Fortieth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Moscow in November 1957 he continued to stress the unity of the Socialist camp. In his speech to students at Moscow University on November 18, 1957, he said simply: "Our Socialist camp should have a leader, and that is the Soviet Union. The Communist and Workers' Parties of all countries must also have a leader and that leader is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."

Sino-Yugoslav relations were steadily improving during 1957 and

<sup>9</sup> Mao Tse-tung, *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People*. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958.)

a number of Yugoslav delegations visited Peking in spite of an increasingly critical and condescending attitude on the part of the Chinese. Trade<sup>10</sup> and other agreements were also signed with Yugoslavia during this year which marks the peak of Sino-Yugoslav collaboration and exchanges. When Yugoslavia failed to sign the Communist Declaration issued in Moscow late in November 1957 the Chinese press did not comment on this fact and maintained its current attitude towards Yugoslavia.

An event which may have affected Sino-East European relations in a negative way, was the sudden reversal in early June 1957 of the so-called "100 Flowers" policy of permitting criticism of the Communist Party. The new witch-hunt for "Rightists" which now began in China ended what had seemed like a trend toward liberalisation. It is likely that Chinese politicians viewed the disorders in Eastern Europe as the result of excessive liberalisation in those countries, and wished to make sure nothing of the kind would happen in China. At the same time East European leaders who may have looked toward China for support and comfort must have begun to reconsider their attitude. If the gain in Soviet prestige occasioned by the orbiting of Sputnik I is added to these considerations any temporary Chinese prestige advantage which may have existed early in 1957 would thereby be counterbalanced. Continued Chinese insistence that the Soviet Union was the leader of the camp of socialism whose experience and advice should be followed, further served to affirm this trend.

The year 1958 nevertheless saw a further expansion of Sino-East European ties. East European leaders continued to bring governmental or military delegations to Peking. Agreements on trade, cultural co-operation and scientific and technical assistance were again signed. One hundred and fifty delegations from Communist *bloc* countries toured China in 1958, and China in turn sent 108 delegations to Communist *bloc* countries. Politburo Member Tung Pi-wu attended Communist Party Congresses in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, taking the occasion to campaign against Yugoslavia's modern revisionism. On September 30, 1958, China established Friendship Associations with all the East European satellites.<sup>11</sup> On this occasion 7,000 people gathered in Peking to hear Liu Ning-yi and P'eng Chen praise the unity of the camp of socialism led by the Soviet Union and condemn modern revisionism (Yugoslavia).

The virtual break with Yugoslavia which came in the spring of 1958, and which has endured ever since, was touched off by an editorial in the *People's Daily* on May 5, 1958. The publication of the April 1958 Draft Programme of the Yugoslav League of Communists had first drawn

<sup>10</sup> Level of Sino-Yugoslav trade: £7 million annually.

<sup>11</sup> But not with Yugoslavia.

criticism in the Soviet magazine, *Kommunist*. Russian criticism, while basic and serious, had been couched in friendly terms and showed no desire to renew the kind of schism which occurred in 1948. The Chinese editorial, however, because of its intemperate language and charges of revisionism, anti-Marxism-Leninism, and neo-Bernsteinism, considerably aggravated the situation. It was promptly reprinted in *Pravda* and must have strengthened Soviet advocates of a tough policy towards Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs made no attempt to conceal their indignation at the "filthy insinuations" of the Chinese and firmly rejected most criticisms as interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. By the end of May, 1958, the Soviet Union had announced the "postponement" of credits and other industrial co-operation with Yugoslavia. A speech by Khrushchev in Sofia on June 3, 1958, finally brought the Soviet Union fully in line with the uncompromising attitude of the Chinese Communists. While China did not initiate the second break with the Yugoslavs she definitely forced Khrushchev's hand in the matter. Richard Walker in a recent article<sup>12</sup> attributes Peking's hard line towards Yugoslavia to personal pique on the part of Mao Tse-tung. There may be some truth in this, but probably ideological factors as well as political considerations played an equally important role.

The Chinese continued their vituperation of Yugoslavia after Khrushchev's speech in Sofia, Ch'en Po-ta writing in *Red Flag* that "for the imperialists Tito is indeed more valuable than Judas." When the death sentence on Imre Nagy was published the *People's Daily* described this as "welcome news," adding that the 1956 uprising had been "revisionism exported from Yugoslavia to Hungary." On June 25, 1958, the Yugoslav Ambassador to Peking finally took the hint and went home. China's ambassador in Belgrade was relieved of his post on September 11, 1958.

The year 1958 saw the introduction of the communes in China. Since Khrushchev had openly rejected the communes system for the Soviet Union, it was to be doubted that the idea of communes would find a very enthusiastic reception in such countries as Poland, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia, where even Soviet-style collectivisation had dragged its feet. The most sympathetic attitude was taken by Eastern Germany, which was more collectivised than the other satellites, and Bulgaria, where according to Bulgarian statistics the percentage of land farmed co-operatively had reached 92.3 in 1958. The institution in Bulgaria of a degree of economic decentralisation and the creation of a number of administrative-economic units made up of formerly separate co-operatives has been interpreted by some as being modelled upon the Chinese

<sup>12</sup> "Chairman Mao and the Cult of Personality" in *Encounter*, June 1960, Vol. XIV, No. 6, pp. 40 and 41.



communes. Some co-operative farms in Bulgaria have indeed commenced paying a fixed monthly salary to their members in addition to the provision of stocks of farm produce for domestic requirements and sale on the free market. However, in the Bulgarian descriptions of these innovations the Chinese communes are not mentioned and the similarities with the Chinese system are not very striking.

Nevertheless a number of East European visitors—including Premier Grotewohl of East Germany—to China at least made polite remarks about the communes, and the Polish Minister of Labour and Social Welfare even offered to recommend the experience to the Poles.

No startling changes in Sino-East European relations have occurred since the end of 1958. The usual trade, cultural co-operation, and scientific and technological exchange agreements are still being signed annually in Peking or in the satellite capitals concerned. Delegations are still shuttling back and forth between East Europe and People's China at the rate of more than four a week. In 1959 there were 127 such delegations from East Europe to China and 104 Chinese delegations to Eastern Europe.

The tenth anniversary celebrations of the Chinese People's Republic in Peking during September/October 1959 were again the occasion for the dispatch of delegations from all the East European satellites to Peking. Conspicuous by absence was a delegation from Yugoslavia. But Chinese relations with Yugoslavia had nevertheless not been entirely severed. Sino-Yugoslav trade agreements for the exchange of goods in the value of £1½ million annually were signed both in 1958 (after the *People's Daily* editorial) and in 1959. In November of 1959, almost two months after the anniversary celebrations at which the Yugoslavs had been boycotted, Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i sent a personal cable to President Tito, congratulating him on the occasion of the Yugoslav National Day. The Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires in Peking gave a National Day reception on November 29 which was attended by two minor Peking officials, Yü Pei-wen, Director of the Protocol Department, and Yü Chan, Deputy Director of the Department of Soviet Union and East European Affairs. It is, however, doubtful that this represents a partial thaw of Sino-Yugoslav relations, in view of the uncompromising statement by K'ang Sheng, the Chinese observer at the February 1960 meeting of the Warsaw Treaty powers in Moscow, in which he described them as "renegades to the Communist movement."<sup>13</sup>

Of the speeches by East European delegates at the tenth anniversary of the Communist régime in Peking, the one by the East German delegate was longest and seemed most cordial towards the Chinese. He commented favourably on the communes, in contrast to other speakers

<sup>13</sup> Reproduced in *The China Quarterly*, No. 2, April-June, 1960, pp. 84-89.



hardly mentioned the Soviet Union, and reminded his listeners that the German Democratic Republic and the Chinese People's Republic had both been founded in the same year and the same month. He did not mention that both also had special reason to hate the United States for supporting their principal adversaries and that they therefore had certain foreign policy aims in common which might not always be convenient to the Soviet Union.<sup>14</sup> It was perhaps not a coincidence that Sino-East German exchanges (43 delegations in 1959) top the list in a tie with Sino-Czechoslovak exchanges. To the political consideration here must be added the practical reasons that East Germany and Czechoslovakia are the two most highly industrialised of the satellites and therefore potentially the most useful to the industry-conscious Chinese, and that Sino-East German trade, by volume, is second only to Sino-Soviet trade.

Two prominent Chinese visitors to Eastern Europe during 1959 were Marshal Chu Teh and Defence Minister P'eng Teh-huai. While it may be a coincidence, P'eng Teh-huai's stay in East Germany was longer than in any of the other satellites. Some of these surface manifestations of the Sino-East German relationship may well have made Soviet leaders feel slightly nervous and annoyed. It is certain that both Mao Tse-tung and Walter Ulbricht welcomed the summit collapse. There has been talk of a "Peking-Pankow Axis." However, in June 1960, before the Bucharest Congress, an official statement<sup>15</sup> emanating from the East German Press maintained that the Chinese people's communes were *not* a higher form of agricultural producers' co-operatives and that *no* people's communes would be established in East Germany. It was further made clear that East Germany would follow the Soviet Union in major questions of policy. This development cast doubt upon a Sino-East German identity of viewpoints. The statement has widely been regarded as a signal that East Germany was swinging back into line with Moscow. The fact that the cultural, scientific and technical exchanges between East Germany and China, which had been maintained at a very high level, have recently been considerably reduced would seem to confirm the drift away from Peking.

Albania is another satellite which seems to have been flirting with Peking. China and Albania share a common hatred of Yugoslavia, which in terms of Professor Walker's analysis must make Mao Tse-tung love the Albanians very dearly. Albania has received long-term Chinese loans and during the first half of 1960 has developed especially close relations with Peking. However, in the other East European satellites

<sup>14</sup> Dr. J. Dieckmann, President of the East German People's Chamber, upon his arrival in Peking in April 1959, had said: "Germany will one day be unified, Taiwan will one day be liberated."

<sup>15</sup> See the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, June 17, 1960.

Communist China's prestige and popularity seems to have somewhat receded during the past two years due to the anti-rightist campaign, the communes, apparently excessive belligerency towards the West, dogmatism and excessive persecution of revisionism. Moscow has doubtlessly strengthened this tendency by emphasising that "unity of the socialist camp" is based on allegiance to the Soviet Union. It is noteworthy that at the Bucharest Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party in June 1960, the East European satellite leaders all supported Khrushchev in his debate with the Chinese on the inevitability of war with the capitalist world.

Nevertheless Sino-East European relations have already become an important aspect of politics in the Communist orbit and will continue to deserve the utmost attention, especially as long as Peking and Moscow disagree publicly on important issues, as they have done recently. There is no doubt that China has resorted to her time-honoured practice of "fighting Barbarians with Barbarians," in this case by trying to use the satellites to put pressure on the Soviet Union. This scheme can succeed, however, only in cases where Chinese interests coincide with those of one or the other satellite. This alone would suffice to keep the majority of the East European satellites on the Soviet side for the present—quite apart from the hard facts of geography which must keep a possible potential dissident like East Germany in line.

## RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

*With the next four articles we initiate a new section of THE CHINA QUARTERLY in which we will provide extended analyses by contributors of the most important recent events to complement our Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation.*

### *The 1960 Educational Reforms*

By ROBERT D. BARENDSEN

SINCE the 1920s the pattern prevailing in the field of primary and secondary education in China has been that of a twelve-year cycle divided into three basic parts—a six-year primary or elementary school followed by a three-year “junior middle” or junior high school and a three-year “senior middle” or senior high. The six-year elementary cycle was further subdivided into four years of junior grades followed by two years of senior grades.

This basic twelve-year primary-secondary cycle was inherited by the Chinese Communist régime when it gained power in 1949 and has been continued as the standard pattern in full-time “regular” or “ordinary” (i.e., academic-type) pre-university level education until the present time.<sup>1</sup>

As of late 1958, some 94,920,000 students in Communist China were enrolled in schools in this sector of the educational system—86,400,000 in elementary schools, 7,340,000 in full-time ordinary junior middle schools, and 1,180,000 in full-time ordinary (college-preparatory) senior middle schools.<sup>2</sup> Among these students, those at the middle school level are the élite of their age group. Several million additional young people of high school age are reported to be receiving secondary-level

<sup>1</sup> From late 1951 to late 1953 the régime experimented with the substitution of a five-year unified elementary school for the six-year school divided into two parts, but this experiment proved abortive and was abandoned at the end of 1953.

<sup>2</sup> The figure for elementary students and the total for regular full-time middle school students appear in the section on cultural and educational affairs in *Wei-ta Ti Shih-nien* (*The Great Ten Years*), a statistical report compiled by the State Statistical Bureau of Communist China and published by the People's Publishing House on September 1, 1959. The breakdown for the two levels of middle schools was given in an English language news release of the official New China News Agency (NCNA) dated September 18, 1959.

education in a network of vocational schools, mainly on a part-time basis, and in spare-time classes organised by industrial and agricultural units.

The educational experience of students in the ordinary full-time elementary and secondary schools has been affected in various ways during the ten years in which the Communist régime has been in power, most notably in recent years by the changes instituted under the educational reforms of 1958. The major emphasis in the 1958 changes was on the introduction of "productive labour" into the curriculum of all schools and colleges. Under this policy all students from the age of nine up were required to spend a certain number of hours of their school time each week working at jobs assigned them by their school authorities. According to an account by the régime's official news agency, in early 1959 primary students were generally working four hours a week, junior middle school students six hours, and senior middle school students eight hours.<sup>3</sup> The type of work varied with the ages and capacities of the students, but most of it was of such a nature as to fulfil an economic need. Some of the work performed by elementary pupils was of the "housekeeping" variety, but much of the labour, even among these pupils, went into the production of goods for the market. Students laboured in workshops set up on the school premises or in nearby factories or farms.

During 1959, while methods for combining education and productive labour were being worked out and implemented, articles in the mainland press indicated that there was some concern as to the effects these changes were having upon the quality of teaching and learning in the schools. The régime cautioned against an overemphasis on labour, and found it necessary to remind both students and educators that pupils were in school primarily to study. The net result of the discussions of the new changes, however, was a reaffirmation of the need for productive labour in the schools, an insistence that the innovations had not affected the quality of education where they were correctly administered, and a castigation of the motives and attitudes of the critics.

At the beginning of 1960 it appeared that although considerable progress had been made in adjusting the educational system to the dictates of the policy of incorporating labour into the school curriculum, the new system emerging from the 1958 reforms had not been fully consolidated. Yet in April this year the régime announced its intention to embark on still another major alteration in its educational system.

<sup>3</sup> NCNA news release of March 23, 1959. These figures are cited in J. C. Cheng, "Half-Work and Half-Study in Communist China," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXXII, No. 2 (June 1959), p. 191.

## THE 1960 EDUCATIONAL REFORMS

### THE 1960 REFORMS

#### *Outline of the reforms*

The new changes in the educational system were announced in early April at a meeting of the National People's Congress, the highest legislative body in Communist China. They were outlined in two speeches to the Congress—one by Minister of Education Yang Hsiu-feng and one by Lu Ting-yi, who is a vice-premier of the government and concurrently the Director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.<sup>4</sup> Lu has been in recent years the Party's foremost spokesman on educational policy.<sup>5</sup>

The central point in these two speeches was the announcement of the intention to reduce appreciably the number of years in the primary-secondary cycle in full-time schools. Both Lu and Yang revealed that a number of provinces and municipalities had been experimenting since 1958 with various ways of shortening the cycle. A large number of areas were reported to have tried out the substitution of a five-year unified (integrated) elementary cycle for the previous two-part six-year cycle. Several provinces had experimented with a five-year secondary cycle, either unified or split into a three-year junior middle and two-year senior middle school. Some areas had tried out a ten-year unified primary-secondary cycle.<sup>6</sup> One province and the influential Peking Normal University were said to have conducted experiments with a nine-year unified system. All of these various experiments were said to have proved the feasibility of shortening the cycle.

No firm final choice among the alternatives was laid down in the speeches. The Minister of Education contented himself with calling for a reduction of years and citing the various successful experiments. The Party spokesman—whose views presumably are more authoritative—took a more definite stand, stating that "it is our preliminary intention . . . to reduce the number of years of full-time middle and elementary school education to approximately ten." He also went somewhat beyond this formula by adding the comment that "it is practicable to adopt the ten-year unified middle and elementary school education system"—thereby indicating a preference for a *unified* cycle as well as one of ten

<sup>4</sup> Yang's speech was published in the Peking newspaper *Jen-min Jih-pao* (*People's Daily*) of April 9, 1960. Lu's speech was printed in the same newspaper on April 10. A translation of Lu's speech prepared by the régime for foreign consumption appears in the magazine *Peking Review*, No. 19, 1960 (May 10, 1960), pp. 15-20.

<sup>5</sup> Lu's formal post in the Party organisation illustrates the close connection between education and propaganda under a Communist régime.

<sup>6</sup> It is not clear just how much experimentation with a 10-year unified system has taken place. The Minister of Education said that "a number of localities" had tried this system, but Lu Ting-yi mentioned only Peking and Honan Province in this connection. With respect to Lu's statement, however, it may be significant that both Peking Municipality and Honan Province have often served as experimental or "model" areas in recent years.

years' duration. It would thus appear that the régime is actually thinking in terms of a ten-year cycle, but leaving a loop-hole for some slight modification if further experience should indicate its desirability.

The question immediately arises as to what levels of accomplishment the graduates of this new shortened cycle will be expected to achieve. Both Yang and Lu are explicit on this point. After mentioning the various experiments in shortening the cycle (including the Peking Normal University advocacy of a nine-year period), the Minister of Education says that "all of these experiments and views indicate that the standards of the middle school graduates under the new systems would be raised to the level of present college freshmen." Lu says that under the ten-year system it would be feasible to "raise the standard of the graduates to that of freshmen in our colleges." Although the point is not spelled out in either case in so many words, the logical interpretation of these remarks is that both men were referring to the standards of students who have *finished* the freshman year. Thus the régime's intention seems to be not only to compress a previous twelve-year educational experience into "approximately ten years," but to incorporate into that period as well the work heretofore offered in the first year of college.

One might imagine that this compression and acceleration of primary and secondary education might be facilitated by a reduction of the hours of "productive labour" required and an increase in the time spent in the classroom. But such is apparently not to be the case. Although there is no indication in either speech of the precise extent to which labour will be expanded, both Lu and Yang call for "suitable increases" in physical labour as part of the new reforms. The Minister of Education is the more outspoken of the two men on this point, and his reasoning is worth quoting at length:

In carrying out the reform of the school system in middle and elementary schools, it is necessary to suitably increase working hours. This is because the co-ordination of education with productive labour is the central task in the educational revolution. . . . We must not neglect labour at any time.

In the past, because of restrictive labour conditions and long class hours, it was impossible to set aside much time for the students to participate in physical labour. In the future, after tightening control over class hours and after improving and intensifying pedagogical work, it will become possible to suitably increase the students' working hours.

As indicated in the above quotation, the plan is to decrease the number of hours in class. Elsewhere in his speech Yang enjoins teachers to reduce their lecture hours and require students to spend relatively more time in "self-study" and homework.

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### *Timing and motivation*

There can be no doubt that the régime is committed to undertaking the radical changes indicated in the two speeches to the Congress. The Party spokesman stated unequivocally that "we have now determined to [take] this road," and the Minister of Education called upon everyone concerned to recognise the "necessity" for the reforms and to "confidently and actively carry out the reform programme wherever possible and as early as possible." In Communist China such statements as these from authoritative spokesmen mean that basic decisions in principle have been made at the highest levels. But the details of the implementation of this basic decision are still open to some discussion. Both Lu and Yang took pains to say that the régime fully expected that the carrying out of the reform plan could be done only gradually over a period of ten to twenty years. Lu called for the launching of even larger-scale experiments than those which were quietly conducted in the past two years, warned against "impetuosity," and reminded his audience that "partial and temporary setbacks and even partial failures" could be expected in the course of working out the new system over time. He also noted that no Party or government decrees had yet been issued on the subject, and that the new system was not yet formally adopted.

The basic rationale behind the intended changes was explicitly stated in the speeches before the Congress. It was found not in the field of pedagogy, but in the sphere of economics. It was expressed most succinctly and bluntly by the Party spokesman, Lu Ting-yi:

Why do we advocate "approximately ten years"? Because it takes approximately ten years for children who start schooling at six or seven years of age to grow to the age of sixteen or seventeen, when they will be considered as full manpower units.

Continuing with equal directness, Lu added that

all students in our present senior middle schools now are full manpower units. For this reason, we cannot afford to extend our present senior middle school education to too many persons. . . . Should we try to increase [the numbers in these schools] we would take away too much manpower from production.

It is clear from Lu's statements that the primary consideration, in the régime's view, is the need to have most youths of the sixteen to seventeen age bracket available for employment. It cannot "afford," from an economic standpoint, to have very many of this age group still engaged in full-time education. Since students are considered ready for enrolment in elementary school at age six or seven, they will have time for only approximately ten years of school before they become "full manpower units." It is by this method of calculation, apparently, that the



régime has arrived at the figure of about ten years as the basis for the new school system.

Lu Ting-yi estimated that whereas the presently supportable full-time middle-school enrolment provides less than a million senior middle graduates a year, the country could afford to offer regular middle-school education to many more young people and could obtain several million more graduates annually if the students were able to complete middle school by age sixteen or seventeen.

*Methods for compressing and accelerating study*

The ways and means by which the régime will accomplish the proposed compressing and accelerating of the primary-secondary cycle have not as yet been spelled out in detail, and will presumably be the subject of continuing experimentation. But the basic approach to this problem and some interesting particulars were mentioned in the two speeches. The main lines of thinking were revealed by the speakers in two ways—by voicing criticisms of the present curriculum and teaching methods, and by making specific suggestions for the elimination of some defects. The Party spokesman did not go into great detail on criticisms but he did acknowledge that since the Communist régime had taken over the mainland

cultural standards have been lowered in some respects, as exemplified by the elimination of analytical geometry from the curricula of senior middle schools and the adoption of lower standards in foreign languages.

The Minister of Education was more caustic. Speaking of the "most serious conditions" contributing to poor results in elementary and middle-school education, he noted that

much of the mathematics, physics, and chemistry now taught in middle schools, in particular, is old stuff from the nineteenth century which in no way represents the science and technology of today.

The methods by which the régime hopes to overcome such serious defects were indicated in the guidelines laid down by Yang and in the reports of recent experimentation contained in the two speeches. As a matter of first importance the Minister of Education (and Lu as well) placed great emphasis on a concept of key courses in the curriculum. The key courses are seen as being mathematics and languages (both native and foreign). Mastery of these subjects is said to make it "relatively easy" to understand all others.

In line with the idea of concentration on mathematics and languages, several concrete proposals were put forward. Regarding mathematics, Yang suggested that this subject should be introduced into the curriculum at an earlier stage and pushed forward at an accelerated rate. All

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arithmetic and simple algebraic equations currently taught in junior middle schools (seventh to ninth grade) should be taught in elementary schools.<sup>7</sup> All "basic" mathematics currently taught in college should be covered in senior middle school; analytical geometry as well as differential and integral calculus should be included at this level.

The Minister of Education made no specific proposals regarding the acceleration of language study, but Lu mentioned successful experiments ostensibly proving that the study of the native written language could be introduced in kindergarten and speeded up drastically in the early primary years.

Yang made several suggestions looking to the acceleration and modernisation of science study at the secondary level. He said that all basic science now taught in college should be covered in senior middle school, that physics courses at that level should have more advanced material in nuclear physics and cover the theory of semi-conductors, and that senior middle chemistry courses should have more advanced material on high molecular compounds and include the study of rare elements.

In order to devote greater attention to these subjects, Yang suggested that less time be spent on courses of lesser importance, and that some subjects be dropped out of the curriculum. He did not list the courses which were slated for elimination, but he indicated that they would be mainly in the category of the social sciences by making particular appeals for the merging of all elementary-level history, geography, and natural science into one "common knowledge course," the amalgamation of middle-school foreign and domestic geography into a single course, and the "streamlining" of middle-school history and geography to "reduce redundancy."

Some further details on the methods by which the régime hopes to accomplish the compression of the primary-secondary cycle were supplied in another speech to the Congress, given by Yeh Sheng-tao, a Vice-Minister of Education.<sup>8</sup> Addressing the meeting on the subject of the pressing need for further reform of textbooks for elementary and middle schools, Yeh followed closely the lines laid down by Yang and Lu. He maintained that much of the material in present elementary-level arithmetic and native language texts was pitched at too low a level due to an underrating of the younger children's capacity for learning. He was

<sup>7</sup> This suggestion was in line with experimentation reported by Lu, who said that algebra had been successfully introduced in fifth grade "in co-ordination with arithmetic" and had proved useful to the students in solving arithmetical problems. Another experiment reported by Lu revealed that kindergarten children could be taught to "calculate figures up to 20" through games.

<sup>8</sup> Yeh's speech was published in the *Jen-min Jih-pao* on April 14, 1960. A translation appears in U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, "Translations of *Jen-min Jih-pao* Articles on Education—Communist China" (JPRS Report No. 2777, June 3, 1960), pp. 23-36.

particularly concerned with the time wasted in the overlapping repetitions of subject-matter at various levels in the elementary and middle-school treatment of such subjects as arithmetic and history. And he was even more critical of outdated material in the field of mathematics and science than his superior, stating that the "basic contents of mathematical textbooks still remain at the level of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries." Summarising his views as to what could be accomplished through a tightening and modernisation of teaching materials, Yeh said that the mathematics previously studied in seven years at elementary and secondary levels could be covered in only four years within elementary school, and that a total of more than 1,000 class-hours could be saved in middle schools in the subjects of language, mathematics, history, geography, physics, biology and chemistry.<sup>9</sup>

Presumably further experimentation will lead to the additional changes needed to complete the revision of the curriculum. Such experimentation will undoubtedly be undertaken in such a way as to conform to the general approach indicated in the Congress speeches.

Yang and Lu also specified in their speeches a number of supplementary measures which were necessary to make possible the changes to a shorter primary-secondary cycle. Foremost among these was the need to upgrade training in normal schools and colleges in order to raise the standards of teachers, including those for strengthened nurseries and kindergartens. Lu also mentioned the need for new equipment, citing audio-visual aids as the main category in this respect. And the Party spokesman called for more dormitories, an appeal apparently aimed at further extending the recent trend toward boarding schools at all levels.

In addition to these recommendations, both Lu and Yang (and Yeh as well) called for better "ideological preparations" to facilitate the new reforms. Under this heading they repeated the standard exhortations to all educational personnel to familiarise themselves with the guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thought, intensify their "Marxist-Leninist ideological and political education," and thoroughly condemn the theories of "bourgeois pedagogy."

#### IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW REFORMS

The outline of the new system of primary and secondary education and the material presented in explaining and justifying the change have

<sup>9</sup> A reduction of 1,000 class-hours would mean the elimination of approximately one-sixth of the total class-hours in the six-year middle school cycle. This would be roughly equivalent to one year of class time. See an article by V. Klepikov in the Soviet journal *Narodnoye Obrazovaniye* (*Popular Education*), No. 8/1958, pp. 100-101, translated by Ina Schlesinger in *School and Society*, Vol. 88, No. 2168 (February 13, 1960), pp. 72-74, which gives 6,023 as the total number of hours in the middle school curriculum in Communist China.

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significant implications which throw light on the whole pattern of educational development in Communist China. First of all, the Congress speeches confirm notable weaknesses existing in the current system of pre-university level education—weaknesses that still exist after ten years under the Communist régime. The Minister of Education's flat statement that much of the mathematics, physics, and chemistry now taught in secondary schools is badly outdated points up a critically serious problem in a country struggling to build itself into a modern industrialised nation. The problem is accentuated when one considers that in a brief section of his speech devoted to current tasks in the field of higher education, Yang said that "we should quickly include the most advanced sciences and technology needed by our country in the curricula of our full-time higher education institutions." The implication is that the present system is backward in science and technology at the college level as well as in the middle schools.

Not only does the backwardness in middle school mathematics still exist today, but it has apparently become worse under the Communist régime. Lu Ting-yi acknowledged this when he mentioned that cultural standards had declined since the Communists took over the mainland, and cited the elimination of analytical geometry from the senior middle school curriculum as a case in point.

In the same breath in which he noted the decline in mathematics standards, Lu also mentioned a lowering of standards in foreign language training in the middle schools. This criticism is especially striking in view of the fact that both Lu and Yang refer to mathematics and languages as the key subjects in the elementary and secondary curriculum. It would thus appear that the régime has allowed a decline in standards in the very courses which it now views as the central core of the curriculum.

The new reform programme foresees the elimination of these weaknesses from the present system. But the implementation of the reforms will require the solution of many new problems arising out of the new system. One major problem will be the providing of trained teachers and facilities for the drastically increased numbers of pupils to be studying at the upper secondary level. Whereas at present full-time senior middle schools are turning out only several hundred thousand graduates a year, the new shortened system is seen as being able to turn out several million graduates annually. Since there will be about ten times as many students at the upper secondary level in full-time schools as there are now, there will be a need for at least several times as many teachers with the advanced level of training needed to teach at the senior middle school level. If science instruction is to be modernised and

strengthened at that level, a great amount of expensive facilities and equipment—e.g., laboratories and audio-visual aids—will also have to be provided. Such tasks will tax the capacities of the national economy, even if the burden is spread over a number of years.

Another basic problem that must be faced, of course, is the working out of a system in which twelve or thirteen years' work can be compressed into ten while the student's hours of "productive labour" are increased and his class hours are reduced. How this will be done is still unclear at the present time. Apparently some courses will be dropped and others will be drastically consolidated, but the only real clues to the régime's intentions in this regard are the suggestions by Yang regarding the "merging" and "streamlining" of courses in the social science field and Yeh's remarks on textbook reform. One very interesting possibility arising out of Yang's suggestion is that the régime may be considering reducing the time allotted to political courses in the regular school curriculum. Neither the Party spokesman nor the Minister of Education placed any emphasis on the place of courses dealing with political matters in the new school system. This omission was rather striking in view of the fact that the documents issued at the time of the announcement of the 1958 reforms stressed the importance of such study at all levels in the educational system. It is just conceivable—although subject to future confirmation—that the régime feels secure enough at this juncture to reduce overt political indoctrination in the regular full-time schools in favour of a more concentrated academic curriculum.<sup>10</sup>

The compression of the primary-secondary cycle into fewer years will also be facilitated if Lu Ting-yi's call for the provision of dormitories for all students is rapidly carried out. In a boarding-school atmosphere it would be much easier for the régime to control an intensified programme of supervised self-study, and to set up convenient time-saving arrangements for labour.

The proposed new school system has important implications for the future of higher education, although that sector of the educational system is not directly affected by the reforms announced in April. One of the current problems in the field of higher education is a reported shortage of middle-school graduates qualified to enter the colleges.<sup>11</sup> The new

<sup>10</sup> In this connection, however, it should be noted that in discussing the reform of history textbooks, Yeh criticised the failure of some current texts to "use the class viewpoint in the analysis of an historical situation." He added that "we must use the proletarian standpoint . . . and method in the description of the phenomena of society and the phenomena of nature. Only thus may we . . . augment the political and ideological character of the textbooks."

<sup>11</sup> This problem is acknowledged in the announcement of the Ministry of Education regulations governing the enrolment of new college students in 1960. See the announcement released by NCNA on June 3, 1960, translated in *Survey of China Mainland Press* (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 2285 (June 27, 1960), pp. 12-13.

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system will produce several million more senior middle school graduates annually, and these students will be qualified to seek entrance to the colleges. But how will this large increase be accommodated at the college level? <sup>12</sup> Lu Ting-yi, in his speech, said that once these large numbers of senior middle school graduates were available, the régime would set up a large number of full-time, part-time, and spare-time higher educational institutions throughout the country, so that "we shall be able to let all youth above sixteen and seventeen years receive higher education." But how can the régime allow all the young people of sixteen and seventeen to continue on into higher education, when the basic reason for the shortening of the primary-secondary cycle is to have all young people of this age through with school and ready for employment? There can be only one answer to this apparent contradiction. It seems clear that the overwhelming majority of the students going on to higher education will take their college work on a *spare-time* basis, studying after work in a network of spare-time collegiate-level institutions.

The announcement of the new reforms in the Chinese Communist educational system is also of interest because of the light it throws on current educational thinking in that country as compared with that in the other major power in the Communist *bloc*—the Soviet Union. Superficially, the move to shorten the pre-university cycle to approximately ten years brings China into line with the current Soviet system, which is based on a ten-year period. However, it may be significant that the Chinese Communists are shortening their cycle, while the Soviets have moved from nine to ten years and are now changing gradually to an eleven-year primary-secondary cycle. Thus the trend in the two countries seems to be in opposite directions. As further details on the revisions in curriculum and changes in teaching methods to be adopted in Communist China become available, it will be interesting to compare the Chinese approach with developments in the Soviet Union—as well as with modern pedagogical ideas in other parts of the world.

In the three months after the new reform plans were presented to the National People's Congress in April, virtually no further details on the intended changes were released in the mass media on the Chinese mainland, although leading speakers at a national meeting of "advanced workers" in the cultural field held in Peking in early June made passing references to the intended reforms. It is likely that discussions of detailed ways and means to carry out the changes are taking place in educational circles throughout the country at the present time, in line with the cautious policy of gradualism called for by the régime.

<sup>12</sup> Communist China's full-time institutions of higher learning will take in only 280,000 new students in 1960. *Ibid.*



## North Vietnam's Party Congress

By P. J. HONEY

"THIS is an historic event of great significance in the political life of the Vietnam Workers' Party and people. With incomparable feelings of joy, we warmly congratulate the conference on its important achievements." So ran the editorial in the *Jen-min Jih-pao* (*People's Daily*) on the morning of September 12, although—unless the Chinese are a nation of masochists, which I refuse to believe—it is hard to discover the reason for this jubilation, for China had just suffered her most humiliating defeat to date in the ideological war she is waging against the Soviet Union. The occasion was the Third Congress of the Vietnam Lao-Dong, or Workers' Party, which met in Hanoi from September 5 to 10. Since it was the first such congress for nine years, the Vietnamese Communists had spared neither trouble nor expense to make it a resounding success. Official delegations from the fraternal parties of eleven Communist states attended, together with representatives from Communist parties of seven non-Communist countries and fraternal diplomats stationed in Hanoi. The date of the congress had been carefully fixed so that proceedings would open three days after North Vietnam's National Day, and the foreign visitors had been invited to come a few days early to sample the delights of this celebration too.

August 31 was taken up with the arrival of delegates and their ceremonial reception at Gia-lam airport, with the customary welcoming banquet given by the Prime Minister in the evening. It was not until the following day, at an Eve-of-National Day meeting in Hanoi, that proceedings commenced in earnest, but when they did they got away to what our sports commentators would term an "all-action start." Pham Van Dong's opening speech demonstrated, beyond any possible doubt, that he supported the Russian case against the Chinese, for he said, "Nowadays the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries are successfully building Socialism and Communism and have become an invincible force. Along with peace-loving people all over the world, they are able to prevent war, to check the bloodstained hands of the imperialists, preserve peace, and save mankind from a new World War, a nuclear war." This statement indicated a complete change in the position which Vietnam had hitherto occupied, and its suddenness must have caused considerable shock, particularly to the Chinese.

The leader of the Soviet delegation, Mukhitdinov, a member



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of the Praesidium and a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, also spoke, and he too argued Russia's case in the dispute. After declaring the intention of the Russian Government and Party to increase its co-operation with North Vietnam, he went on to state, "The foreign policy of the Soviet Union aims at ensuring a lasting peace among nations, eliminating the cold war, and ending the armament race. This policy is winning warm support from the working people throughout the world because it reflects their fundamental interests. The Soviet Union undertakes to create conditions for eliminating the possibilities of provoking war. The clear and concrete proposals of the Soviet Government on general and complete disarmament, put forward in various speeches by Premier Khrushchev, is the correct way to create a favourable atmosphere in international relations."

The leader of the Chinese delegation, Li Fu-ch'un, who must have been greatly perturbed by what he had just heard, also spoke, devoting much of his speech to the "comradeship in arms between the Chinese and Vietnamese peoples" and stressing the factors binding the two countries closely together.

No less interesting than the speeches themselves was their treatment by the Russian, Chinese, and Vietnamese news agencies. Pham Van Dong was reported by all three agencies, but the New China News Agency (NCNA) omitted his references to the possibility of avoiding war. Tass and the Vietnam News Agency (VNA) reported the speech made by Mukhitdinov, but the Chinese failed to make any mention of it. The NCNA reported Li Fu-ch'un's speech in full, but the VNA simply named him as a speaker giving no details of what he said, although the agency reported separately on the other main speeches. The Tass report of the meeting did not mention Li Fu-ch'un at all. Thus, even before the Party Congress had met, the ideological warfare between the Soviet Union and China was being openly waged in Hanoi, and the Vietnamese had suddenly switched their former neutral policy to one of support for the Russian line. It was in this strained atmosphere that the Congress opened, and the dispute hung like a storm cloud over the whole proceedings, tending to overshadow the purely Vietnamese business. It quickly became clear that the new North Vietnamese alignment with Russia had greatly influenced the whole content of the Congress, and that all the policies put forward had been specially designed to fit the new situation.

Purely from the point of view of the Lao-Dong Party itself, the most important business of the whole Congress was the unexpectedly outspoken report on the revision of the Party Constitution read by Le Duc Tho, a member of the Political Bureau. The revised constitution is designed to strengthen the Party Central Committee "in numbers and quality," to raise the criteria of Party membership, to stress the

importance of the Labour Youth Union as an auxiliary and reserve body, to heighten the Marxist-Leninist theoretical standards, and to make the Party more disciplined and democratic. The report itself was frank to the point of bluntness, and a careful study of it is revealing.

In the first place, it admits past failures of the Party without most of the customary equivocation and circumlocution. It points out that "the work of building the Party has not always been thoroughly performed with the correct line and guiding principles. . . . As a result, at this moment when we are stepping into the period of Socialist revolution, some of our weaknesses have come to light." At another point, the report states, "We must struggle against erroneous political and ideological tendencies so as to preserve inner Party unity and consolidate inner Party discipline. But there are a number of comrades who are much worried when we speak of inner Party struggle because they fear that struggle may destroy solidarity. Therefore, contradictory views usually are not thoroughly debated to distinguish between right and wrong. Shortcomings in work are usually not severely criticised. In many Party committees and organisations there is an easy-going atmosphere, a tendency to 'consider peace as the most important thing'." Again, "Apart from the very small number of counter-revolutionary and opportunist elements, which the Party must relentlessly expose and drive out of its ranks, comrades who have committed mistakes unconsciously and who are prepared to listen to reason and make efforts to correct themselves, must be criticised in the spirit of comradeship, according to the principle of curing the disease to cure the patient, and aiming at educating and uniting the comrades."

All of this would seem to indicate a major purge of the Vietnamese Lao-Dong Party in the near future, a purge in which some of the leading members are to be expelled, while others are to be given the opportunity to admit past errors and to remain in the Party with, presumably, their influence much reduced. The question which immediately springs to mind is "Which Party leaders?" and here the report is explicit. "Dogmatism," it says, "is quite serious among leading cadres at all levels. It is most readily observed in the mechanical study and application of foreign experiences. . . . Dogmatism has limited the creative power of the Party and the masses, has hampered the development of the wisdom and experience of our whole Party." Dogmatism is, of course, the crime of which China stands accused in the ideological dispute now raging within the Communist world, so the only possible interpretation of the Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution is the following one. At all levels in the Vietnamese Party leadership there are numbers of persons who, during the period when North Vietnam was still neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute, were inclined to favour the

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Chinese line. Now, however, Vietnam has decided to support the Russian line, so these people are to be purged or else to be given an opportunity to recant and admit their past errors. Such a purge will have the effect of aligning North Vietnam still more closely with the Soviet Union and making her hostile to China.

Other evidence confirms this conclusion. Until September 1, all the utterances of Vietnamese Communist leaders had been ambiguously phrased so that it had not been possible to divine from them whether Vietnam backed the Russian or the Chinese line, but Pham Van Dong's speech made on the eve of National Day unmistakably supported the Russian point of view, and the subsequent utterances and behaviour of the Vietnamese leadership left no doubt that Vietnam had accepted the Russian line. Moreover, Vo Nguyen Giap, the commander-in-chief of the Vietnamese People's Army and Minister of Defence, stated in his address to the Congress that, "At present, economic construction in the North has become the central task of the Party. That is why our defence budget must be reduced and military effectives cut." This is a policy which is certainly based upon the Russian contention that war is not inevitable.

On the economic front, the most important contribution of the Congress was the announcement of a five-year plan for the period 1961-65. This will be North Vietnam's first five-year plan and it will follow the completion of the present three-year plan. The principal aims of the new plan are, in the words of Le Duan, "to take the first steps in Socialist industrialisation, to lay the first material and technical foundations of Socialism, alongside the completion of Socialist transformation, thereby transforming our economy into a fully Socialist economy."

The report states that, at the end of the three-year plan, "agriculture still plays a major part in the national economy, but the technical standard of agriculture is still low; heavy industry is still in the initial stage and light industry is still small." It claims that "unemployment has fundamentally been solved in the cities," but, by implication, is still prevalent in the countryside. The plan sets out to develop a surprisingly large heavy industry: "It is necessary to build a system of heavy industry in which machine building is the key branch. . . . The tempo of industrialisation in our country can be a high and steady one." The report gives the main control figures as a basis for mapping out the five-year plan. According to these figures, by 1965 the total value of industrial output will have increased by 148 per cent. as compared with 1960, constituting an average annual increase of 20 per cent., and the total value of agricultural output will increase by 61 per cent., constituting an average annual increase of 10 per cent. By early 1965, industry will make up 51 per cent. and agriculture 49 per cent. of the total value

of industrial and agricultural output. In the five years 125,000 high and middle level technical cadres will be trained, that is 10 times as many as in the three-year plan.

All of this represents a staggering target for industrialisation, and the prospect of industrial output outstripping agricultural output by 1965 in a backward and underdeveloped country, such as North Vietnam is at present, stretches the imagination to its limit. It would be lunacy to embark on such a plan without firm promises of massive industrial aid from abroad. Since the plan has been put forward, it must be assumed that such promises have been made. But China is incapable of supplying industrial aid on this scale, so one is forced to conclude that it is to come from Russia.

Perhaps the greatest failure of the Communist leadership in North Vietnam has been its inability to move any closer to national reunification, towards overthrowing the Southern régime or reaching some compromise agreement with it. From the very outset the difficulty of this task was appreciated, for Pham Van Dong, immediately after signing the Geneva Agreements on Indo-China under Russian pressure, remarked to some non-Communist Vietnamese friends staying at his villa that the national elections envisaged by the agreements would never take place. Nevertheless, in public, both he and the rest of the leadership had to pretend to believe in them. Since that time, the Communists have never been able to achieve anything more than periodic disruptions of the security of the South and the assassination of minor government officials. It is interesting, therefore, to see what fresh ideas the Congress has to offer for the overcoming of this difficulty.

The Political Report, read by Le Duan, sets out two strategic tasks which have the common goal of reunifying the country peacefully. The first of these is the carrying out of a Socialist revolution in North Vietnam and the second "the realisation of the tasks of the national people's democratic revolution, the eradication of the colonial and semi-feudal régime in South Vietnam and the realisation of national reunification." Brave words, but how is this to be done? The solution proposed is nothing more than the hoary old "achieving the unity of the whole people to fight resolutely against the aggressive warmongering U.S. imperialists and their lackeys—the oppressive and dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem clique—to form a national democratic coalition government in South Vietnam, to win national independence and establish democratic freedoms, and to make an active contribution to the defence of peace of South-East Asia and the world." Predictably, it goes on to urge "our people there to strive to establish a united bloc of workers, peasants, and soldiers, and to bring into being a broad national united front, with a worker-peasant alliance as the basis, directed against the U.S.-Diem

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clique." This is the mixture as before, and it is to be doubted whether age has increased its efficacy.

The one new departure from past policy is an offer to political dissidents in South Vietnam. "In the course of our struggle," stated Le Duan, "it is possible that different forms of gradual national reunification may present themselves. We will sincerely unite with all forces opposed to the U.S.-Diem clique and approving national reunification in order to struggle perseveringly together with these forces for the implementation of every step of gradual reunification, however short this step may be." The very inclusion of this offer is tantamount to an admission that little success has so far been achieved by Communist agents in the South and that new allies would be welcomed. It is true that, in practice, the Communists have always been ready to collaborate with any Southern dissidents who might prove useful to them, but the blunt phraseology of this offer renders it almost an official government invitation to subversion in South Vietnam. To state this publicly as the official Party policy is extremely gauche behaviour even for a Vietnamese Communist leader inexperienced in the niceties of international diplomacy.

The remainder of the Political Report is concerned with increased Socialisation, and it affirms that North Vietnam possesses the required conditions to skip the period of capitalist development and to advance directly to Socialism. Plans are outlined for the Socialisation of both agriculture and industry. In brief, the Party promises that the state will take over all sectors of production, agriculture, and trade still in private hands. The consolidation of unity is heavily stressed, and the report, by naming special categories of people, indicates which elements have so far proved most troublesome to this overall unity. Singled out for special mention are the organised handicraftsmen and pedlars, the Catholics, who are to be "united with non-Catholic people," the ethnic minorities, and the intellectuals. The policy for intellectuals, a group which has proved particularly recalcitrant in the past, is "We must foster the old intellectuals and make great efforts to train new intellectuals of worker and peasant origin."

On September 10 the new Central Committee was elected, but this produced no unexpected results. Ho Chi-minh, who had formerly been the titular Secretary General, became Chairman and Le Duan was named First Secretary. However, for some time past, Le Duan had been performing the tasks of Secretary General and had, on at least one occasion, signed himself "Secretary General," so that this change was more apparent than real. The Political Bureau was enlarged from eleven to thirteen by the addition of two alternate members. These new members are Tran Quoc Hoan, Minister of Public Security, and Lieutenant-General Van Tien Dung, a member of the National Defence Council.

As alternate members, these two will attend meetings of the Political Bureau but will not enjoy voting rights. The three changes in the order of precedence of the eleven full members were due to the continuing rapid rise of Pham Hung who was promoted to fifth place. (The consequent drop of General Vo Nguyen Giap from fifth to sixth place is discussed below.)

The whole Congress, as has already been stated, was overshadowed by the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute, which obtruded into most of the speeches made. In his opening address, President Ho Chi-minh placed himself unequivocally on the side of the Russians by saying, "Our people strongly support the peaceful foreign policy and the disarmament programme advanced by the Soviet Union and other countries in the Socialist camp. . . . The peoples of the world, uniting closely together and struggling actively, will undoubtedly be able to prevent a world war and establish a lasting peace." The Political Report, read by Le Duan, was equally emphatic about the possibilities of avoiding war, stating "This (the present) situation has presented real possibilities for preventing a new World War, and these possibilities are increasing with every passing day."

Of the speeches made by the foreign visitors to the Congress, the great majority supported Russia's standpoint. Mukhitdinov put the Russian point of view even more strongly than at the National Day meeting. "The Communists," he said, "have never intended to use force to propagate their ideologies; they do not want war. Peaceful co-existence is the only policy completely conforming to the noble humane nature of Socialism and the Communist ideologies. . . . Our conviction is based upon a deep Marxist-Leninist analysis of the contemporary international position." In reply, Li Fu-ch'un denounced those who were attacking dogmatists, and concluded "It is absolutely impermissible to relinquish fundamental theoretical positions of Marxism-Leninism on the pretext of opposing dogmatism." The delegates from Japan, Morocco, Canada, and North Korea carefully avoided any mention of the dispute, but the Central Committee of the North Korean Party had already issued a statement supporting the Russian line. Albania and Indonesia spoke in favour of the Chinese position, Albania more strongly than Indonesia. The remaining delegates, representing the Parties of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, France, India, and Italy, all showed clearly that they were on the side of Russia.

It was at a rally, held in Hanoi on September 11 to celebrate the completion of the Congress, that the Russian delegate unleashed his bitterest attack on the Chinese. In a speech which went unreported in China, he first of all gloated over the Russian success: "We are gratified



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to note that the documents of the 3rd Congress of the Vietnamese Workers' Party, as well as the speeches of delegations of fraternal parties, once again reaffirmed with great unanimity and resolve the possibility of preventing war in present-day conditions." Continuing, he declared that the dividing activities of the dogmatists and the sectarians were no less serious a danger to the Communist movement than those of the Titoist revisionists. But it is the conclusion of his speech which contains the most outspoken attack on the Chinese Communist leadership. "The dogmatists want to pass off their erroneous ideas as Marxist-Leninist 'truths' and want to impose them on other people. Often hiding in a national shell, they sometimes put narrow local and national interests in opposition to, or above, the tasks of proletarian internationalism."

There can be no doubt that the occasion of this Congress was an overwhelming victory for the Soviet Union in her ideological dispute with China, the more so because she won the host country Vietnam, which had hitherto maintained a strictly neutral attitude, to her side. It is in the light of this outcome that the events must be examined so as to ascertain the present and future position of North Vietnam in the Communist world.

The clue to the change of Vietnam's position from strict neutrality to wholehearted support of the Soviet line probably lies in the secret visit which Ho Chi-minh paid to Moscow in August. Ho made no public appearances in Vietnam between August 3 and 24, and the Hungarian Party daily, *Nepszabadsag*, reported that he was present in Moscow on August 15. On August 31, immediately after his arrival in Hanoi, the chief Soviet delegate, Mukhitdinov, paid a visit to Ho and handed him a personal letter from Khrushchev. This, coupled with the staggering programme of industrial development envisaged in the five-year plan, points to the following explanation. Ho Chi-minh visited Moscow without the knowledge of the Chinese and bargained with Khrushchev, offering Vietnamese support of the Soviet line and closer links with Russia in the future in exchange for greatly increased aid from Russia in the industrial sphere. For several reasons the inclination of the Vietnamese is to align themselves with Russia rather than China: in general Vietnamese dislike the Chinese towards whom they have an inferiority complex as a result of 1,000 years of domination by their powerful northern neighbour; in particular the North Vietnamese Communists have been somewhat disillusioned by the failures of such Chinese policies as the "100 Flowers" and accelerated collectivisation, both of which they unsuccessfully attempted to transplant to their own country in 1956. Russia, for her part, is anxious to prove to the world that the Soviet interpretation of Communism will work perfectly well even in a country in which the people and conditions are so very similar to those of China.



In other words, she wishes to prove that the Russian interpretation is correct while that of Mao is unnecessary and erroneous.

The consequences of Vietnam's change of position will be far-reaching. Firstly, strenuous efforts will be made to uphold the basic Russian interpretation that agriculture must serve the needs of industry, and to disprove the basic Chinese contention that industry must serve the needs of agriculture. In the second place, Vietnam will follow the Russian policy of peaceful co-existence based on the possibility of avoiding war. This is already foreshadowed in the reduction of the defence budget and cuts in the armed forces. An important result of this will be the final abandonment of any plans for an armed attack on South Vietnam, although subversion may well be increased.

A further consequence of Vietnam's change of position will be the removal from office, or from key positions of power, of all those Vietnamese Communist leaders who have, in the past, tended to favour the Chinese interpretation of Communism. A purge within the Party seems inevitable, and the speech of Le Duc Tho cannot be interpreted as meaning anything else. In the interests of avoiding the disruption of unity, the Vietnamese Communists will probably endeavour to carry out this purge as discreetly and quietly as possible. Some leaders will have to be discarded, but others may well be transferred from positions of real power to offices carrying grandiose titles but having no real influence upon the country's affairs.

The influence of China in North Vietnam will be greatly reduced, and this will probably entail the withdrawal of a considerable number of Chinese experts and advisers, coupled with a reduction of Chinese aid. In the past, Chinese aid has equalled, or even surpassed, the total aid given by Russia and the European satellites. In the future, the major portion of aid will come to North Vietnam from the Soviet Union. This will bind Vietnam closer than ever before to Russia, and it will undoubtedly influence the selection of a successor to President Ho Chi-minh, who is already an old man and cannot expect to retain the supreme office for so very much longer.

The whole pattern of North Vietnam's economy will be changed if the five-year plan is successful. More and more people will be drawn from the countryside to work in industry, but the population can derive a sense of relief from the knowledge that the Chinese-type communes will not be introduced to North Vietnam in the foreseeable future.

A further point which is clarified by the Congress is the decline in position and power of General Vo Nguyen Giap. The reasons for this have been the subject of much speculation for some time, but they are now easier to discern. At the end of the Indo-Chinese war in 1954, Giap's power and popularity were very great indeed, and they remained

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so during the early years of independence. This was simply due to his position as Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army. The army retained its considerable importance while the possibility of an armed attack on South Vietnam was real. As time passed, and this possibility became increasingly remote, so Giap's importance was lessened. With the forthcoming reduction of the defence budget and cuts in the military effectives, his importance may decline still further.

One cannot but admire the consummate political skill exhibited by Ho Chi-minh in securing what the majority of North Vietnamese Communists have always wanted, independence of China, and securing it at no cost to himself. On the contrary, he has achieved this and, at the same time, obtained hard promises of vastly increased Russian aid in the industrial sphere. The negotiations between Ho and Khrushchev were kept completely secret, not only from the rest of the world, but from China too, so that the results could be revealed at a time and place calculated to cause the greatest damage to Chinese prestige. There can be little doubt that Ho, even in his old age, remains the most astute Communist leader in Asia.

## Writers and Artists Confer

By JEROME CH'EN

THE third Congress of China's Literary and Art Workers,<sup>1</sup> the first since the Hundred Flowers Campaign, was held in Peking from July 22 to August 13 "to review and assess" the literary and artistic achievements in the years between 1953 and 1960, "summarise and exchange experience, further define the road of development of socialist art and literature, and consider the tasks to be faced in the coming years."<sup>2</sup> The presence of Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, and other political leaders and the large space which the *People's Daily* devoted to the meeting indicated its importance. Of the 2,300 delegates there were professionals and amateurs working in local governments and the services and from them a praesidium of over 180 members was elected before the long speeches on the opening day began. Kuo Mo-jo, as the President of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, first spoke a few words of welcome and then went on to outline the circumstances under which the Congress was convoked and the general political lines along which China's art and literature had been and would be developing. These lines were repeated once more, and elaborated, by Lu Ting-yi, Director of the Party's Propaganda Department and Deputy Premier, who represented the Party and the Government, and subsequently they were to be repeated many times over. The third speaker on the opening day to recite them was Chou Yang, Vice-President of the Federation and a Deputy Director of the Party's Propaganda Department, who also laid down six tasks for the Congress.

The first task, according to Chou Yang, was that China's art and literature must be placed under the political guidance of the Communist Party, so that they can play their full part in building a socialist society and in serving the workers, peasants, and soldiers. Secondly, they must be regarded as a weapon in the struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism and as bonds of friendship between all the progressive peoples of the world. Thirdly, further encouragement must be given to the workers and peasants who used their spare time in literary and artistic activities. Fourthly, writers and artists should make strenuous efforts to raise both the ideological and artistic standards of their work. Fifthly, art

<sup>1</sup> The two previous meetings took place in July 1949 and September 1953.

<sup>2</sup> *Peking Review*, July 30, 1960.

and literary criticism should be developed a step further along Marxist-Leninist lines in order to foster a healthy and refined discernment. Finally, writers and artists must strengthen their unity, so as to organise themselves into a fighting unit for the interests of the working class.

Chou Yang also dealt with the "dialectical unification of revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism," but only in round terms.<sup>3</sup> Mao Tun, another Vice-President of the Federation and an outstanding writer, picked up where Chou Yang had left off on the previous day by going into more specific questions in a business-like manner. Other speeches of the second day were somewhat perfunctory, echoing what Lu Ting-yi had already said and thus making Mao Tun's report sound like a fresh breeze after a hot and stuffy summer's day.<sup>4</sup>

Mao Tun tackled four major questions of literary creation. In selecting a subject, an author must attach the greatest importance to its social significance and to its ability to reflect the spirit of the age. While creating a character, he should constantly bear in mind the marriage of realism and romanticism—that is to say that he should reject the revisionist principle of describing men as they are. Admittedly men had their shortcomings, yet these shortcomings must be put in a proper perspective by being shown that they were either transitory phenomena in the process of development of a character or, if incorrigible, doomed their possessor to failure. Only in this way could the educational value of art and literature be clear; only in this way could they perform their function as stimulants in the building of socialism. And the "dark side" of society was to be handled in the same way, depicted not for the sake of doing so, but for showing to the reader the inevitability of a reactionary being eliminated, an internal contradiction among the people being resolved, and of wrong being righted. In plain language this means that a realistic, romantic writer should write, not of human beings and things as they are, but as they ought to be. The omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience of the Party see to it that in art and literature predestination never fails. This strikes a familiar note to the readers of Westerns and thrillers which, in this respect, agree in principle with present-day Chinese literature. Mao Tun's last point concerns human nature and human interests. He is against giving undue importance to them, unless their class characteristics and social meaning are made unambiguous. According to Mao Tun and other Chinese writers and critics, no interests are shared by *all* classes. People of different upbringing have different natures and different interests, and it is the task of a revolutionary writer to reveal and dignify those of working men.

<sup>3</sup> *People's Daily*, July 23, 1960, and *Peking Review*, July 26, 1960.

<sup>4</sup> *People's Daily*, July 25, 1960.

After Mao Tun's report, the Congress broke up into small groups and serious and technical discussions began on July 25 and continued until August 12. Information about these discussions has so far been scanty and Kuo Mo-jo's final speech on August 13 was merely a formal piece, virtually the same as his opening address delivered some three weeks before. His opening speech and Chou Yang's report were unanimously endorsed by the Congress, which also passed this resolution:

"The paramount task of literature and art in China, . . . is to use every literary and art form to heighten the level of socialist and communist consciousness and the moral qualities of the whole nation, thoroughly eliminate bourgeois political and ideological influence, and work actively in the service of China's socialist revolution and socialist construction."<sup>5</sup>

This does not represent any major change from the principles laid down in Mao Tse-tung's famous talks at the Yen-an Forum in 1942.<sup>6</sup> The standpoint is still that of the proletariat and the broad masses of the people; the audience for art and literature is still composed of workers, peasants, soldiers and cadres; the attitude to the people is still to praise their toil and struggle and to educate them; political criteria are still placed before artistic criteria; and the task is still to serve the cause of the socialist revolution and construction. Why then was the Congress called again after a lapse of seven years?

In the last few years there have been two campaigns which stand out as particularly relevant to this question. The first is the campaign against revisionist writers and critics such as Hu Feng, Ting Ling, Ai Ch'ing, Feng Hsüeh-feng, and many others; the second is the mass poetry movement which began in 1958.<sup>7</sup> The anti-revisionist campaign really centred round the problem of human nature, although it was waged in political terms. Hu Feng and Feng Hsüeh-feng were of the opinion that a deep understanding of life and human nature was the basis of any literature if it was to be realistic and impressive, and so able to rise to the level of art.<sup>8</sup> Pa Jen, another revisionist writer, recently attacked contemporary Chinese writing as being "devoid of human sentiments and humanitarianism of human nature" (*sic*).<sup>9</sup> In an earlier contribution

<sup>5</sup> *Peking Review*, August 16, 1960, and *People's Daily*, August 14, 1960.

<sup>6</sup> Mao, *Selected Works*, IV, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1956) pp. 64-67 and 85.

<sup>7</sup> See Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Hundred Flowers* (London: Stevens, 1960), pp. 174-194, and S. H. Chen "Multiplicity in Uniformity: Poetry and the Great Leap Forward," *The China Quarterly*, No. 3, 1960.

<sup>8</sup> Yao Wen-yüan, *Lun Wen-hsüeh-shang-ti Hsiu-cheng-chu-yi* (On Literary Revisionism), Shanghai, 1958, p. 286.

<sup>9</sup> Ch'ien Chün-jui, "Uphold the Party's Literary Principles and Dismiss Modern Revisionism," *Wen-yi Pao*, No. 8, 1960. "Humanitarianism of human nature" perhaps means "kindness." The Chinese term, *jen-tao-chu-yi*, can mean either "humanism" or "humanitarianism." It has been used freely to mean either or both throughout these campaigns by all participants, and the confusion has caused the downfall of several eminent writers. Readers of the highly polished translations of Mao Tse-tung's famous

to a symposium on socialist realism [*She-hui-chu-yi Hsien-shih-chu-yi Lun-wen-chi*, I (Peking: 1960)] he impatiently brushes aside all the dialectical niceties with a forthright demand that writers should produce their wares and that critics should leave the rarefied air of general theory and get down to examining the merits and demerits of specific works.

In the eyes of orthodox Chinese Marxists these writers and critics have erred in allocating too much importance to human nature and its role in literature, and have consequently put the criteria of art before those of politics, used literature to expose the weakness of human nature rather than to improve it, and upset the delicate equilibrium (or dialectical unity) of revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism. If Chinese literature were to develop along the revisionist lines, it would concentrate on the portrayal of a handful of characters, or on the innermost secrets of the human heart. Such literature has no place in a society engaged in socialist construction, for it is addressed to intellectuals and dilettanti, not to working men. In China today writers and artists should leave their studies and studios and live among workers and peasants, in order to learn from them and write for them. They have been doing so since 1958, and the contact has touched off the mass poetry movement mentioned above, in which thousands of working men and women have become amateur "poets" and billions of rhymes have flowed from rustic pens. Ai Ch'ing wrote in 1953:

"Literature and art must free themselves from the siege of 'gentlemen,' 'professors,' and 'poets,' so that they can pull themselves out of the quagmire of decadence, mysticism, and sensualism."<sup>10</sup>

This has now come true. The eternal subjects of love, death, sacrifice, revenge, and so on have now, as I Ch'un anticipated,<sup>11</sup> been replaced by praise of the Party and of the brilliant achievements of the people; study of individuals and individual characteristics has given way to interest in groups, classes and communities. Novels must have dramatic plots with a definite beginning and end, be easy to understand, and easy for the reader to retail to his workmates. Poems should be short and straightforward, roll nicely, and contain a story.<sup>12</sup>

The anti-revisionist campaign and the mass poetry movement have succeeded in channelling Chinese literature and art in the direction demanded by the Party. Quantitatively production has been tremendous,

talks to the Yen'an Forum will see that even the Chairman himself vacillates in using the term *jen-tao-chu-yi* between meanings of "the spirit of the Renaissance" and "love of mankind."

<sup>10</sup> *Shih-lun* (On Poetry), (Peking: 1953) p. 5.

<sup>11</sup> *Tsai-wen-yi-szu-hsiang-chan-hsien-shang* (On the Literary and Artistic Ideological Front) 1940, pp. 26-27.

<sup>12</sup> *Jen-min Wen-hsüeh* (People's Literature), 1960, No. 2, pp. 126-127, and No. IV, pp. 125-128, articles by Ch'en Ch'ing and Ch'i Ssu respectively.

as speakers at the third Congress repeatedly pointed out. And in quality? Tsang K'e-chia, who edited the *Selected Poems* (Shih-hsüan) of 1956 and 1957, tactfully suggested in the prefaces that the poems were rich in passion but lacked form, elegance, and imagery; he also regretted the leanness of the poetical harvest in 1957. If we look at the 1957 anthology, we find 416 exclamation marks in 123 punctuated poems (eleven on p. 85 alone) and forty in the poem "Fatherland! The Brilliant October!" which has only forty-nine lines. The "hysterical screams" which Ai Ch'ing did not want are also with us. Passion and patriotism have swamped the Chinese writer's humour and sensibility, unsettled his mind, and dulled his skill. The result is a flood of verses overloaded with abstract terms, arid, shapeless and uninteresting; film-scripts which sound like ledgers or reports made to political meetings.<sup>13</sup> As for the novels, let me quote Wei Chin-chih:

"Now we often hear that one only needs to read the first page to know how the story will end. . . . The plot is no more than addition, subtraction, multiplication and then division. The sum total is always the same."<sup>14</sup>

Indeed, the question of quality haunted all the speakers at this Congress. Kuo Mo-jo spoke emphatically in his opening and closing addresses of raising ideological and artistic standards; the fourth and fifth items in Chou Yang's list of tasks for the future showed his deep concern with this problem; Mao Tun's report was almost entirely devoted to the old question of reconciling popularisation with elevation; Pa Chin, an accomplished author himself, in a group discussion prayed that a miracle might happen to raise the literary standard.<sup>15</sup> But in the end the delegates came to the conclusion Mao Tse-tung had reached eighteen years before:

"All revolutionary artists and writers of China . . . must, for long periods of time, unreservedly and whole-heartedly go into the midst of the masses . . . before they can proceed to creation."<sup>16</sup>

This, the delegates hoped, would kill two birds with one stone: the writers and artists would be able to purge themselves of their revisionist inclinations, and, at the same time, deepen their understanding of the workers' lives.

The policies which have emerged from this Congress are no different from those which China has been following all along, except that they have been restated in a more thorough-going fashion. But for us, several pertinent questions still remain. As Chinese psychological studies have

<sup>13</sup> *Wen-yi Yueh-pao* (Literature and Arts Monthly), 1959, No. 1, p. 6.

<sup>14</sup> *Wen-yi Yueh-pao*, 1959, No. 4, p. 13.

<sup>15</sup> *People's Daily*, August 8, 1960, p. 4.

<sup>16</sup> Mao, *Selected Works*, IV, p. 77.



#### WRITERS AND ARTISTS CONFER

not yet entered the post-Freudian stage, can professional writers really learn to understand working people simply by living among them?<sup>17</sup> What tools of analysis have they at their disposal? In every society there are, roughly speaking, two streams of literature and art—the highbrow and the lowbrow. Their coexistence may not be an ideal solution to this “contradiction,” but will shaving off the highbrow really improve the appearance of art and literature? When the operation is completed, shall we have to deny the very existence of literature and art in China? If not, what criteria should we apply in evaluating them? Shall we compare them with the works of T. S. Eliot, or with the best sellers and the box-office successes?

<sup>17</sup> See an interesting summary of a Chinese article on love, *New Statesman*, September 10, 1960, p. 326, in which a student of the Chinese press quotes: “Love is an ideological thing and the product of objective practice.” The premise of this observation is that men are born men.

# The Chinese Cinema To-day

By HSIUNG DEH-TA

*From August 23 to September 4, the British Film Institute showed a series of films from Communist China at the National Film Theatre, London. The season included ten full-length features and a number of documentaries and other shorts.*

"As the motion picture is one of the most popular arts and one of the Party's most effective weapons of propaganda and education, in our film undertakings we must necessarily put political ideological work and the question of creative thinking in the leading position, strengthen the Party's leadership over the cinema. . . ." Thus declared Hsia Yen, Deputy Minister of Culture.<sup>1</sup> But the problem is, how much artistic independence must be sacrificed in order to strengthen the Party's leadership over the cinema? The answer seems to be clear after viewing the dozen or so films from China shown recently at the National Film Theatre in London.

Before the Communist take-over, the film industry in China was practically non-existent. With a few exceptions, all films were of poor quality, both in content and appearance; at their best, they reminded one of the oldest Hollywood traditions but without the professional flair. During the past eleven years, like everything else in China, the industry has grown rapidly. Almost all the studios are now equipped with the latest facilities, and there is a Film School in Peking for training technicians, actors and writers. But most of the films shown at this special season were made by the old generation, *i.e.* people who have been working in films since before the Second World War; furthermore almost all the films were made during the past two years, so it is rather difficult for the Western audience to judge the remarkable progress of the Chinese cinema.

*New Story of an Old Soldier*, with which the season opened, tells the story of an army veteran who came to the "Great Northern Waste" to open up the virgin soil and set up a farm.<sup>2</sup> Although it is written by the young writer Li Chun, its director, Shen Fu, was a film actor before the Liberation, and the leading role is played by Tsui Hui, an actor trained in the thirties. The story seems quite non-political at first,

<sup>1</sup> "Struggle for a Continuing Great Leap Forward in the Film Industry," *People's Daily*, February 2, 1960, reproduced in part in *The China Quarterly*, No. 2, April-June 1960.

<sup>2</sup> Winner of a silver medal at the Moscow Film Festival of August 1959, this film was voted one of the most popular films in China in 1959 in a poll conducted in Peking and Shanghai according to the New China News Agency (NCNA), January 24, 1960.

but we learn that the hero's main aim in setting up the first state farm was "for the cause of socialism and the liberation of the whole country" (the event took place in 1948) and he was able to overcome all difficulties only because he "mobilised and relied on the masses of the people, under the leadership of the Party." It may be because of the forceful personality of our hero, but the impression we get from the film is that the Party's leadership seems to be not at all strong here. We have in this old soldier a simple, honest character who defies all hardship and devotes himself wholeheartedly to his work, while the Party's Political Commissar seems to be rather a weak and useless man, though kind-looking and reasonable. True, all the help came from the masses of the people, but we never see the Political Commissar doing any actual work. All he did was to telephone to say that the tractors promised earlier had now been cancelled! But all the way through the film the makers have tried hard to stress the role of the Party in everybody's life with lines like: "Don't thank me, thank the Party," "If I can't trust the Communists, who can I trust then?" or "Do you think I am good enough to join the Party?" All this sounded rather naïve and crude to the Western audience, but one must remember that this film, and indeed all the rest of them, was primarily intended for a popular, domestic audience.

The most successful part in this film is the wonderful portrayal of the veteran soldier by Tsui Hui, who really brought the character to life. This hot-tempered but likeable soldier was played with true feeling and understanding and there is no breath of fiction about him. Another good point about this film was its lyrical freshness and feeling for the open air; though the photography as a whole is not strikingly impressive, there are some fine shots (in colour) of the picturesque countryside of the north.

*Storm* is a film version of the stage play of the same name, in both cases, written, directed and acted in by Chin Shan. The story is based on actual events—the Peking-Hankow railway strike in 1922-23, a turning-point in the history of China's revolution. Chin Shan is obviously a talented artist, but this film seems to be inspired by political necessity rather than by purely artistic considerations, and it fails to sustain the promise of its brilliant opening sequence. At its best it has the merit of careful, consistent craftsmanship, but it is too stubborn and impersonal really to touch the emotions. Perhaps because it is an adaptation from a stage play, the dialogue is over-precisely articulated stage language, and all the characters and actions remain exaggerated and contrived, with true feeling always subservient to propaganda.

When *Storm* was first released in China last year, it made such an impact both on the intellectuals and the masses that it was hailed as the most powerful and original of Chinese films. Compared with films of similar subjects made earlier, it certainly shows great improvement in

many aspects. The atmosphere of Hankow under the rule of war-lords in the twenties is extremely well captured throughout the film; but there is no great and sudden outpouring of new and revolutionary techniques. On the contrary, the film lacks freshness and spontaneity, and the handling of the characters, though technically competent, is static and often old-fashioned. The main fault may lie in the script, the limitation of the subject matter. To re-create real heroes of the working class struggling against their oppression in the early days of the revolution is no easy task, especially when it is restricted by the unrealities of Socialist Realism. That is why in the fighting scenes, when certain elements from the Chinese classic theatre are employed, it looks too stylised and unnatural. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if given a less politically committed subject, *Chin Shan* is capable of producing something more substantial and exciting.

Just as there are women engine-drivers and women pilots in China, so there must be women film directors too. In *The Constant Beam*, the woman director, Wang Ping, has produced a work of real humanity, a compassionate study of underground workers' life in wartime Shanghai. The only trace of the feminine touch can be found in the delicate handling of the characters and the attention to detail.

The story is about Li Hsieh, a political worker trained in radio transmission sent to Shanghai, then occupied by the Japanese, to investigate and report back to Yen-an, the wartime Communist capital, the "traitorous activities committed by the Kuomintang." Li remained at his work until after the war when Shanghai was taken over by Chiang Kai-shek. "In spite of the white terror, Li persisted in his work and made a great contribution to the revolution," says the official synopsis, until at the end when the location of the transmitting station was discovered and "having bravely fulfilled the task assigned to him by the Party, he fearlessly laid down his life."

The achievement of this film lies not so much in the story, which is full of political propaganda and stereotyped characterisations, with the villain as black as the devil, but rather in the wonderful performances by the actor Sun Tao-lin and, to a lesser extent, the actress Yuan Hsia. Both roles were portrayed with genuine feeling. The reconstruction of wartime Shanghai was particularly well done. The film's weak point is at the beginning when Li is leaving Yen-an. Here the cutting is uneven and the acting is artificial. But the film's ending is most impressive. No one could forget the sequence in which Li bids farewell to his comrades in Yen-an over the air when he is about to be captured. Moving, but never over-sentimental, this scene is treated most delicately; aesthetically speaking, it is the re-integration of lyricism with realism.

One common fault among Chinese film-makers is that they are too

ambitious in their projects; they always want to make an epic out of every subject. The result is over-long and sometimes tedious films on small incidents of life. *Two Generations of Swimmers* is one such case. It has no less than five scriptwriters and the director, Hsieh Tien, an old hand in films, is one of the five. The theme concerns the moral conflicts between a swimming coach and his son, a champion swimmer; but the story starts over twenty years ago, showing the father as a fisherman whose love of swimming is hampered by the political situation of those days, and how after the Communist take-over all this was changed. Instead of a short prologue or the use of some quick flash-backs, we are supposed to get through the modern history of swimming in China in two hours.

This film is not without its merits. Human problems are stressed and they are specific, not generalised. The character motivations are treated with sympathy and the feeling is pure and eloquent. The performance by the actor Su Shih is memorable, especially in the second half of the film. The camera work is of high quality; some of the shots, when the documentary technique is employed, are particularly interesting. It saved several situations from banality by its astute observation.

The Opium War of 1840 is an important chapter of Chinese history, though it is not an episode in which British historians can take pride. Lin Tse-hsü was the Chinese hero of this war and the film, using his name as its title, is not merely an historical or biographical story.<sup>3</sup> It conveys the sense of real people, real problems and real relationships. It shows the evil of the opium trade which was imposed on China, the corruption and helplessness of the Ch'ing Government and the struggle of the people against it.

The film opens in 1838 when the Emperor, Tao Kuang, dismayed by the way the importation of opium is draining the country of its silver reserves and turning thousands of people into addicts, sends Lin Tse-hsü as High Commissioner to the port of Canton to enforce the decree prohibiting the trade. He compels the foreign, *i.e.* British, merchants to surrender their opium stocks which he burns at the waterfront. However, he is removed and exiled as a result of the intrigues at Court and the work of Lin Tse-hsü thus comes to a tragic end. The story however does not end with Lin's defeat, but with the awakening of the masses. In the final scene Lin witnesses how the peasants and fishermen around Canton, organised into *Ping Ying Tuan* ("Put-Down-the-British" Corps), take up their resistance to the foreign troops penetrating the countryside.

It may be argued here that the film could arouse more sympathy and indignation from its audience if it were to end at the point of Lin's

<sup>3</sup> Voted second in popularity in the Peking-Shanghai poll. NCNA *loc. cit.*

defeat and with China's destiny at stake. Aesthetically, it might be more satisfactory, but in terms of Socialist Realism this would not do, for one is not supposed to have a too pessimistic view concerning any historic event, particularly an event of national importance. Though it was a national defeat, it had to be a defeat of a corrupt government, not of the people.

The most disappointing item in this season was *The Magic Lotus Lantern*, which was described as a Chinese National Dance Film in colour, but which turned out to be a film of semi-Western ballet in Chinese costume accompanied by pseudo-Western music. The story is an old legend, a love affair between a mortal and a goddess, and how with the help of their child and the Magic Lotus Lantern, they overcome the powerful god Erh Lang, the goddess's brother who represents orthodoxy. It is obvious that the influence of Tchaikovsky is strong, but the music here is too monotonous and without any theme. Some of the dances are embarrassingly long and boring. Though the spirit of this experimental venture should be highly praised, it fails in many respects. Let us hope that some more successful attempt will be made in the near future.

An unexpected delight was the film *Five Golden Flowers*, a sort of musical about the young people of the Pai nationality in the province of Yunnan in south-west China.

Basically it is a love story, but one can see its political significance from characters with names like Deputy Commune Director Golden Flower, Iron-Smelter Golden Flower, Tractor Driver Golden Flower, Cattle Breeder Golden Flower and Fertilizer-Collector Golden Flower. It has some of the wistful charm of Chinese verse, and its poetic regard for the countryside and people amply compensate for some rough edges in the script. Again, it is a little too long. Towards the end, the whole business almost becomes unintentionally funny. One point worth noting is in this film; the Chinese, admittedly two intellectuals, are shown quite helpless and weak compared with the Pai people.

Among the documentaries, the most interesting one was *Training Players for the Chinese Classical Theatre*, a detailed and fascinating account of the training of young children for the stage, ending with some impressive demonstrations of technique by senior students and the staff. Others like *Underground Palace* and *Along the Lhasa River* are worth consideration for their seriousness and craftsmanship, though they lack the passion necessary to create a national school.

Judging from these films, the most common theme is how, with the Communist takeover, people's lives changed from hardship and oppression to happiness and prosperity. This seems to fit the quotation at the beginning of this article that the Party's leadership must be strengthened over the cinema. True, most of these films have important themes (human

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relations, social problems), but from a purely aesthetic point of view, how important is the content of a film in relation to the form? Claude Chabrol, one of the forerunners of the *nouvelle vague* in France, stated that the important or "big" subject is worth no more than the unimportant one, and that the smaller the subject is, the more it can be treated greatly. In other words, the more noble a film's subject the more suspiciously it is regarded.

This view, that form is paramount over content, can be easily dismissed by the Socialist Realists as decadent. But the Chinese filmmakers all seem to make the same fundamental mistake: they disregard the real, human truth of their material. Instead they adapt some key figures and dramatised incidents to serve political arguments, and the result is films which look like shadows of their own intentions.

With such a long cultural history, China should be capable of producing films that make a genuine contribution to the development of this medium, just as India and Japan have done. It is difficult to be certain whether we can expect any surprises from China. All the productions so far still have by Western standards a slightly dated look. China has yet to produce anything to compare, visually even, with the Polish *Kanal* or the Hungarian *The Merry-go-Round* or even the Russian *The Cranes are Flying*



## Controversy

In THE CHINA QUARTERLY, Nos. 1 and 2, we published the opposing views on the originality of Mao Tse-tung of Karl A. Wittfogel and Benjamin Schwartz. Here we publish the two disputants' concluding remarks as well as the comment of Mr. Henryk Sjaardema on some of Prof. Wittfogel's points.

### "Maoism"—"Legend" or "Legend of a 'Legend'"?

#### Reply to Benjamin Schwartz

At some point in a debate one or all participants usually feel that it should come to an end. Professor Schwartz expresses this wish in his recent comments on my rejection of the "Maoist" thesis; but he does not tell us why. I also think the present discussion should be terminated; but I am quite willing to give my reasons. I see little benefit in continuing to argue the meaning of Mao Tse-tung's development with an opponent who employs methods of evasion, omission, and misrepresentation. However, the underlying issue has not disappeared, and certain points even in this debate require further clarification.

The "Maoist" thesis crystallised between 1948 and 1952; Professor John K. Fairbank was its guiding spirit. This being the case, I regret that he has not seen fit to defend the viewpoint which he tentatively spelled out in 1948 and which he restated in 1958 in the revised edition of his *United States and China*. To be sure, Prof. Schwartz is fully qualified to speak on the "Maoist" thesis: his prominent role in developing it is well known. But his recent remarks aggravate rather than reduce the confusion that made me criticise the "Maoist" thesis in the first place.

There is no need here to comment in detail on points which were made by Schwartz in the *New Leader* on April 4, 1960, and which I answered in my article "Mao Tse-tung and Lenin" in that weekly on April 11, 1960. A few major items in the overlapping discussions have to be examined again; but essentially I shall concentrate on some newly introduced formulations and arguments.

Particularly important is the new definition of "Maoism" given by Schwartz in *The China Quarterly*, No. 2. In 1951 Schwartz considered Mao's attitude toward the peasantry heretic when viewed against the

orthodox policy of the Stalin-directed Comintern.<sup>1</sup> In 1952 he and his two colleagues, John K. Fairbank and Conrad Brandt, who, with him, co-authored *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, maintained the same position.<sup>2</sup> But now Schwartz, speaking of "the legitimate uses of the word 'Maoism' as I conceive them," states that this word "may be taken in the first instance to refer to the strategies and policies of Mao and Stalin."<sup>3</sup>

Manifestly the linkage of *Mao and Stalin* destroys a core plank in the original "Maoist" thesis. If the Communist policy of rural soviets which emerged in China in 1927/28 and which was formerly depicted by Schwartz as the essence of "Maoism" is actually a policy of *Mao and Stalin*, then we are no longer faced with a problem of "Maoism," but with a problem of Maoism-Stalinism. And if, as I believe the evidence suggests, this policy was initiated by *Stalin and the Stalin-led Comintern*, then there is not even a problem of Maoism-Stalinism, but only a problem of Stalinism.

Obviously Schwartz's new definition involves a basic shift in his position; and while it is certainly legitimate to make such a shift, he should have explained what he did and why. This he has not done. Instead, and confusingly, he continues to restate portions of the original "Maoist" thesis without linking them up with his new Mao-Stalin definition.

Of a different order is Prof. Schwartz's tendency to attribute to me views I do not hold. Having dealt with his major misrepresentations in my recent *New Leader* article, I shall touch but briefly on a few flagrant examples of his method.

According to Schwartz, I consider Marxism-Leninism "a ready-made science of power with established recipes for dealing with all situations,"<sup>4</sup> and I believe "that the whole 'Maoist' development of Chinese Communism is outlined in Lenin's [1920] 'directives'."<sup>5</sup> It is hard to understand how Schwartz could have made the first assertion after reading my article, "The Legend of 'Maoism,'" which demonstrates that the Marxist-Leninist peasant policy, like other features of doctrine and strategy, has undergone radical change<sup>6</sup>; and it is equally hard

<sup>1</sup> Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 77 et seq.; cf. p. 191 (hereafter cited as Schwartz 1951).

<sup>2</sup> Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 78 (hereafter cited as *Documentary History*).

<sup>3</sup> Benjamin I. Schwartz, "The Legend of the 'Legend of 'Maoism,'" *The China Quarterly*, No. 2 (April-June), p. 36 (hereafter cited as Schwartz 1960).

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* p. 36.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* p. 38.

<sup>6</sup> See also the chapter on Communist peasant policy which I wrote for the *Handbook of World Communism*, edited by Joseph M. Bochenski and Gerhart Niemeyer and published originally in Germany. (The American edition will soon be put out by F. Praeger, New York.)

to understand how he could have made the second assertion. In the same article I have shown that the Stalin-led Comintern modified Lenin's 1920 concept of Eastern peasant strategy in two respects: by introducing the idea of regional differentiation and by making a significant terminological adjustment.

These are crucial points in my appraisal of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. Ignoring them, Schwartz ignores the very substance of my anti-"Maoist" argument. His philological contortions fail to do justice to my position—or, for that matter, to certain ideas he himself held previously.

For instance, Schwartz claims that all his references to the "Maoist" strategy "refer to the period after December 1927" and that "the phrase 'heresy in act' refers to the full development of the strategy after the 1933-34 period."<sup>7</sup> On this basis he accuses me of having improperly claimed that he applied the "heresy in act" formula to Mao's 1927 behaviour. What are the facts? In 1951 Schwartz defined "Maoism" as a "strategy" that imposed a Communist party "onto a purely peasant mass base."<sup>8</sup> And while he did not expressly apply the term "strategy" to Mao's behaviour, he did say that "basic features" of this strategy were apparent "as early as 1928," that is, five years before 1933. Furthermore, in the *Documentary History* he and his co-authors presented Mao's Hunan Report as "one of the clearest portraits of 'Maoism' in its formative stage."<sup>9</sup> If this means anything, it means that Mao manifested the Maoist "heresy in act" in a significant (albeit formative) way as early as February 1927.

More serious than Schwartz's failure to cite my views correctly is his failure to present adequately the concepts of the historical and political role of the peasants in the Communist doctrine as initiated by Marx and Engels, and as expounded by Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, and Mao.

*Marx and Engels.* In his recent answer Schwartz restates what he wrote in 1951—namely, that pre-Leninist Marxism "did not regard the peasantry as an independent creative force in human history."<sup>10</sup> Thus he again lumps together "independent" and "creative," attributes which Marx and Engels were at pains to keep separate. According to them, the peasants were unable to conduct major political actions independently; but they did participate in an essential way in revolutions which were destined to transform the old mode of production, especially the great "bourgeois" revolutions of the West. Under these conditions, they constituted, not the directing agency (this role was reserved for the

<sup>7</sup> Schwartz 1960, p. 41.

<sup>8</sup> Schwartz 1951, p. 189.

<sup>9</sup> *Documentary History*, p. 77.

<sup>10</sup> Schwartz 1951, p. 117.

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bourgeoisie), but the main fighting force. In other words, they constituted one of the essential ("creative") elements in certain societal revolutions.

No matter how many of Engels' writings Schwartz may have read, in his argument he misrepresents the Marxian concept of the revolutionary role of the peasantry. By so doing he obscures the doctrinal (Marxist) roots of a key feature of the peasant strategy, which the Communists continue to employ in many "backward" and colonial areas of the non-Communist world.

*Lenin.* The development of Marxism-Leninism (Lenin's version of Marxism) is a complex and serious matter. Its study involves a conceptual approach in depth and the systematic examination of Lenin's writings. Such an approach enables us to identify Lenin's 1902 concept of the party and his 1906 concept of the new peasant policy. It enables us to chart the way in which they were combined and modified in Lenin's 1920 concept of the Eastern peasant policy. Professor Schwartz has done none of these things in the past, and he does not do them now.

In 1951 Schwartz prudently avoided citing Lenin's statements of 1920 when he made the fantastic claim that for the pre-industrial East Lenin only "speculated" about a Communist power policy based on peasant support. In his recent answer he concedes that Lenin did more than this. But his new suggestion—that, according to Lenin, Communist parties of metropolitan (Western capitalist) areas should create peasant soviets in backward areas—still rests on a problematic use of Lenin's statements. Any reader who examines Lenin's pertinent writings will see what I mean.

Professor Schwartz's inadequate method is particularly striking in his treatment of the 1920 Baku Congress which Lenin hailed as an important manifestation of the Eastern peasant strategy he had outlined in the preceding Second Comintern Congress. As I have shown previously, it was at Baku that one of the prominent Comintern speakers coined the slogan, "the dictatorship of the poorest peasantry," a slogan approvingly repeated by the then chairman of the Comintern, Zinoviev.<sup>11</sup> Faced with Zinoviev's and Lenin's attitude toward this gathering, Schwartz tells us: "I do not have available the stenographic materials on the Baku Congress."<sup>12</sup> Lack of research is hardly a convincing argument. Copies of the Baku protocols can be found in a number of American libraries. Schwartz could have consulted any one of these copies which—and I speak from experience—would have been made available to him had he requested it.

<sup>11</sup> Karl A. Wittfogel, "The Legend of 'Maoism'," *The China Quarterly*, No. 1 (Jan-March 1960), p. 81 *et seq.*

<sup>12</sup> Schwartz 1960, p. 40.

*Trotsky.* Schwartz, who seems to have been more interested in Trotsky's criticism of the Chinese rural soviets than was either of his two colleagues,<sup>13</sup> raises a fundamental question regarding his own position by claiming that this criticism was based on "the solid ground of orthodoxy."<sup>14</sup> Schwartz's present argument is far from precise. But it obviously aims to show that, since 1917, Trotsky was both a "genuine Communist" and an orthodox Leninist.

In the context of the Maoist problem Trotsky's attitude is merely a side line, but since Schwartz, who first raised the issue, reverts to it in his answer, I shall briefly comment on what I consider Trotsky's views on the concept of Eastern peasant soviets as formulated by Lenin in 1920 and applied to China by the Stalin-led Comintern since 1927.

During the first phase of the Soviet régime, which lasted until Lenin's death, a person could be a genuine Communist and yet disagree with Lenin on important theoretical and political matters. The outstanding example is, of course, Bukharin. Trotsky, who after having repeatedly fought the Bolsheviks finally joined them in 1917, was more cautious; but he also openly combated Lenin on such major political questions as the acceptance of the German peace terms and the nationalisation of the trade unions.<sup>15</sup> He was more restrained on two other points that had important implications for the Eastern peasant policy: Lenin's concept of the "proletarian" party and his idea of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the "democratic dictatorship."

In 1920, when Lenin postulated that the policy of the peasant soviets could be applied everywhere in backward Eastern countries, Trotsky did not, to my knowledge, invoke his previous argument against the underlying Leninist party concept. But when he spoke on the colonial question at the Second World Congress of the Comintern he did, in an oblique way, indicate his disagreement with Lenin by warning against an overestimation of the soviets and by stressing the need for basing the Communist-led and soviet-oriented revolutions on "the proletariat itself."

Lenin 1920: "The idea of Soviet organisation is a simple one and can be applied, not only to proletarian, but also to peasant, feudal and semi-feudal relations." Hence the Communists must "carry on propaganda in favour of the idea of Peasants' Soviets, of Toilers' Soviets everywhere."<sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Schwartz suggests that he, Fairbank and Brandt do not constitute "an indivisible entity." This is perfectly acceptable to me, since I never considered them an entity, except in the promotion of the "Maoist" thesis.

<sup>14</sup> Schwartz 1951, p. 193.

<sup>15</sup> Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed, Trotsky: 1879-1921* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 373, 507.

<sup>16</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*. 12 vols. (New York: International Publishers, 1943), X, p. 242.

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Trotsky 1920: "The Soviet form of organisation does not possess any miraculous powers. Revolutionary power lies within the proletariat itself. It is necessary for the proletariat to rise for the conquest of power—then and only then does the Soviet organisation reveal its qualities as the irreplaceable instrument in the hands of the proletariat."<sup>17</sup>

Significantly, in 1920 Trotsky said little about the colonial problem. And, in 1921, he showed a similar reserve when he commented on this issue at the Third World Congress of the Comintern.<sup>18</sup>

In his 1930 reminiscences Trotsky asserted that, while Lenin lived, he (Trotsky) did not again criticise the idea of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Allegedly he did so only when "the epigones" (Stalin, Bukharin *et al.*) attacked his theory of the permanent revolution as "a means of the direct sabotage of the Chinese revolution,"<sup>19</sup> that is, in 1927. Trotsky's statement that for years "it did not interest me to come forward for my old historical prognosis"<sup>20</sup> (that his strategy was feasible, while Lenin's concept of "democratic dictatorship" was not) refutes the claim that Trotsky accepted all of Lenin's ideas once he had joined the Bolsheviks. But still this statement does not tell the full story. Contrary to his 1930 recollections, Trotsky reaffirmed his differences with Lenin long before 1927, in fact even before Lenin was fully incapacitated. As early as the spring of 1922, when Lenin first showed signs of his approaching illness,<sup>21</sup> Trotsky republished a 1909 article attacking Lenin's concept of the bourgeois-democratic revolution.<sup>22</sup> And on July 1 and 2, 1922, five weeks after Lenin's first stroke, Trotsky published an article in *Pravda* further emphasising his anti-Leninist position.<sup>23</sup> After 1930 he reasserted this position, particularly with reference to the Chinese revolution. And he upheld it until his death in 1940.<sup>24</sup>

Whatever the value of Lenin's concept of the bourgeois-democratic revolution may have been to the Bolsheviks in 1917 (Trotsky claims it was little, but I believe it gave Lenin a useful means of deception), in China, and contrary to Trotsky's prediction, it certainly was enormously

<sup>17</sup> Leon Trotsky, *The First Five Years of the Communist International*, trans. from the Russian and edited by John G. Wright. 2 vols. (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1945), I, p. 130.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 223, 237.

<sup>19</sup> Leon Trotsky, *Permanent Revolution* (Calcutta: Gupta Rahman & Gupta, 1947), p. 174.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> P. Kershenzew, *Das Leben Lenins* (Basel: Verlag Freie Schweiz, 1937), p. 347; Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1959), p. 220 (hereafter cited as Schapiro 1959).

<sup>22</sup> In an appendix to his book, *The Russian Revolution of 1905*, which he then republished. The preface is dated March 18, 1922 (*Die Russische Revolution 1905* [Berlin, 1923], p. 9).

<sup>23</sup> Leon Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution*, trans. by Max Eastman (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1932). 3 vols. Vol. I, p. 463.

<sup>24</sup> Leon Trotsky, *Stalin. An Appraisal of the Man and his Influence*, edited and trans. by Charles Malamuth (New York and London: Harper's, 1941), p. 433.



effective. Viewed against Trotsky's position which, according to his own statement, was Leninistically unorthodox (he recommended a permanent revolution directly oriented toward the dictatorship of the proletariat), the official Communist strategy in backward and colonial countries initiated by Lenin and developed by Stalin has a much broader appeal. In terms of totalitarian results this strategy was, and is, a much more dangerous weapon than Trotsky's more "proletarian," and much more sectarian, scheme.

*Stalin and the Comintern.* For the record it is sufficient to note here—what I have previously indicated—that Professor Schwartz has neither factually nor analytically explained the role of the Stalin-led Comintern in the establishment of the Chinese rural soviets. In view of the issue under discussion this is unfortunate. It is particularly unfortunate since Professor Schwartz in his recent article equated the policies of Mao and Stalin.

*Mao 1931–1940.* Like Professor Schwartz, I consider the Chinese Communist policy since the establishment of the rural soviets eminently significant. But again I take exception to the way in which the "Maoist" group has presented it. The authors of the *Documentary History* have seriously distorted the picture of this period by failing to view the attitude of the Chinese Communists toward the Nationalist Government and the Japanese within the framework of Moscow's changing foreign policy. They did not explain the fact that the Chinese Communists, after the start of the Japanese invasion in 1931, like the Comintern, directed their propaganda against Japanese and "world imperialism" <sup>25</sup> (not specifically against Japan) and against the Nationalist Government as long as Moscow hoped to reach an understanding with Tokyo—that is, until 1935. They did not explain how, under the influence of Moscow's new policy, the Chinese Communists radically altered their external and internal policy (the *History* does not contain a single document for the years 1935 and 1936). Furthermore, they have neither documented nor analysed four very important shifts in the policy of the Mao-led Chinese Communist government after the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war: (1) after Munich (when the USSR seemed in great danger, Mao suddenly praised Chiang Kai-shek as China's supreme present and future leader); (2) the beginning of the Stalin-Hitler Pact (externally: Mao declared English and French imperialism worse than Hitler fascism; internally: the CCP intensified its hostility against the Chinese capitalists and landlords and announced a new radical land programme) <sup>26</sup>; (3) Hitler's

<sup>25</sup> See *International Press Correspondence* 1931, pp. 991, 992, 1029, 1040; Victor A. Yakhontoff, *The Chinese Soviets* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1934), pp. 237, 239 *et seq.*, 251.

<sup>26</sup> Mao, "On New Democracy" (Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, 4 vols. [New York: International Publishers, 1954 *et seq.*] III, p. 122 (hereafter cited as Mao, SW).



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invasion of the USSR (again Mao reversed his external and internal policies. The *Documentary History* called the new land programme of 1942 "the mildest . . . yet applied by the CCP"<sup>27</sup>; but it did not connect the CCP's sudden desire for maximum unity with the German invasion of the USSR); (4) the gradual abandonment of this mild policy beginning with Stalingrad (Mao, very correctly, labelled this battle "the turning point in World War II" and one that was likely "to affect the world war as a whole").<sup>28</sup>

These methodological deficiencies—which ultimately stem from conceptual deficiencies—highlight the reprehensible manner in which Schwartz and his colleagues have dealt with *On New Democracy*. Instead of presenting this pamphlet as a significant expression of Mao's policy during the Stalin-Hitler Pact, they interpret it as an indication of Mao's claim to theoretical originality. In previous articles I have shown how improperly the authors of the *History* have handled the text of *On New Democracy* in this respect. Schwartz has given no specific answer to my specific criticism. Since he and his colleagues have described Mao's alleged claim to originality as "a gesture with profound implications,"<sup>29</sup> he should have explained why they omitted the very passages in which Mao ascribes the origin of his interpretation of the Chinese revolution to Stalin and Lenin. Schwartz's evasions lend further support to my already expressed conclusion: The authors of the *Documentary History*, who are responsible for this textual omission, not only violated fundamental rules of scholarship, but distorted history as well. For this reason, and because the "Maoist" thesis collapses when the historical evidence is fully consulted, I see no need to discuss these matters further with Professor Schwartz.

But this does not mean that debating the validity of the "Maoist" thesis has been useless. By no means. Arguing this issue would have been worthwhile even if it did nothing more than confirm the conviction that the Chinese Communists were "real" Communists in the Leninist sense when they waged their struggle for power. In a very different context Max Weber once reached a similarly obvious conclusion. After re-examining the character of Germany's early social order, when new doubts were raised, and finding the original view confirmed, he noted: "This may seem trivial. Yet unfortunately trivial results often are for this very reason valid."<sup>30</sup>

However, the present debate has done more. It has underscored the need for including a differentiating study of conflict in the historical

<sup>27</sup> *Documentary History*, p. 275.

<sup>28</sup> Mao, SW, IV, pp. 98 and 102.

<sup>29</sup> *Documentary History*, p. 261.

<sup>30</sup> Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Tübingen, 1924), p. 556.

and institutional analysis of Marxist-Leninist Communism. If Communist rule involves a unique concentration of political, economic, social, and ideological power in the hands of a totalitarian bureaucracy, and if this bureaucracy can perpetuate its privileged position because it is able to keep the mass of the population atomised, then conflicts within any single Communist régime or between the two great axis powers do not generally constitute primary long-range problems. But they may constitute secondary short-range problems of considerable significance. The effectiveness of our policy will depend on our ability to identify the pseudo-problems, eliminate the fallacious solutions, and concentrate all our efforts on a methodologically sound analysis of the real issues.

"There is no royal road to geometry." And there is no royal road to the study of Marxist-Leninist Communism. Like any other historical phenomenon, understanding can be achieved only by orderly and objective inquiry. Today thoughtful attempts are being made to determine the nature and range of institutional changes and of actual and potential conflicts within the USSR.<sup>31</sup> Similar attempts are required—and in fact are already being made—with respect to Communist China. Properly conducted, such studies should enable us to recognise, within the framework of an over-riding identity of interest, the many genuine tensions that characterise, but do not dominate, the present relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China.

KARL A. WITTFOGEL.

*Prof. Schwartz comments*

In my article "The Legend of the 'Legend of 'Maoism''" (*The China Quarterly*, No. 2, pp. 35-42), there appears the following passage: "What then are the legitimate uses of the word 'Maoism' as I conceive them? In the first place I would assign the 'ism' in Maoism neither more nor less weight than the 'ism' in Stalinism: (1) It may be taken in the first instance to refer to the strategies and policies of Mao and Stalin."<sup>1</sup> Now it seems to me patently clear that the antecedent of the pronoun "it" is the word "ism" and not the word "Maoism." In referring to Stalin's "strategies and policies" here I am by no means simply referring to his strategies in China but rather to the sum total of all his strategies, both domestic and foreign. By pretending that the antecedent of the pronoun "it" is Maoism, Prof. Wittfogel wins for

<sup>31</sup> See Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 421 *et seq.*; Bertram D. Wolfe, "The Durability of Soviet Despotism," *Commentary* (August 1957): 93-104; Schapiro 1959, p. 213 and *passim*; Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen. Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 377 *et seq.*; Hugh Seton-Watson, *Neither War Nor Peace* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 238 *et seq.*

<sup>1</sup> *Loc. cit.* p. 36.

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himself an easy albeit spurious victory.<sup>2</sup> Thus Maoism as a category includes "the strategies of Mao and Stalin." From this false beginning we go on to the astounding assertion that the "linkage of *Mao and Stalin* destroys a core plank in the original 'Maoist' thesis."

Quite apart from this particular piece of jugglery, I have never denied that elements of Stalinism have played a role in the development of Chinese Communism. To follow Prof. Wittfogel's logic one should never use the word "Stalinism" since, according to his own views, Stalinism embodies large elements of Leninism.

BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ.

### The Essence of "Maoism"

PROF. WITTFOGEL reminds me of nothing quite so much as the conductor faced with a difficult score. There is always the danger that the interpretation will be superficial and inadequate; this seems to have been the case in his recent article in *The China Quarterly*, "The Legend of Maoism." Rather than attempt to deal with his "bird shot" attack against Prof. Schwartz, I would like to address myself to the specific substantive material which he marshals to demonstrate: (1) that Mao's shift of focus to the peasantry in his Hunan report of February 1927 was anticipated by earlier Comintern policy,<sup>1</sup> and (2) that it reflected no conflict with Comintern policy of that time.<sup>2</sup>

For Prof. Wittfogel it is enough that earlier Comintern policy deals with the peasantry.<sup>3</sup> What he fails to explore are the policies which stem from this concern, and it is precisely here that crucial distinctions between Comintern policy and Mao's Hunan report occur. That the peasant question was considered in May 1926<sup>4</sup> by the Comintern is unquestioned; that its policy was directed toward a continuance of the CCP-KMT alliance, even at the expense of the peasantry, is equally clear.

The main task of the Chinese Communists and Kuomintang is to explain to the peasant masses throughout the whole of China that only the formation of an independent revolutionary government (the KMT) . . . can radically improve the material and political position of the peasantry.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See p. 89 of this issue.

<sup>1</sup> *The China Quarterly*, No. 2, p. 20.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 20.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Asian Materials—International Press Correspondence: 1921–1927*. Edited by Henryk Sjaardema (Private Printing, 1959), p. 405. The preceding has been utilised because it allows a facile tracing of Comintern policy in Asia; since it is not generally available, I have included the location in the *International Press Correspondence* as well. See *Inprecor*, 1926, p. 649.

<sup>5</sup> *Asian Materials*, *op. cit.*, p. 405; *Inprecor*, *op. cit.*, p. 649.

The implications of this policy were further delineated by Stalin in November 1926.<sup>6</sup> Once again the peasant question was considered in great detail. The polemics are sympathetic to the peasantry; the policy statement is not.

Soviets cannot be set up in the rural districts of China if they are not set up in the industrial districts.<sup>7</sup>

The gist of the report established a clear priority for organisational work in the cities. The focus of policy remained the urban proletariat. At the VII meeting of the ECCI, beginning in late November 1926,<sup>8</sup> Tan Ping-shan, speaking for Katayama,<sup>9</sup> Doriot,<sup>10</sup> Roy,<sup>11</sup> and Schao,<sup>12</sup> made this clear.

... the question of the labour movement is always the most important concern of our party.<sup>13</sup>

Still, it is legitimate for Wittfogel to insist that Mao's innovative energies were not marked by his commentaries on the plight of the peasants. What is clearly marked is Mao's shift in focus. The Comintern line would recognise the importance of the peasantry, but would bind its future to the success of the urban proletariat; Mao was to reverse this emphasis.

All revolutionary parties and all revolutionary comrades will stand before them (the peasantry) to be tested, and to be accepted or rejected as they decide.<sup>14</sup>

The meaning here is not devious. Simply, the success of the revolution must ultimately turn on the peasantry. Implicit in this is a turning from the city to the country—from the urban proletariat to the rural peasant. It is on this that the innovative energies of Mao were directed.

Prof. Wittfogel would further insist that Mao's Hunan report was consistent with Comintern policy.<sup>15</sup> He cites Bukharin's policy statements of June 1927 to demonstrate this.<sup>16</sup> He makes no mention of the fact that this Comintern statement was the direct result of Chiang's Shanghai coup in April 1927, and marked a new line:

... China is now experiencing an agrarian revolution enormous in its breadth and power. What is an agrarian revolution? It is actually the basis and essence of a Bourgeois democratic revolution.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 482-485; *Inprecor*, 1926, pp. 1581-1583.

<sup>7</sup> *The Communist International*, December 30, 1926, p. 7; *Inprecor*, 1926, p. 1583.

<sup>8</sup> *Asian Materials*, pp. 486-503.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 494-496.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 497-498.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 498-500.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 500-501.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 502-503; *Inprecor*, 1926, pp. 1607-1608.

<sup>14</sup> Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Writings* (Lawrence & Wishart, Ltd., 1955), Vol. I, p. 22.

<sup>15</sup> *The China Quarterly*, *op. cit.* p. 20.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* p. 21.

<sup>17</sup> *The Communist International*, June 30, 1927, p. 201; for Bukharin's reiteration of this line see *Inprecor*, 1927, pp. 927-930.

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In this statement Stalin had in fact redefined the Bourgeois democratic revolution. In November 1926 the energies of the party were to be directed against the foreign imperialists in the cities<sup>18</sup>; in June 1927 the agrarian revolution was to be the base.<sup>19</sup> It is clear that Mao's Hunan report did not call for renewed activity against the imperialists in the cities by the proletariat—a line which was current when he wrote his report in February 1927. The evidence to which Wittfogel refers only becomes tenable if one accepts the thesis that the egg lays the chicken.

From this evidence it is not unreasonable to charge Wittfogel on two counts: (1) he has failed to understand the innovative direction of Mao's Hunan report which was not merely concerned with the peasantry, but saw the future success of the party, not in the urban proletariat, but in the rural peasantry, and (2) he has been unwilling to recognise the policy aspects of Stalin's speech of November 1926 which insisted on the primacy of urban organisational work. His evidence that later Comintern policy supported Mao can hardly be considered evidence which would prove or disprove Mao's adherence to an earlier line.

HENRYK SJAARDEMA

### *Prof. Wittfogel comments*

Mr. Sjaardema claims that I "failed to understand the innovative direction of Mao's Hunan Report which was not merely concerned with the peasantry but saw the future success of the party, not in the urban proletariat, but in the rural peasantry."

Actually I presented documentary evidence to show that the strategy of basing the Communist power struggle in the East on the peasantry stemmed from Lenin, who tested it practically in Inner Asia and formulated it theoretically in 1919–20. I furthermore presented documentary evidence to show that Mao in the 1927 version of the Hunan Report did not express this policy. The ideas about Communist leadership and the solving of the land question (the key aspects of Lenin's new strategy) did not appear in the original Report; Mao inserted them in 1951 in the doctored edition of his *Selected Works*.

Mr. Sjaardema also claims that I have been "unwilling to recognise the policy aspects of Stalin's speech of November 1926 which insisted on the primacy of urban organisational work."

Actually I made exactly this point. On page 83 of *The China Quarterly*, no. 1, I recorded Stalin's insistence "that when the revolution reached the soviet stage, the soviets would include 'the industrial centres

<sup>18</sup> See Stalin's policy speech of November 1926, reported in *Inprecor*, 1926, p. 1583.

<sup>19</sup> *The Communist International*, op. cit.; *Inprecor*, 1927, pp. 927–930.

of China'." Having overlooked this statement of Stalin's 1926 position, Mr. Sjaardema quite naturally overlooked my reference to its modification. Originally Stalin saw the Chinese revolution as a nation-wide (urban and rural) process, directed towards the creation of soviets of workers and peasants. However, in the summer of 1927 Stalin began to view the Chinese revolution as a regionally diversified process in the course of which the Communists might at first be able to maintain power bases only in the countryside.

In criticising me, Mr. Sjaardema rests his argument on a collection of *International Press Correspondence (Inprecor)* data on Asia which he himself published. To be sure, such a collection provides a useful tool. But a serious historical assessment of Moscow-CCP relations requires that *Inprecor* be consulted *in toto* and that, in addition, other Soviet and Chinese sources be examined, among them Mao's original (not his doctored) writings. The deficiency of Mr. Sjaardema's approach is underlined by his assertion that on page 21 of the second part of my article I cited "Bukharin's policy statements of June 1927."

Actually the Bukharin statement given on that page was made in May during the VIII Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and it refers not to policy, but to a report on the Hunan peasants. This Session, "contrary to all precedents in the history of the Communist International, met under quasi-conspiratorial conditions" (Harold Isaacs: *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* [London: 1938], p. 287); and according to Albert Treint, a member of the presidium of the Executive Committee, "no record of the discussions was published either in the Press of the U.S.S.R. or in the international Communist Press" (*ibid.*, p. 288). This certainly was true for *Inprecor*. Hence information on this extraordinary conference must be gleaned from other sources. And this is what I did (*The China Quarterly*, no. 2, p. 21, note 29).

However, even the *Inprecor* data on Moscow's attitude in May/June 1927 clearly indicate that the united-front policy with the KMT was still being upheld with the left Kuomintang after Chiang Kai-shek's break with the Communists in April. Mao's united-front-orientated Hunan Report could therefore be consistently praised by Bukharin in May.

A full understanding of the CCP's first united-front policy is eminently helpful for our understanding of growth by penetration, a method which has been so successfully employed by the Communists in many "backward," colonial, and semi-colonial countries. Since, according to the historical evidence, Mao's behaviour until the summer of 1927 expressed this policy effectively, I regret the continuing tendency to view Mao's Hunan Report as a heretic innovation, which it is neither in its original

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form nor in the doctored version that is being studied as a guide to action by the Communists and their friends in Latin America, Africa, and Asia today. It is bad generalship to misjudge the weapons of any enemy. It is catastrophic to misjudge the operational and propagandistic weapons of an enemy whose power and will to victory cannot be doubted.

KARL A. WITTFOGEL.



## *The Third International Sovietological Conference*

(September 18-25, 1960, Lake Kawaguchi, Japan)

It has more and more become a practice these days to hold conferences in areas of isolation, usually in the mountains away from urban centres. This has been the case with a number of Sinological conferences in America these last few years. Though many of these conferences were manifestly preoccupied with problems of Confucianism, one may suspect a latent Taoist influence in the organisers. Though the Sovietologists can hardly be suspected of Taoist inclinations, the last two conferences of students of the Soviet Union have also taken place in mountain areas distant from the distractions of intensive civilisation. The 1958 Second International Sovietological Conference took place in the green hills of Styria, in Bad Aussee.<sup>1</sup> This one took place in the equally green hills of the Fuji-Hakone region of Japan. The delegates were housed in the superbly efficient Fuji-View Hotel, a hotel built almost entirely in Western style but capped with a Japanese type roof, located on the shores of Lake Kawaguchi. From the front of the hotel and from many of the rooms one could see the sloping cone of Fuji rising into the air. Though on some days hidden by the mist, on other days the erstwhile volcano stood clearly visible, but usually with strange clouds swirling about its summit, as if the fires within it were still producing steam. The nearest town was far enough away to require an effort to reach. Hence the delegates for the most part stayed on the hotel grounds, enjoying each other's company and thus creating an atmosphere of personal contact which so many academicians say is the real profit from academic meetings.

The host for this year's conference was the Ōa Kyōkai, literally translated the "Association for Europe and Asia," but whose official English title is "Japanese Association on Communist States in Europe and Asia." Let me say that were it not for the amiable guidance of Ambassador Eiji Amau, the president of the Ōa Kyōkai, and the hard work of Mr. Yoji Hirota, managing director of the Ōa Kyōkai, the conference could hardly have proceeded in the way in which it did.

<sup>1</sup> The first conference, held at Münsterfeld in 1956, was initiated by Dr. Klaus Mehnert, Director of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde, Stuttgart, with the object of getting scholars from all over the world to compare notes on the progress of Soviet Studies, and to discuss the "thaw." The theme of the second conference was the Soviet Model and Asia.

### THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL SOVIETOLOGICAL CONFERENCE

Scholarly meetings usually require more than the simple availability of a place for scholars to meet. Without the sure hand of direction, meetings of scholars with different temperaments and inclinations so easily fall apart. A certain degree of "democratic centralism" has its advantages in the organisation of scholarly meetings.

There were forty-six official delegates to the Conference, as well as thirty-four observers. The delegates came from the following countries: Argentina, Australia, France, Germany, Hongkong, India, Japan, Pakistan, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. As could be expected the delegations from Japan and America were numerically the largest. About half the delegates were experts on China and the Far East in general, and many of the remaining delegates had considerable professional interest in the Asian side of Sovietology. But again, many of the China experts had knowledge and experience with Soviet problems. In many ways, it was this broad foundation of mutually shared knowledge both of Soviet and Chinese Communist problems which was one of the major reasons for the intellectual success of the conference. One of the problems which students of Communist China often face is the deep intellectual gap between those who work on "contemporary" and those who work on "traditional" China, a gap which arises out of the totally different problems which each face in their own work. Such was not the case in this conference. In fact, the degree of intellectual compatibility between the Soviet and Chinese experts, as well as the general success of the conference, suggests that more meetings of this sort might be planned for the future.

There were five and one-half days of intensive three-hour sessions, from Monday, September 19, to Saturday, September 24. Several impromptu evening sessions were held, each with considerable attendance. Simultaneous translations of English and Japanese, the official languages of the conference, greatly facilitated communications. Another major technical problem in communication was solved by having the papers written, reproduced, and distributed in advance. Papers were discussed, not read. Parliamentary type chairmen skilfully guided discussions, and rapporteurs opened the discussions by detailing interesting and controversial points raised in the papers. Rapporteur was perhaps the wrong word, for the so-called rapporteur in fact launched the discussions by pinpointing the issues. Another aspect of the conference which, in my opinion, played an important part making for its success was the explicit injunction to participants to discuss ideas, problems, issues, and to avoid making substantive presentations, valuable as they might have been. Hence almost every session was exciting, and the soporific effects induced by certain types of academic meetings were avoided. All in all, what made the conference successful was exchange

and discussion of ideas based on the prior availability of individual research papers.

The Third International Sovietological Conference differed from the Second, not only in that the location was now in Asia rather than in Europe, but in that in almost every discussion the attention of the participants was focused on Asia, in particular Communist China. In fact, so China oriented was the conference that the banner on the official conference photograph read: "The Third International Conference of Sovietologists and Sinologists." Despite the fact that the term Sovietology presumably means "study of the Soviet Union," discussion on the internal problems of Soviet society was far outweighed by discussion on the international role of the U.S.S.R., particularly in Asia. But even though there were a number of discussions on problems of Chinese Communism and Chinese society, the main theme of the conference was not "Sinological." The growing evidence of a Sino-Soviet "ideological dispute" made the subject of Sino-Soviet relations and the significance of the dispute for the free world, and for the U.S.S.R. and Communist China themselves, the dominant theme of the conference. But again, more than the points of the dispute itself, it was the implications of the dispute which came up over and over again in discussions. The dispute, in one way or another, seemed to involve the issue of peace and war. In a quasi-public way, that is in their articles celebrating Lenin's ninetieth birthday, in the Bucharest meetings, in remarks made to delegates of the W.F.T.U. meetings in Peking,<sup>2</sup> the Chinese appeared to have openly challenged Khrushchev's programme of peaceful co-existence, and were taking the position that the demise of imperialism and capitalism would inevitably be preceded by war, a war which, despite its destructiveness, would leave the Communist bloc triumphant. Such a position directly, and what is more significant, openly contradicted Khrushchev's policy for a *modus vivendi*, which envisages the destruction of the free world without war, through a process of growing political and economic pressure from the Communist bloc. If the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture, more than a decade ago, was initially an intra-bloc problem, the present Sino-Soviet dispute had immediate relevance for the crucial issue of the present time: disarmament. Thus in addition to the professional interest of the participants in any Sino-Soviet problem, its implications for international relations made this subject the one most intensively discussed. When initially planned only one paper had been submitted on the "peace and war" question, but on the opening day of the conference, the number of papers submitted for discussion on this question had risen to five. Furthermore, the session on the "peace and

<sup>2</sup> *Jen-min Jih-pao*, April 22, 1960, June 28, 1960. *Hung-ch'i*, no. 4, April 16, 1960. *Peking Review*, June 14, 1960.

war" question was the only one which formally received a full day's deliberations.

There was almost complete consensus that the differences between the U.S.S.R. and Communist China were real, that is to say, that they were not contrived tactics in a unified world Communist strategy. On the other hand, virtually no one in the conference felt that a rupture of Titoist type between the U.S.S.R. and Communist China was likely in the near future. Yet most participants thought that these differences were important, that they would persist despite a possible ironing-out in the coming months, and that they would continue to affect both countries involved, as well as the rest of the world. But what are these differences? What are the circumstances out of which these differences have sprung? How wide is the gap between the U.S.S.R. and Communist China? These were in effect the major questions discussed, and on these points there was not, and could not be, a consensus of opinions. It is not so much that the participants disagreed as to the evidence, or even disagreed in the analysis of the evidence. Aside from a few public verbal statements and some concrete actions (such as the departure of Soviet technicians from China), most of the evidence for the dispute consists of Soviet and Chinese Communist articles on problems of ideology. The participants disagreed largely in the evaluation of the evidence, and in the conclusions to be drawn therefrom. And in this respect disagreement arose mostly out of the different backgrounds of the participants, their own particular ways of thinking, and their own experiences with problems of Soviet and Chinese Communism.

There were many participants who felt that, regardless of the significance of the dispute, there were strong practical interests which dictated the maintenance of bloc solidarity. Despite a growing desire for self-sufficiency and definite autarkistic tendencies on China's part, China still remains heavily dependent on the U.S.S.R. and other bloc countries for aid in its programme of rapid industrialisation and economic transformation. On the other hand, though China's importance for the Soviet economy is by no means as great as China's dependence on the latter, there are powerful political reasons which impel the Soviet Union to hold on tightly to its only major ally in the world.

But are the affairs and policies of Communist countries governed by practical considerations alone? There remains the fact that both the U.S.S.R. and Communist China—and particularly China at the present time—are countries governed by ideologies, ideologies which are more than simple propaganda devices. Both in the past have sacrificed expediency for ideological principle. A number of the participants argued strongly that one cannot look upon Communist countries as "normal states." Communist countries are bound up with an ideology

which necessarily transcends their own borders, and are part of a world-wide organisation on which this ideology rests.

One of the participants suggested that a crucial principle was involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute which transcended practical interests: that an authoritarian system requires a single centre and will be seriously endangered if a competitive centre develops. No one suggested that either the Soviet Union or Communist China would collapse as the result of a rift, but what could crumble would be the unity of the world Communist movement. Some speakers pointed out the serious rifts which have occurred in the Indian Communist Party, for example, between a supposed pro-Soviet and a supposed pro-Chinese wing of the Party, the former taking a "soft line" and the latter a "hard line." Even with a Sino-Soviet accommodation in the coming months, the emergence of Peking as a contending aspirant to the role of centre of authority in World Communism could have a serious effect on the hitherto still existing unity of the various Communist parties. As was said earlier, some participants tended to emphasise the forces making for unity, whereas others saw growing signs of estrangement. Often those with economic concerns tended to point out the tight bonds of economic and political interest which held the U.S.S.R. and Communist China together. On the other hand, others, particularly some of the political scientists, saw growing problems of what might be called system incompatibility.

Those who saw system incompatibility as a factor making for growing disunity pointed out that there were divergent tendencies in the development of Soviet and Chinese societies, divergent tendencies which were creating forces working in different and opposite directions. One participant expressed the problem in China's case as one of a growing gap between the "is" and the "ought," that is the present stark reality and the ideal arising out of an increasingly emphasised ideology. Whereas the former saw this gap as a continuing source of tension in China, another participant saw the "rise of expectations" in the Soviet Union as a force making for stability. As life improved in the Soviet Union, pressures would increase from below on the régime toward a policy of stabilisation at home and co-operation abroad. But both of the approaches mentioned related essentially to general factors making for unity or disunity between the Soviet Union and Communist China. There remains the fact that something more specific, immediate, and concrete has given rise to the dispute between Moscow and Peking. And there was a strong feeling among many of the delegates that the issue which gave rise to the dispute involved co-existence, and ultimately the question of peace and war.

No participant was inclined to dispute the fact that China's immediate

interests, *viz.*, the Taiwan problem, its relations, military and political, *vis-à-vis* the United States, were prime factors in the Chinese attitude toward Soviet politics. However, these have been problems ever since the establishment of the People's Republic. A number of Japanese participants, in particular, tended to feel that it was not the problem which had changed, but the Chinese attitude toward it, and an important element in this change was the shift in the world-wide weapons balance. When the U.S.S.R. announced the achievement of an operational I.C.B.M., the Chinese felt that the military situation had shifted decisively in favour of the Communist bloc. Under these circumstances, the Chinese believed that a "hard line" would ultimately force concessions from the West, whereas a "soft line" would induce no substantial concessions, but could endanger the solidarity of the Communist bloc. Thus, paradoxically, though it was the Soviet Union which achieved the technological breakthrough, it was the Chinese Communists who took the "position from strength."

There was no disagreement among the delegates that in the ideological dispute over co-existence, the Chinese took the "hard line" and the Soviets the "soft line." But what did this mean practically? It was noted during the discussions that the Chinese reportedly had indicated their lack of fear of a nuclear war, on the grounds that vast world-wide destruction would have its most devastating effect on the advanced industrialised countries, leaving China relatively stronger *vis-à-vis* these countries after the war. However, no one suggested that the Chinese were willing to incite nuclear war at this time. The trend of discussion was rather that the Chinese were against a Soviet-American *détente*. The failure of a *détente* to materialise would not necessarily mean general war. It could, however, mean that room is left for wars with "limited objectives." One participant suggested several possible kinds of "limited wars": (1) war by proxy (*e.g.*, the type of military action waged by the Pathet Lao), (2) limited war with sanctuaries (as happened in Korea), (3) open attack with limited objectives (*e.g.*, an attack on Quemoy-Matsu alone).

If the Sino-Soviet dispute did involve differing attitudes toward the advantages and possibilities of limited wars, this still could have serious implications for general war. There seemed to be widespread feeling in the conference that Khrushchev's policies were motivated by a deep fear of general war, and that Soviet rejection of the idea of limited war was primarily motivated by a fear that limited war could easily lead to general war, with resultant massive destruction of the U.S.S.R. But, on the other hand, there was no clear consensus that the Chinese approach indicated an approval in principle for limited wars with limited objectives, based on the assumption that such wars would not



incite a general war. It was pointed out that, despite the aggressive tone of the Chinese Press, the Chinese Communists have so far scrupulously avoided direct and even indirect military action in neighbouring South-East Asia.

But if there was no consensus that the Chinese Communists in principle favoured a strategy of limited war, there was considerable feeling that Chinese Communist policy, in contrast to Soviet policy, was strongly concerned with certain limited objectives. And these limited objectives related to its own national and international goals. These objectives involved: assurance and improvement in Soviet economic and military aid to secure China's transformation into a first-class industrial and military power, the acquisition of Taiwan and the decisive elimination of a "second China," and the formal recognition of Communist China as an international power. Some of the Japanese delegates in particular tended to stress China's particular goals and circumstances as the prime factors in the formulation of Chinese Communist policy, rather than Peking's assertion of ideological and organisational authority in the Communist camp as a whole. One of the Western delegates contrasted the "global" nature of the Soviet role in world affairs to the still essentially "peripheral" nature of China's role. Others spoke of China's intense preoccupation with the problems of its own industrialisation and economic development, and its obsession with the Taiwan problem. One Japanese delegate stressed China's experience with foreign imperialism in earlier days as an important factor in its present attitudes.

All in all, these remarks suggested that the Chinese, whose internal and external positions were far from established, secure, and recognised, in contrast to the U.S.S.R., still pursued essentially limited, peripheral, and immediate objectives, even when it seemed as if their actions had global significance (such as, for example, their involvement in Eastern Europe, or their special attitudes toward the F.L.N. in Algeria). One delegate cited an old Chinese tactic expressed in the four character phrase: befriend those far off, attack those near, to indicate the rationale of Chinese Communist behaviour in the international field. If a Soviet-American *détente* did materialise, this could leave the Chinese Communists short of their specific goals. Taiwan would remain out of their hands. Nuclear disarmament would occur before China had become a nuclear Power. And a *détente* might weaken one of the main bonds holding the Communist bloc together—fear of a common enemy. Weakening of bloc solidarity might seriously jeopardise the inflow of material aid from bloc countries, so necessary for the consummation of China's economic transformation.

But if there was considerable feeling that the Chinese were pursuing



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local rather than global objectives in their policies, there also was strong feeling that present Chinese policies, one expression of which is the now open ideological dispute with the U.S.S.R., had much more than local significance. Once the issue had been elevated to the ideological plane, it took on general rather than simply particular significance. Though there was some disagreement as to who first made public a dispute which should have remained private according to the rules of intra-bloc politics, the "weight of opinion" seemed to be that it was the Chinese who took the decisive steps in making it known, particularly in the articles celebrating Lenin's birthday, Yü Chao-li's article in *Red Flag*, P'eng Chen's statements at the Bucharest meetings, and the remarks made to the visiting delegates to the meeting of the W.F.T.U. in Peking. Thus it was the Chinese who felt that the differences with the U.S.S.R., and with Khrushchev in particular, were so serious that they had to risk the effects of publicity in order to put their views across.

One delegate pointed out that so serious was this dispute taken on the Soviet side that Khrushchev had to elicit support from other Communist leaders to buttress his position. Most delegates, as I have said before, felt that there were general elements which make for growing differences between these two societies. But it was also felt that there were specific reasons for the transformation of latent differences into a manifest dispute. And these reasons related to the issue of co-existence because they involved the possibility of a Soviet-American *détente* which would not include China and which would not include as a *sine qua non* the satisfaction of China's demands in regard to its own "limited objectives."

Although the problem of Sino-Soviet relations, and within that problem the issue of the implications of the Sino-Soviet dispute for "peace and war," for co-existence, were the main themes which ran through the whole conference, other issues were also discussed at length. The conference was divided into three major discussion sections, of which the problem of Sino-Soviet relations formed the second part. The first section was called "Communist China and the Soviet Union: A Comparative Analysis," and the third section "The Communist Countries and Non-Communist Asia." As already mentioned earlier, the predominance of the problem of Sino-Soviet relations tended to make all discussions, regardless of the formal subject involved, veer around again to that problem. Nevertheless, several aspects of internal development in the U.S.S.R. and China were discussed. Here again, it is significant that despite the formally "Sovietological" theme of the conference, so many of the papers and so much of the discussion dealt with China.

Within the first section, four subjects came under discussion. Despite the absence of a paper on comparative industrialisation—an absence

which was noted with regret—there was considerable discussion on the economic development of both the U.S.S.R. and Communist China. It is significant that most of the discussion revolved round the problem of agriculture, weak areas in both the Soviet and Chinese economies. The state of the communes in China was of course touched on. One paper dealt extensively with the feasibility of Soviet agriculture as a model for agricultural development in the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa.

Here again, there were too few contributions on this subject and not sufficient discussion, but certain general trends did emerge. Although some doubt was voiced on at least one occasion, no serious objection was made to the general assumption that one must reckon that China will continue to develop industrially at a rapid rate, and that China will achieve great-power industrial status some time in the not too distant future. One of the participants suggested distinguishing between "industrial countries" and "industrialised countries," that is such countries which simply possess extensive modern industry, and those in which the entire society and economy has been transformed by modern industry. In this sense, even the Soviet Union, in contrast to a country like Japan, for example, must be reckoned an "industrial" rather than an "industrialised" country. In the discussions on Chinese agriculture, and specifically on the communes, no one ventured to suggest either the success or conversely the failure of the commune system, either as a form of social organisation or as an operative economic unit. Participants stressed the difficulties which both Soviet and Chinese agriculture faced in their respective developments. Other participants noted that certain peculiar features in Chinese agriculture, namely the prevalence of irrigation and labour-intensive methods of cultivation, could be seen as factors in China's deviation from the Soviet model in its own agricultural development.

There were two extensively documented papers on the comparative development of education in the U.S.S.R. and China. Another paper dealt with the development of social values in the two countries. The latter paper suggested an increasingly divergent development of social values, which the author expressed in the words "the *embourgeoisement* of Russia" and "the proletarianisation of China." The first two papers noted education as an important avenue of social mobility in both countries. In general, both countries have experienced tremendous expansion in their educational systems, although the Chinese now seem to be putting the emphasis on quantity rather than quality, that is turning out as many trained people as possible in the shortest possible time. It was also noted that the Chinese still stressed intensive ideological

indoctrination in their educational programmes, whereas the Russians were becoming somewhat less rigid and more permissive.

There was some discussion, although fragmentary, on the question of whether the general developments of Soviet and Chinese societies are convergent or divergent. Some participants, notably those in the Soviet field, tended to emphasise the idea of "comparable stages," that is that China is in a "stage" comparable to one which Russia already passed through at an earlier period of its development. On the other hand, many speakers, notably from the Japanese side, tended to emphasise the unique features of China's development. This approach suggested a possibly different development for China and implicitly warned against the determinism of a stages approach. Some participants suggested that this problem could be approached through comparative system analysis, that is by an attempt to formulate some sort of model for Soviet and Chinese societies as a whole, with particular emphasis on system goals and values. Needless to say, much remains to be done in this field.

Considerable discussion was evoked by the question as to the extent to which historical and cultural peculiarities serve to explain the development and behaviour of the Soviet Union and Communist China. In particular, this question was raised in regard to China. Are there traditional elements discernible in the Chinese Communist movement? Some participants, particularly those on the Japanese side, tended to see certain ideological similarities between Chinese Communism and Confucianism, although this was modified by saying that the Confucianist influence was more apparent in the behaviour of the Communists, particularly during the Yen'an period, than in the explicit ideology. On the other hand, some of the Western participants stressed system and ideology, rather than history and culture, as the real determinants in Chinese Communist society. The latter tended to emphasise the radical break with tradition which Chinese Communism represented. Others pointed out that in many ways Chinese tradition had already crumbled when the Chinese Communists appeared on the scene. The question has been debated many times before as to whether the Chinese Communists are more "Chinese" or more "Communist," and no clear-cut answer can probably ever be given. However, the "weight of opinion" seemed to favour the latter view.

The present dispute between Moscow and Peking was not the only subject in the field of Sino-Soviet relations which was discussed. The subject of trade and aid between the Soviet Union and China was also raised. A number of interesting points were noted. Thus, for example, it was pointed out that the Chinese Communists have consistently refrained from formally joining the Council for Mutual Assistance, which

handles trade and aid relations between the Soviet Union and East European countries. However, though this might be interpreted as evidence of some sort of economic or commercial gap between China and the rest of the bloc countries, some participants pointed out that the Chinese seemed loth to participate in international arrangements calling for long-range planning. Some of the fluctuations in Chinese trade with other bloc countries could be accounted for by this reason. As a whole, there was some consensus that the economic ties between the U.S.S.R. and China would remain strong.

Also discussed was the problem of the borderlands and the peripheral countries: Mongolia, North Vietnam, and North Korea. Was there evidence of the Sino-Soviet split in these regions? Here, no conclusive answer could be given. There were indications of some Soviet and Chinese divergence in their policies in Mongolia, and some sensitivity in regard to Sinkiang. But on the whole the participants tended, at least tacitly, to feel that whatever the nature and causes of the Sino-Soviet dispute, neither the border lands nor the peripheral countries played a major part in the genesis and manifestation of the dispute. Rather than in these areas, the Sino-Soviet dispute seems to have had greater repercussions in their respective policies toward the countries outside of the bloc. And this brings us to the last major section of the conference.

One of the major policies of both the Soviet Union and Communist China toward the countries of non-Communist Asia has been that of economic aid. It was pointed out that, despite the smallness of Soviet and Chinese Communist aid to these countries compared to the quantity of Western aid, "Communist aid programmes have caught the imagination of the people," as one participant put it. This aid would continue, and would continue to reap political and propaganda benefits for the Communist camp. However, some opinions were expressed that the divergencies of Russian and Chinese policies toward the neutrals, particularly Chinese policies toward India, had caused misgivings among the Russians. There seems to be clear evidence of serious differences in Soviet and Chinese Communist attitudes toward neutralism and neutrals, although there were signs that the Chinese attitude had been changing and "softening" in recent months. Although it was suggested that the Russians and the Chinese may have carved out different spheres for themselves in the non-Communist world, the general feeling seemed to be that this was not the case. In fact, it was noted that Communist parties in most non-Communist countries of Asia tended to follow the Soviet line on foreign policy, even though they felt attraction for Communist China in other respects.

It was particularly within the Indian Communist Party that the

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Soviet-Chinese divergence seems to have had the greatest repercussions, and it was partly with the Indian C.P. in mind that the opinion was expressed that the rise of a second centre of authority in the Communist bloc might lead to serious consequences for the world Communist movement. The subject of bloc policy toward Japan received the attention of an entire session. Here too no hard and fast consensus emerged but most of the Japanese participants seemed to feel that Japan did indeed occupy a special place in the whole picture of Communist strategy, particularly that of Communist China. There seem to be considerable differences of opinion in the Japanese Communist Party in regard to questions such as whether revolution can occur with or without violence, on the right road to socialism, on the definition of Japanese society (is it a semi-colony, or a capitalist society?). In some ways, many of the Japanese participants inclined toward the feeling that if Japan held a special place in Chinese Communist thinking, so also was the problem of Japan's relationship to China one of paramount and special importance.

The conference ended on a Saturday morning, and within an hour or so after the conclusion, most of the delegates were on their way. Most felt, I believe, that it was an interesting, frank and fruitful conference. Though no "communiqué" was issued and no hard and fast conclusions were drawn, the range of issues covered was broad, and the opinions expressed were relevant. It was a unique occasion to hear the opinions of such a large gathering of specialists on the Soviet Union and Communist China.

H. F. SCHURMANN.

## The 25th International Congress of Orientalists

(August 9-16, 1960, Moscow)

FOR the student of contemporary China, the Orientalists' Congress in Moscow was a disappointing affair. There were only three papers dealing with some aspect of Communism in China delivered and only four altogether dealing with the period since 1911. More important still, the expected confrontation of Western, and particularly American Sinologists with the large delegation of Chinese which had been expected never took place for the Chinese did not turn up. Their absence formed one of the main topics of conversation among Western orientalists when they returned each day to their rooms at the towering (twenty-eight storeys) Ukraina Hotel, one of the half-dozen-odd castellated skyscrapers whose long spires topped with red stars dominate the Moscow skyline. (Another is the new building of Moscow University in which the Congress was held.)

There was no doubt that the Chinese had been expected. A Soviet journal had regretted that at the 1957 Congress in Munich there were no delegates from China (and a number of other Asian countries) to show better how oriental studies had grown in the oriental countries themselves.<sup>1</sup> And in July, 1959, the monthly *Sovremenny Vostok* (*Contemporary East*) declared that large numbers of Chinese would be attending the 1960 Congress. Moreover the second circular letter to delegates to the Congress, received late in May, contained instructions to delegates from Communist countries as to how they could pay for their trip; the list of countries included the People's Republic of China.

It is not clear when precisely the Chinese decision not to come was made, but it now appears that it must have been some time after July 9, 1960. This was the date when the July issue of *Sovremenny Vostok* was passed for the press. The issue contained an article on Sinology at the forthcoming congress by Prof. S. L. Tikhvinsky, head of the former Institute of Sinology, now the Chinese Department of the new Institute of the Peoples of Asia. English subscribers to this magazine have now noticed that the first page of Prof. Tikhvinsky's article has been torn out and a substitute carefully pasted in. It is legitimate to assume

<sup>1</sup> See O. Edmund Clubb, "Notes on Soviet Preparations for the 25th International Congress of Orientalists," *Far Eastern Survey*, February 1960.

that the original page passed for publication contained some reference to the assumed presence of the Chinese at the imminent gathering.

This timing makes it clear that the decision not to come must have been made as a result of worsening Sino-Soviet relations. It will be remembered that towards the end of July, despite the apparent conciliation at Bucharest in June, the Soviet Press began to attack as "fatalist" and "dogmatic" views on peace and war enunciated by the Chinese, albeit without mentioning the Chinese by name. In fact, during the Congress itself, the Yugoslav news agency correspondent in Peking reported that Soviet technical experts were leaving China by the trainload; and it emerged that the magazine *Druzhba* published by the Chinese in Moscow for the Sino-Soviet Friendship Society had stopped publication. One was told by Soviet Sinologists that "of course" the Chinese never attended international conferences. Perhaps the increasing specialisation of modern academic life can be blamed for their ignorance of the fact that the Chinese had sent a delegation to the International Automation Congress in Moscow only two months previously!

But if politics were the major factor behind the absence of the Chinese, other considerations, Western delegates felt, contributed to Chinese distaste for the Congress. The Chinese probably did not relish the idea of their top scholars, many of whom would have been trained in the West, renewing contacts with former colleagues and friends. This may well have been the real reason for the cancellation of the Junior Sinologues Conference which is normally held near the time of the Orientalists' Congress and at the same venue. (The Sinologues Conference appears to have been cancelled before the Chinese decided to boycott the Orientalists' Congress. Soviet Sinologists said that too few papers were submitted to justify holding the Sinologues Conference. But if Peking had sanctioned this even more direct confrontation of Westerners and Chinese, it would surely have been possible for a Chinese delegation to have produced enough papers on its own to have kept the Sinologues Conference going.)

Another probable factor, in the case of both congresses, was Chinese distaste at the idea of being the *object* of study. This suggestion advanced to me by a Russian would seem confirmed by the defence of Orientalism as an academic discipline by B. G. Gafurov, the chairman of the Congress and a senior Communist Party official. In his closing speech, Gafurov said that some Asians thought of orientalism as a reactionary science, a reflection of the days when the West ruled over colonies in Asia and Africa, and felt that it should be discarded. Gafurov said that there was a grain of bitter truth in this, but argued that (1) there had been some humanitarian Western orientalists and (2) that with the decline of imperialism politically, so the imperialist



"sediment" in orientalism was playing a smaller and smaller role. Clearly the Russians, whose possession of Central Asian territories has never really made them members of the Afro-Asian club, would not want to abandon what they consider a promising back door into neutralist hearts.

Westerners with Russian friends gathered that some of our hosts were not unhappy at the absence of the Chinese. Perhaps the most eloquent comment on the affair occurred at the closing session of the Chinese section, a time, we had been told, when resolutions could be passed. An American scholar stood up and expressed his regret at the absence of the Chinese. Many of his countrymen were nonplussed, but they had no need to worry. No Russian jumped to his feet to propose the section should pass a resolution on these lines.

#### *Political aspects*

I have remarked on Soviet interest in oriental studies for political purposes. Certainly Soviet politicians have long been conscious of the potential benefits for Soviet diplomacy in having Russians study Eastern languages and cultures. After the Bandung conference in 1955, at which the Soviet Union was not represented, the order went out for much greater attention to be paid to these fields.

Criticising their neglect, Anastas Mikoyan stated at the Communist Party's 20th Congress in 1956 that "... while the entire East has awakened, the Institute [of Oriental Studies] goes on dozing contentedly. It is about time that it should lift itself to the standard required in our day."

This being the Soviet attitude, one expected the first Orientalists' Congress to be held on Russian soil since the Bolshevik revolution to be diligently exploited for propaganda purposes. In his speech of welcome to the delegates, Mikoyan seemed to justify this expectation when he stressed the familiar Soviet theme that the Eastern peoples were now becoming the creators as well as the objects of oriental science and affirmed the particular relevance of Marxism to the underdeveloped countries.

But on the whole there appeared to be no attempt by our hosts to isolate the Western delegates politically. There were reports of special parties for Asians and of their expenses being paid. The Japanese appeared to be largely Communists or fellow-travellers and of dubious scholastic merit. But the general feeling among Westerners was, I think, that wooing of Afro-Asians was a good deal less ardent than had been expected. Perhaps this was because relatively few Afro-Asian scholars came.

This does not mean to say that there were no signs of the cold war

at the Congress. Twenty-five books were removed from the American section of the book exhibition, admittedly for political reasons. Protests from the American delegation led to their restoration, but a few books disappeared again—notably Karl A. Wittfogel's *Oriental Despotism* and Richard L. Walker's *China under Communism: The First Five Years*.

The Russians allowed the majority of papers to go unchallenged because they were on non-sensitive topics. But the two non-Marxist Westerners (both Americans) to give papers on topics bearing on Communist China—Dr. Irene Taeuber on the growth of China's population between 1741 and 1953 and Dr. Morton Fried on the modern family revolution—were both subjected to heavy criticism on political grounds.

In the case of Dr. Taeuber, the attack took the form of a lengthy prepared statement (by a Chinese with a Russian name who had lived for some time in the Soviet Union). Unfortunately he had not had the opportunity of reading Dr. Taeuber's paper before its delivery; and as he apparently did not speak English he was unable to understand it during delivery. Consequently he attacked Dr. Taeuber for something she never said—that there would be a catastrophe unless the Chinese instituted birth control.

A third bone of contention was the venue of the next Congress. The American delegation arrived with money pledged for holding it in New York. The Russians, however, had weighted the selection committee in favour of the Afro-Asians; for instance, Nepal with two delegates had one on the committee, Canada with eleven had none. The Russians apparently put the Egyptians up to offering Cairo. After a series of manoeuvres (as a result of which the Russians are thought to have antagonised the Egyptians), Delhi was accepted as a compromise.

These events should provoke some hard thinking on the part of Western and particularly American orientalists. Is it worth while continuing to attend conferences, of interest more for personal contacts than for academic exchanges, if the cold war is going to intrude? And if it is worth while, should Western delegations be closely organised to resist the kind of tactics employed by the Russians in the committee for selecting the next Congress venue? Can the Congress be organised so as to minimise political clashes in what should be academic discussions? And, since this is unlikely in the case of sensitive topics, should Westerners attempt to copy other international organisations and split away to form a purely non-Communist organisation?

#### *Chinese studies*

Despite the political clashes, Russian Sinologists were extremely hospitable, delighted to have us see their institute and eager to discuss their fields with Westerners interested in the same periods.

The Modern History section<sup>2</sup> of the Chinese Institute, having completed recently a collective work on contemporary China,<sup>3</sup> is now working on one on the period 1840-1919. While contributing to this work, individual members of the section are also preparing monographic studies of the Taiping rebellion (selected documents and commentary), the Boxers, the 1911 revolution, the Hongkong-Canton strike movement 1925-27, the labour movement during the twenties, the Red Army.<sup>4</sup>

I did not have time to examine the library very thoroughly; but the Institute did appear to have large selections of provincial newspapers not normally available in the West. The ban on the export of Chinese periodicals does not seem to have affected the Soviet Union. It is worth remarking that the collection of periodicals in the Lenin Library is even more extensive than that of the Institute.

That the Institute, after only four years of independent existence is now being re-merged with a larger body for the study of the East would seem to me another reflection of Chinese dislike for being the object of study. It is noteworthy that the journal of the Institute, *Sovetskoe Kitaevvedenie*, which first appeared in 1958, lasted for only four issues. Internal evidence indicates that the contents of each issue were submitted to Peking for approval. In the case of the last issue the delay before publication was so extraordinarily long that it was clear that the Chinese must have demanded lengthy revisions. Presumably under such circumstances Soviet Sinologists decided it would be more discreet to make their activities less prominent. In view of the continuing acrimony of the Sino-Soviet dialogue, Soviet Sinology may well be in for a spell in the doldrums.

RODERICK MACFARQUHAR.

<sup>2</sup> The Institute is or was divided into the following sections: Ancient History; Modern History; Literature and Arts; Linguistics; Economics; Contemporary Institutions.

<sup>3</sup> Soviet Academy of Sciences, *Ocherky Istorii Kitaya v Novesheye Vremya* (Historical articles on Contemporary China) (Moscow: Eastern Literature Publishing House, 1959).

<sup>4</sup> If any reader wishes details about the Institute's personnel for purposes of contacting colleagues in similar fields, I would be glad to furnish what information I have. For a detailed appraisal of Soviet oriental studies see Mark Mancall, "The Twenty-First Party Congress and Soviet Orientalism," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, February, 1960.

## Book Reviews

*Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy.* By A. DOAK BARNETT. [For the Council on Foreign Relations, Harper and Oxford University Press. 1960. 575 pp. £2 16s. or \$6.95.]

THIS book is a study of contemporary China as a problem for American foreign policy. As such it is rather more than an essay by a well-informed writer with ideas of his own on the subject; it is published by that influential body, the Council on Foreign Relations and is based, according to the author's preface, on a series of papers produced by a Study Group on Communist China and United States Policy in Asia which the Council set up in 1958. It thus has a considerable weight of institutional authority behind it in a review of past American policy which, though sympathetic, is distinctly critical and in an examination of possible alternatives for the future. As a result of the heavy burden of responsibility of which the author is evidently conscious in his earnest endeavour to give good advice to the American people and its rulers—particularly those of the next Administration—the book suffers somewhat from a tendency to adopt the manner of a public document; it would no doubt have been livelier and less verbose if Mr. Barnett had just been letting himself go as a private individual. It is nevertheless an important and persuasive contribution to current American thinking—or re-thinking—about China, and it is of outstanding value for any non-American observer who wishes to understand the American view and the alternatives between which American policy has to choose.

Barnett himself points out that it has been very difficult for anyone in the United States to write coolly and unemotionally about China since 1949 because of the impact on American national feeling of the Communist victory in China and its sequel, the war in Korea. The change of régime in China affected America far more than any other Western nation, not so much because of any material stake America had had in China as because of the peculiar sentimental enthusiasm the American people had long had for China and their belief that the two countries were linked together by an unbreakable friendship. Bitter indeed, therefore, was the discovery that a new China had arisen profoundly hostile to the United States and everything it stood for; even worse was the experience of actually being at war with China for three

years in a struggle the brunt of which was borne by American forces, even though fifteen other nations were engaged on the same side.

These events not only determined the American popular attitude towards Communist China for the next few years; they also had violent repercussions in American internal politics, for the extremely confused and inconsistent policy followed by the American Government towards China from 1944 to 1949 came under heavy fire in retrospect from opponents of the Truman Administration, while a number of Far Eastern experts and publicists who had for some years been singing the praises of the Chinese Communists found themselves under suspicion of being agents of an organised conspiracy against the interests of their country. The atmosphere of heated controversy and personal recriminations which was thus engendered was not conducive to steady and dispassionate thinking about the new situation with which America was actually confronted. It has been only during the last two or three years that it has been possible to emerge from the emotional stresses of the first impact of Mao's China, and Mr. Barnett's book is one manifestation of a new approach which has shed all the old illusions about the "agrarian reformers" of Yen-an, but is more concerned with devising effective measures to cope with the unpleasant reality than with empty gestures of condemnation and dislike.

Mr. Barnett holds that "the Chinese Communist régime now exercises effective, albeit ruthless, totalitarian control over the mainland of China" and that "in the years immediately ahead there is little prospect either for an overthrow of the Peking régime from within or for a return to the mainland by the Chinese Nationalists." He also considers—although perhaps he might not have been quite so certain had he finished writing the book later than the autumn of last year—that "in dealing with Communist China over the years ahead, the United States will have to deal, not with Communist China alone, but with China backed by the power of the U.S.S.R." From this estimate of the situation he concludes that the American Government must frame a long-term policy which, even if it cannot appreciably modify the attitude of the Chinese Communists themselves or loosen the Sino-Soviet alliance, will gain the maximum of support from other Western powers and attract as far as possible the uncommitted nations of Asia.

Recent American policy, the author believes, has been far from achieving these results and has instead brought the United States into a position of dangerous isolation in Far Eastern affairs. America is indeed linked with several Western, and with three Asian, nations in SEATO and in South Korea continues to be backed by the authority of the United Nations in its protective task. On the other hand, the American commitment in Taiwan is one in which no other nation is associated

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and the American opposition to the seating of Peking delegates in the United Nations has so far been successful only through extraordinary diplomatic efforts which are becoming increasingly a cause of embarrassment to Washington in its general international relations. Although the recent conflicts of Communist China with India and Indonesia have rendered the two latter countries somewhat less hostile than formerly to the SEATO alliance, they remain opposed to American policies of non-recognition of Peking, which also impose severe strains on the existing alliance with Japan.

Mr. Barnett makes several proposals for improvement of the American position. He recognises that the United States cannot repudiate its treaty of defensive alliance with Taiwan because to do so would be disastrous for its credit as an ally, even if there were no other reasons for preserving the island's independence. On the other hand, he points out that the treaty does not bind the United States to join in the defence of the offshore islands and he holds that Washington should put the strongest pressure on the Chinese Nationalists to evacuate them; he argues that there is no issue on which America might be involved in war with less sympathy or support from the rest of the non-Communist world, and that it would actually be easier to provide for the defence of Taiwan itself if they were given up. To the objection that withdrawal would be ruinous for the morale of the Nationalist forces he replies that "it is neither inevitable nor probable that this would undermine the Nationalist régime or cause major defections from Taiwan to the Communists"; he thinks that "in view of the increasing evidence of the harsh realities of Communist rule on the mainland . . . there is probably less danger now than formerly that any significant number of Nationalist leaders will try to come to terms with Peking, even if circumstances force them to the conclusion that re-invasion of the mainland is not an attainable goal for the foreseeable future." The author emphasises that, if the offshore islands are to be given up, it should be done as a deliberate move in advance of a fresh crisis which would turn into a military defeat.

On the question of American recognition of Peking and the seating of Peking delegates in the United Nations Mr. Barnett advocates a form of the "Two Chinas" solution. The basis of this would be that "both régimes are likely to survive for the foreseeable future" and that it "would be desirable for the international community to accept the authority of each over the territory it now controls." Hitherto opposition to this idea has come as much from Taipeh as from Peking; both governments claim to have sole lawful authority over the whole of China. But the peace treaty which Japan concluded with Nationalist China in 1952 specifically confined its recognition of the latter's sovereignty to the territory actually under its control, and it is open to other nations to restrict

their recognition in a similar way. Moreover, if this recognition is confined to Taiwan, excluding the offshore islands, which were Chinese territory before 1945, there is the not unimportant legal consideration that Taiwan was under Japanese sovereignty for half a century and has never been formally ceded by Japan to the People's Republic. By the "Two Chinas" formula two separate states would be internationally recognised and represented in the United Nations, though China's seat as a permanent member of the Security Council would naturally go to Peking by reason of its *de facto* preponderance of population and power.

It may be objected that Communist China would never agree either to establish diplomatic relations or to enter the United Nations on these terms, and certainly there has so far been no weakening of its contention that the question of Taiwan is an entirely domestic matter with which no foreign state has any legitimate concern. It may also be objected that it would be impossible to bring Taiwan into the United Nations because the Soviet Union would veto its nomination as a new member. Mr. Barnett recognises these difficulties, but he argues that what is most important is that the United States should take the initiative in putting forward publicly proposals for ending the deadlock instead of remaining in its present posture of complete immobility; if all such proposals were to be rejected by China and Russia, America would at least gain the credit with world opinion for a willingness to compromise, whereas its current policy is regarded as unreasonably intransigent even in countries which are otherwise closest to American political aims.

In partial justification of the American official attitude Mr. Barnett emphasises that Communist China is the only country (apart from North Korea) which has not only been formally condemned as an aggressor by the United Nations but has actually waged war against United Nations forces, and that this invalidates the argument that there can be no ground for excluding the Chinese People's Republic when other Communist states are represented. It is not simply a question of deciding whether Peking or Taipeh has the right to fill China's seat; even if the United Nations were to decide that the Nationalists were no longer qualified to represent China, this would not mean automatically that the Communists could take their place, for the United Nations would have the right to insist that Peking should first in some way acknowledge that the world organisation was entitled to concern itself with the affairs of Korea. For the United Nations unconditionally to receive the delegates of a power which has waged war against it would be an abject humiliation for it, for the United Nations is after all supposed to be something more than one sovereign state dealing with another. Mr. Barnett suggests that the United States should make it clear that "while opposing the seating of the Chinese Communists until Peking adopts a



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more compliant attitude, it would accept a majority decision on seating Peking if the Chinese Communists were to fulfil whatever the United Nations defines as 'substantial compliance' with its requirements."

In general, Mr. Barnett maintains that "what is needed to meet the challenge of Communist China is, fundamentally, not so much an effective China policy as an effective Asia policy." America's interest, he holds, is "to prevent the domination of Asia by any single state, to support the principles of independence in that area, and to encourage the political and economic growth of democratic non-Communist states." To attain these ends he argues that America should not try too hard to draw non-aligned countries into any system of alliances, but should "back them up and help them achieve their own aims as they see them." It remains to be seen how far American official policy will move in the direction indicated in this book, but there are signs that it is already developing more along such lines; at the time of writing this review, the issue of the Presidential election is still unknown, but the public controversy that has already taken place between the two candidates over the question of the offshore islands has put China again into the forefront of American national consciousness, and whoever is to be the next occupant of the White House, it will be a time for a fresh review of established policies.

G. F. HUDSON.

*Tibet Fights for Freedom. A White Book.* Edited by RAJA HUTHEESING. [Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1960. 241 pp. Maps, Illustrations. Rs. 15.00.]

*The Revolt in Tibet.* By FRANK MORAES. [New York: The MacMillan Company, 1960. 223 pp. Maps. \$3.95.]

*Tibet in Revolt.* By GEORGE N. PATTERSON. [London: Faber and Faber, 1960. 197 pp. Map, Illustrations, Index. 21s.]

THESE three books have much more in common than the word Tibet in their titles. They all reflect a sense of outrage and indignation over what Han expansionism, Communist ruthlessness, and materialistic cynicism have done to a freedom loving, hapless people. In each is told in the writer's own way the general outline of the causes and course of the Tibetan Revolt and the details of the Dalai Lama's flight from Lhasa to India; in each there is an awareness of the free world—but particularly the Asian free world, as audience and shocked spectator, which, at its own peril, must take to heart something which is more than a tale told for the telling, and each of the books has some degree of

endorsement, by the Dalai Lama himself—a young-old strangely appealing figure.

The White Book, *Tibet Fights for Freedom*, edited by Raja Hutheesing, is primarily a meticulous compilation of radio broadcasts and press dispatches bearing on the causes and course of the Tibetan revolt which culminated in the flight of the Dalai Lama from Lhasa. The coverage is world wide: Peking radio as well as Communist Chinese provincial papers speak their pieces equally with the press of India and the news dispatches which reach the columns of the *New York Times* or the *Manchester Guardian*. Nor have the essential official documents been neglected. Every shade of opinion has its say concerning each event or development in the tragedy which engulfed Tibet and suddenly sounded a warning to all Asian countries. The result of this pairing of viewpoints is not, however, a balanced stalemate of assertion and charge and countercharge but a most effective and damning record of ruthlessness, duplicity, and a callous disregard for truth. The Tibetan case is much the stronger and more clear for everyone to read by reason of this painstaking recording of all the bits and pieces which make up the news mosaic of events.

A foreword by the Dalai Lama, and some informed comment on various aspects of Tibetan society and culture, introduce the reader to the main portion of the book, and an analysis of the international aspects of the revolt and its suppression, and a statement of its effect upon Asian opinion, make a good ending.

*The Revolt in Tibet*, by Frank Moraes, is from the editor's chair: one degree removed from the headlined news story of the day or the latest dispatch, it seeks to establish a frame of reference and relate causes—both those which are immediate and those which lie far back in history—to the effects of today and their continuance into tomorrow. As such it is a well researched record of past events, and a penetrating analysis of the many problems of Tibet in this the time of what he fears is the death agony. Mr. Moraes writes with much wisdom about the significance—for the free world and for all of Asia—of the tragedy of Tibet. He discusses events in their relationship to the impassable gulf between the Communist world and the free world and also in their relationship to possible cleavages within the brutally put together solidarity of the Communist world. Much that he says is outstandingly pertinent. He, too, has felt the very great charm and appeal of the Tibetan people and communicates the warmth of his affection to the reader.

*Tibet In Revolt*, by George N. Patterson, takes the reader, in a somewhat confused manner, close to the heart of the Tibetan problem. He presents a very realistic and apt assessment of the attitude of the Tibetans of Amdo and Khams toward the Lhasa government; which

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reflects a degree of distrust and dislike coupled paradoxically with a feeling of basic solidarity when confronted with the menace of the Chinese. He also tells of their corresponding rage and dismay when they were not even mentioned as Tibetans within the provisions of the Sino-Tibetan agreement of 1951. He places the proper valuation on the character and potential of the eastern Tibetans, and rightly points out that the revolt was primarily theirs. Undoubtedly he was closely involved in many of the events of 1951-59 and tells from first hand knowledge of startling events, plots, and counter plots. He writes with partisan feeling and passion, for unquestionably, and rightly, he feels himself very much one with the Tibetans and from that point of view charges that the Indian government has been gravely culpable in sacrificing the Tibetans in barter for a few years of illusive and dangerous peace. This reviewer finds his summation of Tibetan national aspiration and their deep fear and hatred of the Chinese are well-founded and most if not all he tells is true or at least credible.

The book, however, is marred by numerous errors and misstatements, none of which are very grave, yet they give rise to a certain degree of reserve about accepting all that is written. Apparently nothing was ever cross-checked. Ma Pu-fang is difficult to recognise as Ma Bao Feng. Aba Alo, often called Huang Si-ling, is equally difficult to identify when called Abu Abolok or Hou Wan Seiling. He is said to have had access to unlimited supplies of modern weapons during the war years, but at that time, as I knew both from him and his chief of staff, he was getting only a trickle of practically useless rejects. Chinghai is mentioned as a province in connection with the Simla Conference of 1914, whereas the province of Chinghai only came into existence in 1928. The Tibetans are ethnically classified as Tartar in race but speaking a Burmese language and the Lhasa dialect is said to have become corrupted "by restricted in-breeding", whatever that means. The tribe of Dzachuka is credited with one hundred thousand families. But my very painstaking cross check with traders and the Golok chiefs only gave the figure of six thousand—which is a very large tribe for the nomads. Taktser, the eldest brother of the Dalai Lama, is said to have gone, in 1950, from the Communist Chinese headquarters in Chamdo to Lhasa. He has recorded a tape, however, in which he describes in some detail his itinerary from Kumbum to Nagchuka to Lhasa.

The book would be a much stronger presentation of a case, which this reviewer accepts in the main, if these and similar errors had been kept out; but nevertheless his portrayal of the Tibetans is essentially correct.

These three books focus on the Tibetan revolt, but that revolt and its causes raise, inferentially at least, the basic problem as to what

constitutes the theory and practice of the Communist Chinese policy toward racial minorities. Communist doctrine imposes the necessity of giving lip service at least to the idea that minority peoples and their cultures should be fostered and preserved, and given a considerable degree of autonomy or freedom of self-determination. From the very beginning the Chinese Communists have preached such ideas, but when policy had to be put into practice they have found themselves on the horns of a very real dilemma. They were the Chinese who, throughout the course of a long history, with self-assured chauvinism, have absorbed and assimilated many peoples—for their own good: also they were communists who preach cultural self-determination for all good communists.

Great Han chauvinism was an unknown, or unexpressed, concept prior to the rise of the communists, although some Chinese leaders such as Chang Chih-chung were aware of its implications, as shown by the policies he sought to initiate in Sinkiang in 1946-48. The frequency of its use as a self-indictment or preachment by the communist Chinese, even when they were engaged in taking over Tibet, shows that they are aware of the dilemma caused by the difference between what they preach as communists, and what the historical habits of absorption, they have acquired as Chinese, impel them to do. Many of the vacillations discernible in the policy of the Chinese in Tibet from 1950-59 are not necessarily tactical in nature but may derive from a consciousness of this dilemma. The Tibetans were restive under, and finally rebellious against, both communism as such and chauvinistic Chinese imperialism. For the communist Chinese Tibet could have been, either an example of their success in reconciling these two irreconcilables, or the gigantic warning signal of failure. They now hold a crushed, sullen, resentful Tibet; but the problem of how to resolve the contradictions between what they preach as communists and what they practice as Chinese is more acute than ever before. Small peoples both within and without the borders of China can only take warning.

ROBERT B. EKVALL.

## Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation

### 1. Foreign Relations

#### *The Russo-Chinese controversy*

The controversy between Moscow and Peking over peaceful co-existence and the inevitability of war, which had begun in April, continued through the third quarter of 1960. It was still carried on without naming the holders of the views condemned, "dogmatists" and "revisionists" being vehemently denounced but their identification with the leaders of the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union respectively being left to inference only. Each side tried to win over other Communist Parties to its own point of view; in particular, the Soviet Union, challenged in its leadership of the Communist bloc by the Chinese criticism, circulated to other parties full texts of Khrushchev's speech at the Rumanian Communist Party Congress at Bucharest in June. Almost all the European parties showed themselves willing to follow the Soviet line; the contest was rather for the allegiance of the Asian parties, and here too both the Mongolian People's Republic and North Korea inclined to the Soviet side.

North Vietnam, on the other hand, initially showed a leaning towards the Chinese position, but in August Ho ChieMinh appears to have paid a visit to Moscow which was intended to remain secret, for it was not reported except, perhaps through some failure of censorship, in the Hungarian Press. Subsequently at the Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party, which was held at Hanoi from September 5 to 10, a line more favourable to the Soviet Union was adopted.<sup>1</sup> At this Congress Mukhitdinov, a member of the Praesidium and Central Committee Secretariat of the Soviet Communist Party, was present as a fraternal delegate, while the Chinese Party was represented by Li Fu-ch'un. Mukhitdinov emphasised the need for a "creative development" of Marxism-Leninism—a reference to Khrushchev's contention that Lenin would have thought differently about war if he had been living in the atomic age—and denounced "dogmatists and sectarians" for their

<sup>1</sup> See article on p. 66 of this issue.

activities in international organisations which were damaging "the interests of the socialist camp." Li Fu-ch'un in his turn denounced "revisionists" who were deserting "the fundamental theoretical positions of Marxism-Leninism," and declared that these could never become out of date. The Vietnamese Communists were able to listen to both these rival expositions of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, but both the Russian and Chinese authorities denied their own peoples the opportunity of hearing or reading the arguments put forward on the other side of the controversy.

The trend of official opinion among external Communist parties was on the whole favourable to the Soviet rather than to the Chinese side of the controversy, but the isolation of the Chinese Communists had not up to the beginning of October had any effect in bringing about a modification of their attitude, and the influence of the Chinese propaganda on other parties could not be judged merely from the line officially taken by their leaders. It could be argued that even where a firm stand was made ideologically against the Chinese criticisms, it was necessary to counter their effects by demonstrations of toughness in policies towards the West, and that this need made Soviet behaviour in the United Nations Assembly and elsewhere more truculent and anti-American than it might otherwise have been.

As the controversy developed, the Chinese more and more adopted the position of being the defenders of the pure Leninist faith, standing squarely on the letter of Lenin's writings, while the Russians claimed the right to modify the doctrine "creatively" in order to adjust it to new conditions. This was held in Moscow to have been done at the Twentieth and Twenty-first Congresses of the C.P.S.U., but the Chinese ignored these Congresses and acknowledged only the authority of the joint Declaration of Twelve Parties issued on the occasion of the celebrations of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution in Moscow in 1957—a declaration which did not contradict, even if it did not entirely endorse, their point of view on the inevitability of war. A weakness of the Chinese position was that this same Declaration affirmed the leadership of the Soviet Union within the Communist bloc—an affirmation which the Chinese had then supported against Polish and Yugoslav opposition—but it could be claimed that this leadership was only to be accepted if it led against the imperialist enemy and would be deprived of justification if it became corrupted by revisionism.

Although the controversy was conducted on a high impersonal level, with the targets of criticism left in anonymity, there were signs that it was causing strong resentments on both sides. There were persistent reports of withdrawals of Russian technicians from China, interpreted as a form of pressure on the Chinese party by Moscow, but it was

impossible to ascertain whether these were really in excess of terminations of contracts of service falling due in any case. On the other hand, there were clear hints on the Russian side that Soviet aid to China was not something to be taken for granted; one Soviet journalist during August asked whether the building of socialism in contemporary conditions could be imagined even in such a country as China "if such a country found itself in isolation and was not relying on the co-operation and mutual help of all other socialist countries."<sup>2</sup>

The Chinese for their part showed their displeasure very plainly by cancelling without excuse or explanation the expected attendance of a large number of representatives from China at the International Congress of Orientalists held in Moscow during August; as a result, the only Chinese present at the Congress were residents outside the mainland of China.<sup>3</sup> There was also a persistent ignoring or belittling in Chinese Communist publicity of the part played by Khrushchev in international affairs, quite apart from his pronouncements on the specific topics of dispute with Peking. Thus his speech of September 23 to the United Nations Assembly was given less prominence in Chinese publicity than that of President Nkrumah of Ghana. A Moscow commentary on this oration declared that "any inhabitant of our planet, anywhere in the world," if asked what was the most important event of our time, would say there was none more important than Khrushchev's speech, but the actual situation was that, while it was given the greatest prominence by non-Chinese Communist propaganda and a substantial coverage by the capitalist Press of Western countries, it remained virtually unknown to the quarter of mankind depending for its news on the Communist authorities of Peking.

### *China and Africa*

The summer of 1960 saw a considerable development of Chinese Communist political activity in Africa. This included the setting-up of branches of the New China News Agency in Conakry, Rabat and Accra, the beaming of an intensive radio propaganda to African countries and invitations to all kinds of extreme nationalist organisations to send delegations to China, where they were entertained with the most lavish hospitality and official honours. Over a period of a year and a half to September 1960 about 100 delegations from Africa had been received in Peking, encouraged to greater efforts for the ending of colonial rule, and warned against any form of compromise or accommodation with the imperialist enemy. Particularly prominent was the support given to the rebel "Provisional Government of Algeria," which Communist China

<sup>2</sup> S. Titarenko in *Soviet Latvia*, August 16, 1960.

<sup>3</sup> See article on p. 114 of this issue.



formally recognised, whereas the Soviet Union—in diplomatic relations with France—did not. Ferhat Abbas, the Prime Minister of this "Government" went to Peking and had an interview with Mao Tse-tung on September 28. According to an account of the interview subsequently published in a Tunis newspaper, Mao promised "total and unconditional aid" to the Algerians in their war against France and told Ferhat Abbas that time was on his side, that Chinese experience showed that an army of partisans was indestructible provided it retained popular support, and that the important thing was to hold out for "real and solid independence" without being drawn into any compromise.<sup>4</sup> The Chinese leader, however, was alleged to have disapproved of the F.L.N.'s reliance on terrorism to suppress other Algerian groups and urged re-education of "traitors" through capture and indoctrination. There was no indication in this account how far Mao made promises of material aid as distinct from moral support and advice, but there were unconfirmed reports from Cairo in October of an agreement for the use of supply dumps in Egypt for the transmission of Chinese arms to the Algerian rebels.

#### *Sino-American relations*

On September 8, the *People's Daily* commented editorially on the 100 meetings that had been held since the Sino-American ambassadorial talks opened on August 1, 1955. The paper stated that the two countries had adopted diametrically opposed attitudes on the three major problems—Formosa, the return of citizens and trade, cultural exchanges and reciprocal visits by correspondents. The Chinese side had seriously attempted to make the talks successful; the American side had merely used them to deceive public opinion as to its designs, it claimed.

In view of Chinese scorn on other occasions for the idea that peaceful co-existence between the two blocs was possible when the imperialists would never abandon their aggressive designs, the paper clearly felt it necessary to justify to Moscow China's persistence at talks it had described as a "failure." The editorial concluded:

In the course of the Sino-American talks, China has all along maintained this firm stand: To conduct negotiations in earnest with the United States and make efforts to reach agreement, but, at the same time, not to entertain any unrealistic illusions about the talks. We have never because of the negotiations with the United States, eased our vigilance against U.S. imperialism, or slackened our struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression and for the liberation of Taiwan. . . .

The Chinese Side is willing to continue the talks if the U.S. Government is still willing to do so. But we must solemnly warn the U.S. Government: If you still have an iota of sincerity about holding talks, you must negotiate in earnest. Otherwise you will not be able to escape

<sup>4</sup> See the *London Observer*, Oct. 30, 1960.

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the denunciation of the world's people, which will put you more and more on the defensive.

Five days later the Foreign Ministry issued a statement in reply to the American one of September 8 on the question of exchange of correspondents.<sup>5</sup> The Chinese refusal to accept the American draft agreement on this question apparently turned on: (i) the fact that statements on the subject would be issued separately rather than one issued jointly, the Chinese alleging that this procedure had allowed America to renege in the case of the return of civilians; and (ii) the reference in the American statement to the fact that it would be subject to the Constitution and applicable laws, a clause which, the Chinese alleged, left the Americans a loophole for getting out of the agreement. The Chinese draft counter-proposal stated in the preamble that the agreement was a first step towards discussing the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan.

#### *The American election*

The Chinese view of the American election was simple and unchanging. "Observer" in the *People's Daily* on August 1 began his article with a 50-year-old quotation from Lenin: "The two bourgeois parties deceive the people and divert their attention from their vital interests by means of a spectacular and empty duel." Asserting that time had not lessened the truth of the comment on the "U.S. presidential election farce," "Observer" pointed to the statements of the two candidates on defence matters and Communism as the main evidence for his case that whoever was elected the "U.S. monopolist groups will not abandon their policies of aggression and war. . . ."

#### *Contacts with Japan*

Liu Ning-yi, Chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, led a delegation to Japan at the end of July to attend the fifteenth convention of SOHYO (the Japanese trade union movement) and the sixth world conference against nuclear weapons. During his stay, which lasted two weeks until August 11, Liu detailed the three principles on the basis of which Sino-Japanese relations could be improved. These were: (1) The Japanese Government should refrain from pursuing a policy hostile to China; (2) The Japanese Government should refrain from taking part in the U.S. plot to create "two Chinas"; (3) The Japanese Government should refrain from obstructing and sabotaging the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations.<sup>6</sup>

These three principles were confirmed by Chou En-lai in a statement handed to Kazuo Suzuki, Managing Director of the Japan-China Trade

<sup>5</sup> *Peking Review*, No. 37.

<sup>6</sup> *Peking Review*, No. 33.

Promotion Association, on August 27 but not published till September 10 when the Premier received Shichiro Hozumi, Chairman of the Special Committee of the Japanese Socialist Party for the Protection of the Constitution, and two leading officials of the Japan-China Friendship Association.

In his discussions with Kazuo Suzuki, Chou En-lai also detailed three principles on the basis of which Sino-Japanese trade might be removed. They were: (1) *Government agreement, i.e.*, all agreements must from henceforth be on a governmental level since the Japanese Government would not guarantee private contracts; (2) *Private contracts* might still be concluded, however, on a short term basis whenever conditions were "mature"; (3) In *special cases* where Japanese workers were dependent on Chinese raw materials trade would be continued and might be expanded.<sup>7</sup>

While in Peking, the two Friendship Association officials signed (on September 18) a statement on cultural exchanges which envisaged the holding of various Chinese exhibitions in Japan and the exchange of films and goodwill delegations. This represented a continuation of established policy. Twelve Japanese delegations visited Peking for the October 1 National Day celebrations and issued a joint statement with their Chinese opposite numbers calling for peaceful co-existence, the banning of nuclear weapons and the abolition of the Japan-America treaty.<sup>8</sup>

### *China and Cuba*

China's keen diplomatic activity in Cuba bore fruit on September 28 when the two countries announced that they would establish diplomatic relations. Cuba is the only Latin American country to have recognised the Communist régime.

Prior to this event, a number of Chinese delegations had been visiting Cuba. A trade delegation headed by Lu Hsu-chang, Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade, signed an agreement on trade and payments and another on scientific and technical co-operation on July 23. Under the former China will purchase 500,000 tons of sugar every year for five years. For the first year, Cuba will receive 20 per cent. of the value of the sugar in pounds sterling. The remaining 80 per cent., together with the value of other Cuban goods exported to China, will be paid for in the form of goods. After the first year all Chinese payment will be in the form of goods. The list of Chinese goods ranges from machine tools to rice, edible oil and clothes.<sup>9</sup> Already two contracts totalling £13

<sup>7</sup> *Peking Review*, No. 37.

<sup>8</sup> *Peking Review*, No. 41.

<sup>9</sup> *Peking Review*, No. 31.

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million have been signed. They provide for the sale of 100,000 tons of Chinese rice to Cuba and 350,000 tons of Cuban sugar to China.<sup>10</sup>

Chinese youth delegations have also visited Cuba and there was a representative of the Communist Party's central committee at the Cuban People's Socialist Party Congress in August. (The representative was Wu Hsiu-chuan who led the Chinese delegation to the U.N. in 1950 and was until recently ambassador in Belgrade.)

#### *China and Burma*

The Sino-Japanese joint boundary commission (see *Quarterly Chronicle* in Issue Two) met for the second time from July 25 to August 1 in Peking, then again in Rangoon from August 25 to September 4 and finally for a fourth time in Peking later in September. On September 24, the two Governments announced that Premier U Nu and General Ne Win, Chief of Staff (who, as Premier had signed in January the agreement initiating the boundary discussions), would go to Peking for China's October 1 National Day celebrations when the two Governments would sign a border treaty. The main feature of the treaty (which will be discussed in an article on Sino-Burmese relations by Dr. Shen-yu Dai in the next issue of this journal) was the cession of the three Kachin villages of Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang and the surrounding area (about 59 square miles) and the "areas under the jurisdiction of the Panhung and Panlao tribes" in the Wa states (about 73 square miles) by Burma in exchange for China's cession of the Namwan Assigned Tract (about 85 square miles).<sup>11</sup>

#### *China and Afghanistan*

Marshal Ch'en Yi, Foreign Minister, paid a six-day visit to Afghanistan from August 21 to August 27, the first senior Chinese official to go there since Chou En-lai included Kabul on his Asian goodwill tour in January 1957. During Marshal Ch'en's visit the two countries signed a treaty of "friendship and mutual non-aggression" (on August 26) clearly designed like the recent Burmese and Nepalese treaties to salvage something of China's Bandung reputation. The communiqué issued at the end of the visit revealed that King Mohammed Zahir Shah had accepted an invitation to visit China. (Premier Daud visited Peking in October 1957 and Deputy Premier Naim followed him in September 1959.)

The two countries also renewed their exchange of goods and payments agreement. To judge by the 1957-58 figures this will not be of great

<sup>10</sup> *Peking Review*, No. 33.

<sup>11</sup> The text of the treaty was published in the *Peking Review*, No. 40.

importance. China exported about £66,000 and imported about £100 worth of goods from Afghanistan during that period.

### *China and Nepal*

The joint Sino-Nepalese Boundary Commission envisaged under the boundary agreement concluded in April during Chou En-lai's visit (see *Quarterly Chronicle* in last issue) was set up on August 11 in Katmandu. In the meanwhile, Mr. Chou had apologised for the deaths of the Nepalese soldiers in the frontier clash (see *Quarterly Chronicle* in last issue) and had paid compensation, but reports still came of Chinese troop concentrations across the border.

## **2. Internal Political and Economic Developments**

### *Economic Policy*

In an article in *Red Flag*, No. 16, 1960, Li Fu-ch'un, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, gave a general survey of the national economic scene on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Politburo session which launched the commune movement and the frenzied "leap forward" of the latter months of 1958. His article, like that of Liao Lu-yen (see *Agriculture*), points up the change of attitude that has taken place among the planners in Peking since those hectic days.

Skyrocketing enthusiasm must be combined with scientific analysis so as to allow of planned and proportional development on a "forward-looking yet reliable basis"; targets, while demanding vigorous efforts, must be "realistic and leave an appropriate margin for unforeseen circumstances"; the country should not undertake too many projects at a time.

Li made six main points for future policy: (i) adherence to the new policy of simultaneously developing agriculture and industry; (ii) simultaneous development of big and modern, and small and local enterprises; (iii) development of a diversified economy with multiple use of resources; (iv) promotion of the initiative and creativity of the masses in the sphere of technical innovations; (v) realistic targets; (vi) reliance on "our own efforts" ("We should do what we can in seeking aid from abroad for our socialist construction, but the Party is consistently of the opinion that we must rely mainly on our own efforts. This was so in the past and will be even more so in the future").

### *Agriculture*

Natural calamities have been worse this year than last. Even before the end of August, the *People's Daily* was declaring that 600 million *mow* (40 million hectares) had suffered from flood or drought compared with

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500 million *mow* in 1959 which was an exceptionally bad year.<sup>12</sup> This figure represented 37.5 per cent. of the total cultivated acreage recently officially estimated at 1,600 million *mow* (106.66 million hectares).<sup>13</sup> On October 1, the *People's Daily* raised the percentage to over 60.

There was a protracted dry spell in the main wheat provinces of Hopei, Honan, Shantung and Shansi where there was no adequate rain for a 200-day period. The whole process from sowing to harvesting was described as a succession of fights against the most serious droughts in decades. In view of these conditions, the *People's Daily* declared that it would be a big victory if the summer harvest were the same as or a little bigger or smaller than that of 1959.<sup>14</sup>

In other areas, floods have caused heavy damage. A typhoon followed by rainstorms inundated villages and fields in Liaoning at the end of July and disrupted rail traffic.<sup>15</sup> In Kwangtung, the People's Council transferred parts of the labour force to agriculture because of the "heavy damage" caused by floods and typhoons<sup>16</sup> and this province and Kwangsi had to initiate crash planting programmes in early July.<sup>17</sup> In Fukien soldiers were deployed as a "crash force" to assist the peasants combat floods.<sup>18</sup> On August 1, the *People's Daily* emphasised editorially the need for redoubled efforts in the transplanting of late rice because the heavy rainfall and low temperatures had reduced the growing period in some areas. But despite these and other reports, the Minister of Agriculture, Liao Lu-yen, was optimistic enough to write in September: "The yield of summer crops this year is in the main on a par with last year's production level; the autumn crops this year, with the exception of some areas hit by natural calamities, are growing quite well and a bumper harvest is in sight."<sup>19</sup>

Liao Lu-yen's article is worth quoting at length (see below) because it offers a comprehensive justification of the new policy of "taking agriculture as the foundation and industry as the dominant factor" of which the most striking feature is the decision to press rapidly ahead with the mechanisation of agriculture. It also shows, with its admission that the achievement of high yields on more than just a few experimental

<sup>12</sup> Editorial, August 25.

<sup>13</sup> Article by Yang Ling, *People's Daily*, September 19. Other figures released in the same article were: additional area that can be brought under cultivation—1,000 million *mow* (66.66 million hectares); forest land—1,000 million *mow*; grassland—4,000 million *mow* (266.66 million hectares); denuded hill country—4,000 million *mow*; inland water—300 million *mow* (20 million hectares); sea fishing grounds—2,000 million *mow* (133.33 million hectares).

<sup>14</sup> Editorial, July 31.

<sup>15</sup> NCNA, August 7.

<sup>16</sup> Peking Radio, July 8. Quoted in the B.B.C.'s *Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB)*, Part 3, FE/W66.

<sup>17</sup> Peking Radio, July 17, 18, quoted in *SWB*, Part 3, FE/W67.

<sup>18</sup> Foochow Radio, July 16, quoted in *SWB*, Part 3, FE/W67.

<sup>19</sup> *Red Flag*, No. 17, 1960.

plots is a process that must take some time, how the planners in Peking have had to adopt a far more realistic attitude towards the prospects of rapidly increasing agricultural outputs than they did during the euphoria of the early months of the "big leap forward" in 1958.

### *The "Two-Five System"*

The régime is popularising a new method of implementing the "mass line," of getting rural officials out of their offices to do manual labour. Under the "Two-Five System," cadres spend two days a week on meetings, inspections and political studies and the other five actually in the fields. During these five days, the cadres spend the early mornings inspecting work, the bulk of the day in manual labour, and the evenings helping production team leaders plan the following day's schedule.

### **Documentation: Taking Agriculture as the Foundation**

Agriculture is the foundation of the national economy. Taking agriculture as the foundation and industry as the dominant factor and integrating priority for the development of heavy industry with the speedy development of agriculture is a fundamental policy for socialist construction put forward by Comrade Mao Tse-tung on the basis of China's experience in construction. It is a highly important, creative development made by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in Marxist-Leninist political economy. This policy is playing a great guiding role in the practice of socialist construction in our country.

Socialist industry is undoubtedly the leading force in the national economy. But industry cannot develop in isolation. This is especially true in the case of such a socialist country as ours with a rural population of more than 500 million, which, in a sense, cannot possibly develop industry without developing agriculture. . . .

The development of industry necessitates, first of all, an increase in the labour power engaged in industrial production. It also requires a corresponding increase in labour power in communications, transport and commerce. In 1957, the last year of the First Five-Year Plan, the number of workers and employees in the country was three times as many as in 1949; in 1958 and 1959, the first two years of the big leap forward, it again increased by more than 85 per cent. as compared with 1957. Most of the new workers and employees came from the countryside. But for the rapid growth of agriculture and the rise in its labour productivity resulting from the realisation of agricultural co-operation and the further establishment of the rural people's communes, it would be impossible to transfer such a huge labour power from the rural areas to industrial production.

Along with the development of industry, the population in the cities and industrial and mining areas has increased, the consumption of grain for industrial use and by the city inhabitants has also increased and so has the demand for marketable grain. The amount of grain to be supplied to the cities in 1960 is estimated to be nearly twice as much as in 1953, the first year of the First Five-Year Plan for socialist economic construction. At the same time, in consequence of the increase in the production of industrial crops, the amount of grain supplied to the peasants of the areas which mainly grow such crops has also increased. It would be impossible to meet such



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a rapid and substantial increase in the demand for marketable grain if there were not a correspondingly large increase in agricultural production, particularly in grain production.

The constant expansion of industrial production calls for a constant increase in the supply of raw materials. Light industry mainly uses agricultural produce as its raw materials. In our country, industries using agricultural produce as their raw materials now roughly account for more than one-third of the gross value of industrial output and for more than four-fifths of the value of the output of industrial consumer goods. A rich or poor harvest in agriculture has a very great and direct effect on industrial production. Whenever agriculture enjoys a rich harvest, the rate of increase of industrial production in the same or the following year will be relatively greater. On the other hand, if the rate of increase of agricultural output is smaller, the rate of increase of industrial output in the same or the following year will also be smaller.

The existence of a home market is a most important condition for the growth of socialist industry. Socialist industry takes the home market as the prerequisite for its growth. But saying this, of course, does not mean that there is no need for foreign trade. With the rural population constituting 80 per cent. of the nation's population, the vast countryside provides the main, and an extremely broad, market for the growth of light and heavy industry. . . .

At present, in our country, about two-thirds of the industrial goods used as means of consumption go to the countryside. . . . The facts of the last few years also show that the power of the countryside to purchase industrial goods, especially light industrial goods which are used as means of consumption, is directly affected by a rich or poor harvest in agricultural production. . . .

To develop industry, heavy industry in particular, huge amounts of funds must be accumulated. Agriculture is one of the main sources of accumulation of funds by the state. Funds directly accumulated in the form of agricultural tax constitute a very small part of the financial revenues of this country. But of the state income handed in by the industrial, communications and trade departments in the forms of tax and profit quite a large sum is derived from the processing, transport and sale of farm produce. At present, about half of the nation's financial revenue is related, directly or indirectly, to farm produce. Light industry is an important source of the accumulation of funds and the raw materials it needs are provided mainly by agriculture. . . .

Ours is a country where industry is not well developed; during its socialist construction, it needs to import a certain amount of machinery and equipment which it cannot produce as yet or its output of which still fails to meet the demand. In order to import we have to export. In 1959, China's total exports nearly quadrupled compared with 1950. Of the exports more than 70 per cent. were farm produce or processed farm produce. . . .

In short, whether from the angle of labour power, food grains, raw materials, markets, funds or foreign trade, without a high-speed development of agriculture in our country, there can be no high-speed industrial development.

The policy of making agriculture the foundation fully conforms to the

policy of making industry the dominant factor. The high-speed development of agriculture calls for a large amount of agricultural machinery, chemical fertiliser and other industrial goods to be provided by industry. Only when industry develops with steel as the key lever is it possible to lay the material foundation for the technical transformation of agriculture. . . .

While agriculture is the foundation of the national economy, grain must be made the key lever in agricultural development. It is the basis of the growth of the various branches of agriculture. The livelihood of the people is in the main secured if grain production grows. The average annual rate of increase in China's grain output for the last ten years has reached 9.6 per cent., surpassing that in all capitalist countries; as far as the total amount of grain output is concerned, China has the biggest grain output of any country in the world. But its per capita grain output is still comparatively low. At the same time, as the national economy grows and the people's living standard goes up, the need in both city and countryside for grain will increase constantly. If we can raise our grain output by another 100 per cent. or so in the next ten years, then there will be a radical change in the comparatively low per capita grain output. We must do our best to achieve this end. . . .

If grain yields make no bigger progress, it will be impossible to increase substantially the amount of grain for feeding animals and it will also be difficult to grow fodder crops on a greater acreage of land. . . .

In order the better to implement the policy of taking agriculture as the foundation and rapidly develop grain production and a diversified rural economy, we must fully comprehend the characteristics of agricultural production, have a firm grasp of the laws of agricultural production and adopt various effective measures for increasing output.

Agricultural production is different from industrial production. In the growing of crops we are dealing with plants and in livestock breeding we are dealing with animals. Plants and animals are animate. This is a characteristic which marks the fundamental difference between agriculture and industry. People can and should take positive and appropriate measures to promote the growth and development of crops and livestock in accordance with the laws of their growth and development. But the factors affecting their growth and development are complicated and many-sided. Some still cannot be controlled, or fully controlled, by man; others have not yet been understood or fully understood. Engaging in agricultural production is therefore a complicated and arduous task.

Agricultural production is to a large degree subject to natural conditions and this brings instability to it. Of course, natural conditions can be transformed. The building of water conservancy works, soil amelioration, afforestation, etc., are all effective means of transforming natural conditions. In the ten years since the founding of the People's Republic of China we have achieved tremendous successes in this regard. However, to effect complete control over nature is, after all, not something that can be accomplished in a short space of time. . . .

Agricultural production in our country is still done almost entirely by manual labour. Most of the semi-mechanised farm implements are also operated by animal traction and manpower. . . . The present task is to equip the people's communes with modern farm machines so as to carry

#### QUARTERLY CHRONICLE AND DOCUMENTATION

through the mechanisation and modernisation of our agriculture. This is the fundamental way out for agriculture.

The switch over to the people's communes and the level already attained in our country's industrialisation have prepared the necessary conditions for the mechanisation of agriculture. We are now striving to bring about the mechanisation of agriculture in accordance with the policy put forward by Comrade Mao Tse-tung to "achieve a minor solution in four years, an intermediate solution in seven years and a major solution in ten years." This task will certainly be fulfilled and can be fulfilled ahead of schedule. . . . The areas cultivated by farm machines in 1959 constituted only about 5 per cent. of the country's cultivated land. We still have only a very small amount of chemical fertilisers; reliance has to be placed mainly on farm manure and the accumulation and transportation of manure is still done by manual labour. This places certain limitations on the rapid rise of labour productivity in agriculture.

In agriculture, the popularisation of advanced experience is a complicated thing. Since the big leap forward, a great deal of advanced experience and typical examples of high yields have been created on the agricultural front and these must be popularised energetically. Nevertheless, popularisation of advanced experience on an extensive scale, and raising the output of ordinary fields to that of high-yield fields invariably demands a whole process of work. The transition from the typical to the general must go through a process—this is the general rule of the development of objective things. In agriculture, the process of proceeding from the typical to the general usually takes a longer time. This is because farm crops are animate things, and the characteristics of their different varieties differ from one another. Besides, agricultural production is still controlled to a large extent by natural conditions, which vary from season to season and from place to place. There are great differences in the nature of soil and various agricultural regions also differ vastly from one another. Agricultural production is now in the main done by manual labour; even under the same conditions, it is difficult to lay down completely identical rules of operation. All advanced experience must be experimented with successfully before it can be popularised for use. Experimentation and popularisation of advanced experiences in agriculture is even more complicated, and takes longer time. The experience of cotton growing in the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, for instance, cannot be mechanically applied in the Yangtse River valley. The successful experience gained in the cultivation of early rice is not necessarily applicable to late rice, etc. . . .

We must muster all those who can possibly be spared both inside and outside the people's communes to strengthen the agricultural front and reinforce the manpower engaged in field work. . . . All other undertakings, with the exception of the few where production has to be maintained all the year round, must be geared in with the farming seasons—do more work in the slack seasons, and less in the busy seasons, suspend work in the busiest season, do farm work when there is plenty of such work, and resume work when there is not much farm work—so as to make fuller use of the labour power in the countryside. . . .

We must stick to three-level ownership based on ownership vested in the production brigade, and prepare conditions for the transition from ownership mainly vested in the brigade to ownership mainly vested in the

people's commune by developing commune-owned economy in the course of the common development of the economy of the organisational units of the people's commune at all three levels. As to when the transition will take place, it will be decided after 1965 in the light of the conditions then prevailing. . . .

[Liao Lu-yen in *Red Flag*, No. 17, 1960, from the abridged translation in the *Peking Review*, No. 37, 1960.]

### *Mao's Writings*

The National Day celebrations of October 1 were made the occasion for the publication of the fourth volume of Mao Tse-tung's selected works. It includes seventy articles of the period August 1945–September 1949, thirty-five of which are said to have been made public for the first time.<sup>20</sup> In an article on the volume written for *Red Flag*, No. 19, Marshal Lin Piao, Defence Minister and a member of the Communist Party's Politburo's Standing Committee, made several points clearly formulated with both eyes on the current Sino-Soviet dispute. The main ones were that the Chinese Communists had never shown credulity towards the peace offers of the Kuomintang (for Kuomintang read Americans); that given correct leadership and by fighting hard, the revolutionary forces were bound to triumph eventually "no matter how strong the enemy or how frightful the weapons in his hand"; that though revolutionaries might hope for peaceful revolution, the reactionaries would always be the first to resort to force. In his historical survey of the civil war, Marshal Lin appeared to want to show up the Soviet position of the time in a poor light. He asserted that in 1946 the Communist armies "had no foreign aid" and made no reference to Soviet handing over of Japanese weapons, and added that some "well-intentioned friends at home and abroad were also worried about us." (In his biography of Tito, Dedijer relates that Stalin told the Yugoslav Communists how Mao rejected his advice to seek an accommodation with the Nationalists.)

<sup>20</sup> The book will be reviewed in a forthcoming issue.

## CONTRIBUTORS

### CONTRIBUTORS

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